

# **The Public Order Policing of Community-Based Events**

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## **Abstract**

This thesis offers an exploratory investigation of public order policing in the context of events that are staged for members of different types of communities. The research utilises a qualitative case study methodology that combines observational fieldwork conducted during the planning and staging of four events with the interviewing of 27 participants involved in this process. Relative to other public order contexts (e.g. political protest, industrial disputes, community disorder), academic research on the type of ‘community-based’ events that formed the basis of the field research is lacking. The presented empirical findings reveal that a number of micro, meso and macro factors impacted on the prospects for safety and order at the observed events. An evaluation of existing public order related analytic accounts highlight both opportunities and limitations in explaining these factors. In response, an analytic framework is developed which employs Pierre Bourdieu’s concepts of the habitus and the field. This reveals that the prospects for safety and order are enhanced when the police and organisers are engaged in close working practices which increase trust, cohesive decision-making, communication and consistency. The resulting policy implications are intended as ‘good practice’ guidance for both the police and organisers in relation to planning and staging community-based events, and identifying potential ‘beyond the event’ benefits. Although this thesis is exploratory and care is required in making generalisations, future research could determine whether the presented analytic framework and the policy implications are applicable to other public order contexts.

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# **Chapter One: Introduction**

## **1. Thesis Introduction and Structure**

Public order policing has attracted considerable interest from the academic community. This is not surprising given that it represents an important and at times controversial component of police work (P.A.J Waddington, 2001). The majority of this academic interest has been focussed on contexts that broadly encompass the policing of protest / industrial disputes and forms of community / festival disorder (King and Brearley, 1996). In contrast, the general aim of this thesis is to explore public order policing from a different and under-researched perspective. To provide appropriate context, it is pertinent to quote an inter-faith advisor writing two days after an outbreak of significant community disorder in Bradford during the summer of 2001:

‘Where were the cameras last weekend when 130,000 people of all cultures enjoyed a trouble-free Mela – an Asian part of Bradford’s popular annual festival?’<sup>1</sup>

This quote laments the lack of media interest in a large and orderly event that occurred almost simultaneously with the disorder in the same city. Following this incidence of community disorder, the government granted considerable attention and resources to understanding two issues: what happened and how could it be prevented in the future (Cantle, 2001; Ousley, 2001; Community Cohesion Unit, 2002)? In comparison, the Mela event attracted no national media attention apart from the quote above.

From an academic perspective, Benewick and Holton (1987) argue that there is potentially much to be gained by understanding the processes associated with the ‘peaceful’ crowd. However, it is a perspective that has received little academic attention. One possible reason for this is presented by Reicher, Stott, Cronin and Adang (2004, p558) who argue that “‘No Riot at Demonstration’ is hardly a news

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<sup>1</sup> *The Independent*, 9<sup>th</sup> July 2001.

headline'. By implication, an orderly public event presents fewer opportunities for the academic or policy maker compared to the more pressing demands of accounting for and responding to disorder. P.A.J Waddington (1994a) presents an impressive analysis of why order is maintained during the majority of public order operations but this work predominantly focuses on political protest and industrial dispute. In addition, P.A.J Waddington (1994a, p208) states that 'my research is distinctly skewed towards the more problematic operations and under-represents "nothing jobs"'. Therefore, a gap exists to generate greater understanding of public order policing that culminates in safe and orderly events and is conducted in a different context to political protest / industrial dispute and community disorder.

This thesis aims to address this gap by presenting an exploratory analysis of public order policing that accompanies the planning and staging of 'community-based events'. In broad terms, these types of events are arranged for members of a community and occur on a regular and predictable basis (i.e. at publicly-announced times). Four such events represent the basis of qualitative observational fieldwork and interviewing that informs this current research. These include a Solstice celebration, a Gay Pride festival, a Mela festival and a Multicultural Festival. Although taking different forms and sharing varied histories, each of these events is characterised by a planning process involving the police and a diverse array of organisers that culminates in an ultimately safe and orderly staging process.<sup>2</sup> The thesis will outline both the practice that is associated with these planning and staging processes, and present an explanatory analytic account to further understanding of this particular public order perspective.

To achieve this, the remainder of the thesis is divided into eight chapters. **Chapter two** presents an overview of public order policing and social research. This allows for an evaluation of the relevant literature and policy relating to public order policing. The chapter starts by addressing the ambiguities that are associated with defining and conceptualising 'public order'. This is followed by consideration of

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<sup>2</sup> This work predated the terrorist attacks that occurred in London, July 2005. Despite this, it is important to note that these attacks could impact on future public order policing (e.g. resourcing officers to police events, possible challenges to freedom of expression). This demonstrates the continually evolving political / social context in which public order policing operates.

the different contexts in which public order policing is practiced and the exploration of a variety of analytic perspectives that attempt to account for it. Finally, there is discussion of contemporary policy for the police and organisers in relation to the planning and staging of public events. The issues that are raised in chapter two both inform the subsequent analysis and allow for the identification of gaps in knowledge. The chapter ends with five specific research aims for this thesis.

**Chapter three** outlines methodological considerations in relation to the thesis. This includes a summary of the origins and context of the research topic through the Collaborative Awards in Science and Engineering (CASE) PhD structure and rationale. Within this there is acknowledgement of the guiding role that the CASE Proposal had on the research process and an overview of the National Crime and Operations Faculty (NCOF) which provided financial and logistical support. The chapter also explains the employment of a qualitative research strategy and reflects on the use of observational and interviewing techniques in the field. The chapter concludes by addressing methodological criticisms associated with general public order policing research and outlining the analytic framework that accompanied the fieldwork process.

The next four chapters present the empirical findings that originate from the fieldwork. This process starts with a case study analysis of the four observed events which is presented in **chapter four**. This exercise allows for the identification of important contextual information and this leads to the demarcation of both differences and commonalities across the four events. This process also outlines areas for further thematic analysis. **Chapter five** focuses specifically on the planning processes associated with the four observed events. This starts with the exploration of ‘event safety’ as a uniting function for the police and organisers. Following from this, consideration is given to how each planning group identified and responded to a variety of threats to safety, order or the event future. The chapter ends by briefly considering these findings in light of partnership working in other policing contexts (e.g. community safety and crime reduction). **Chapter six** considers how the police and organisers worked together during the staging of the observed events. This includes an analysis of policing

operations and the identification of different police / organiser event management strategies. There is also reflection on the role of private security personnel and stewards in relation to order maintenance and crime prevention. **Chapter seven** concludes the empirical phase of the thesis by engaging with the ‘post-event’ issues associated with the observed events. The chapter presents a number of processes that impact upon the prospects for order and safety at future events. It also opens up the possibility of good practice avenues that can enhance safety and order in this, and other, public order contexts.

**Chapter eight** explores the empirical findings within a theoretical context. A holistic model is presented that identifies the relevant processes that are associated with maintaining safety and order at the observed events. This is followed by consideration of the model in relation to the public order related analytic perspectives highlighted in chapter two, resulting in both theoretical opportunities and limitations for understanding the empirical findings. The chapter concludes by developing an alternative theoretical framework to account for the public order policing of community-based events by drawing on the work of the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu.

The thesis concludes with **chapter nine** which reflects on a number of policy implications that are rooted in the empirical research. These include the identification of good practice for the planning and staging of community-based events and other policing contexts. The chapter also speculates on how these good practice recommendations might be implemented into other public order contexts. Future research avenues are also considered in addition to these policy implications. The chapter ends with the thesis conclusions. The specific research aims presented in chapter two will be evaluated in relation to the empirical findings, theorising and policy implications. This allows for speculation on the policy and academic prospects in relation to contemporary and future public order policing.

# **Chapter Two: Public Order Policing and Social Research**

## **1. Introduction**

Barton and James (2003) have observed that a characteristic of contemporary Britain is a growth in the staging of special events and festivals that require a public order policing response. The aim of this thesis is to explore the policing of such events through an analysis of the planning and staging of a Gay Pride festival, a Mela, a Multicultural Festival and a Solstice celebration from the perspective of organisers and the police.<sup>1</sup> To place this research into context, this chapter will review the literature pertaining to public order policing in general. This presents an opportunity to identify characteristics from existing research and policy literature that can reveal gaps in our understanding of public order policing and inform the analysis presented in later chapters.

This chapter will start by defining and conceptualising public order policing which requires consideration of issues that relate to more general police related research findings. Consideration will then be given to the diverse contexts in which public order policing is practised. This will be followed by presenting a series of analytic accounts that aim to garner greater explanatory understanding of public order policing. In light of the findings from these sections, there will then be reflection on contemporary policy for both the police and organisers in relation to staging public events. Finally, the chapter will present a set of research aims to be pursued as the thesis develops that are based on gaps in the literature on public order policing when applied to community-based events.

## **2. Making Sense of Public Order Policing**

It is logical to begin this chapter by analysing what is meant by the term 'public order policing'. P.A.J Waddington (2003, p394) suggests that the phrase evokes 'an image of riot-clad officers engaged in forceful confrontation with political dissidents, pickets and those engaged in "community disorders"'. However, the

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<sup>1</sup> The rationale behind the choice of these events is explored in the methodology chapter (chapter three) whilst the characteristics that determine these four events as being 'community-based' – and differentiate them from other public order policing contexts – are explored in detail in chapter four.

reality of research findings concerning public order policing reveals that it is characterised by a lack of arrests and / or disorder and underenforcement of public order legislation (e.g. P.A.J Waddington, 1994a; della Porta and Reiter, 1998). Therefore, rather than purely a police response to disorder, it is important to note that the subject area is conceptually ambiguous: 'the term "public order" gives a superficial coherence to a particularly broad range of circumstances and situations' (Newburn, 2003, p284). Before considering this 'broad range' in more detail, the remainder of this section will identify a degree of conceptual clarity to what public order policing encapsulates.

It is first worth acknowledging that public order policing is associated with the category of 'order maintenance' and that this differentiates it from other forms of police work such as criminal investigation and emergency service (P.A.J Waddington, 1999a; Bowling and Foster, 2002).<sup>2</sup> However, Reiner (2000a, p114) notes that in itself, the concept of order maintenance as a facet of police work is problematic in terms of 'definition, equity and accountability'. Broadly speaking, order maintenance encompasses those aspects of police work that are characterised as being *non-enforcement* oriented. For example, Bayley (1994) notes that the majority of police patrol work is spent either restoring order (e.g. dealing with a troublesome drunk in a bar) or providing a service (e.g. what Bayley refers to as 'cats-in-a-tree' situations) and that arrests (i.e. enforcement of the law) are a rarity. In addition, this is a trend that is consistently found across different policing jurisdictions around the world (Bayley, 1994) and has been mirrored over time through empirical research concerned with the apportionment of police time (Punch and Naylor, 1973; PA Consulting Group, 2001). Although Reiner (2000a) notes definitional difficulties in attempting to group these non-enforcement tasks into discrete categories, it is possible to identify a *distinctive* function through the order maintenance conceptualisation that underpins all police work.

Bittner (1974) argues that the police respond and intervene in a diversity of situations. The *type* of situation is not important; it is the fact that 'the policeman,

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<sup>2</sup> The 'realisation' that police work encompassed more than simply law enforcement is attributed to the classic work of Banton (1964) which represented a watershed in terms of police research (Reiner, 2000b). For a detailed overview of the role of the police in terms of their aims and objectives, see HMIC (1999).

and the policeman alone, is equipped, entitled, and required to deal with every exigency in which force may have to be used, to meet it' (Bittner, 1974, p35). Therefore, in any encounter with the public, there is the *potential* for coercive force or arrest – which is sanctioned by the state – to be employed even though it is rarely invoked. It is this underlying characteristic of the police function that unites every conceivable situation where the police are called upon to intervene. P.A.J Waddington (1999a) expands upon the work of Bittner and argues that, in addition to holding the potential to use this authority as state sanctioned monopolists of force, the police *exercise* symbolic authority (i.e. the authority of the state) through everything they do, even if they are not specifically intervening in a situation.

Therefore, in relation to order maintenance and, by default, public order policing, a crucial question in this research relates to Reiner's (2000a) concerns regarding equity and accountability: what form of 'order' is being maintained and through what mechanisms is this being achieved? It must first be acknowledged that the concept of 'order' is difficult to define and conceptualise (Wrong 1994; Reiner, 1999). However, useful guidance comes from Marenin (1982) who differentiates between two different forms of order that link the state with the police: 'general order' and 'specific order'. The former relates to the state's responsibility to facilitate public tranquillity and safety whilst the latter relates to the preservation of prevailing political interests and / or institutions (i.e. the state). Marenin argues that these two forms of order are a necessity if any form of state is to function. Walker (2000, p6) notes that the police hold a position within the state that requires them to maintain *both* forms of order and that this in turn creates a paradoxical position:

'In a nutshell, it is the capacity of the police to use force and their complex dual mandate which marks them out as indispensable to the protection of institutions and interests endorsed by the constitutional order; yet it is these same attributes which makes them more liable than any other agency within the executive branch of the state to endanger or corrupt that order.'



Walker's argument is that the police are both *guardians* and *threats* to general and specific forms of order. For example, within the context of general order it is both important and a requirement that safety and tranquillity is offered to all sections of society. This is compromised if the police deal inconsistently with different sections of society. Likewise, there are potential tensions if the interests of specific order clash with the interests of the wider general order. Finally, the police present a threat to specific order if they represent sectionalised interests (including themselves) which in turn may hold the potential to undermine the state. Walker (2000) concludes that resolving this paradox relies on the state being able to both constrain and enable the police. The mechanism for achieving this lies in police governance (i.e. the regulatory powers of the state).

Before focussing specifically on public order policing, it is important to highlight ambiguities that exist at both an individual and organisational level within the police. This is important as these ambiguities have implications for accountability and regulation in relation to both general and specific forms of order. Starting at an individual level, it has been previously noted that a characteristic of police work (including public order policing) is that the law is typically under-enforced. The mechanism for deciding when 'coercive force' is to be sanctioned is therefore rooted in *discretion*. To understand this concept, it is useful to draw on the work of Manning (1977) who argues that the police mandate presents a number of contradictions. Manning's argument is that, a) the law is deficient as a resource to guide police work, b) police work is therefore bound by 'practical decision making' which is influenced by factors *in addition* to the law and that, c) the law, when enforced, is directed disproportionately against different sections of society.

Starting with the first point, Lustgarten (1986, p10) argues that 'the police are guided by virtually no legal standards at all... they act within an almost infinite range of lawful possibilities'. Where order has been breached (e.g. a fight on a street), the police officer(s) attending may decide to arrest all participants potentially invoking a variety of public order / assault charges or they may arrest some but not all of the participants. Alternatively, they may resolve the dispute through negotiation and not invoke the law at any stage of the incident. This is particularly pertinent to public order related legislation: Reiner (1999) argues that

it is often vague and subjective, rendering it an ‘all purpose resource’ for a wide range of situations.<sup>3</sup>

Given that the law is lacking as a resource to guide police work, it is important to consider the second and third points raised by Manning (1977). Firstly, ‘practical decision making’ in the context of discretion is most common at the lowest level of the police organisation and occurs in conditions of ‘low visibility’ where the actions of officers are hidden from regulation in the form of supervisors and other agencies (Goldstein, 1960). Within this context, and in relation to the majority of incidents, a number of factors in addition to the law will influence the use of discretion such as the seriousness of the incident and weighing up the pros and cons in terms of the costs in potentially invoking the law (Lustgarten, 1986). However, there are other factors that, within the conditions of ‘low visibility’ (the fact there is no direct supervision of much patrol work), undermine the order maintenance function in the context of general order:

‘The “common sense” which tempers full enforcement may readily become a cloak for conscious or unconscious discrimination on the basis of political opinion, personal appearance, demeanour, social status or race. Under-enforcement becomes selective enforcement.’  
(Lustgarten, 1986, p15)

Reiner (2000a) suggests that individuals from groups such as ethnic minorities, gays, and the unemployed constitute examples of ‘police property’.<sup>4</sup> This conceptualisation posits that these groups hold a lower status and / or are viewed as problematic compared to a dominant majority in society. As such, the police ‘control’ and ‘segregate’ these groups through order maintenance (Reiner, 2000a).

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<sup>3</sup> Left-realist criminologists proposed that the issues raised by a multitude of ‘lawful possibilities’ could be avoided by the adoption of ‘minimal policing’ (Kinsey, Lea and Young, 1986). This position argues that the police should focus reactively and exclusively on crime that is brought to their attention by the public. However, as Johnston (2000) notes, whilst this approach might limit the occasions on which the police act, problems occur in relation to ‘common-sense’ decision making – how does an officer respond to a situation where a violation of the law has not occurred but in their judgement it is about to occur? For this reason, Johnston (2000) argues that discretion in relation to applying the law is evident even in a minimal policing model which effectively undermines Kinsey et al’s (1986) argument.

<sup>4</sup> Explanations for why this should be the case have dominated the literature in terms of attempting to understand the police occupational culture. For an overview of this work, see Chan (1997), P.A.J Waddington, (1999b) and Reiner (2000a). For an historical analysis of the police relationship with different social groups / classes, see Brogden (1982).

This is perhaps best exemplified by disproportionate rates across ethnicity concerning ‘stop and search’ – Bowling and Phillips (2003) state that in 2001-2, black people were eight times, and Asian people three times, more likely to be stopped and searched compared to white people. Lustgarten (2002) echoes his earlier views on ‘lacking legal standards’ in relation to these disproportional statistics. In addition to the presence of both direct and indirect forms of discrimination, Lustgarten (2002) argues that much ‘stop and search’ practice fails to satisfy the standard of reasonable suspicion that is located within PACE and that Codes of Practice require amending (i.e. emphasising the illegality of searches lacking reasonable suspicion) if the problem is to be appropriately addressed. Bowling and Phillips (2003) also stress that ethnic minority communities have been subject to discrimination as *victims* of crime as well as suspects (i.e. they have received a poorer service compared to other groups). The most high profile example of this is the account of the Macpherson Inquiry into the murder of Stephen Lawrence (Macpherson, 1999).

The important point to be made is that a number of factors will influence police decision making that are not wholly dependent on legal powers. Instead, discretion is exercised through conditions of low visibility ‘on the street’. If this discretion to enforce the law is applied selectively, there is the potential for general order to be corrupted. Returning to the theme of addressing the mechanism and regulation of order maintenance, it is now pertinent to address similar concerns that occur at an organisational level.

The regulation of the police as an organisation is rooted in police governance which can be defined as ‘the constitutional arrangements for framing and directing police policies’ (Jones, 2003, p605). The nature and form of police governance has constantly evolved since the inception of the ‘new police’ in 1829 (Joyce, 2001). However, for the purposes of this section, it is relevant to briefly draw upon the principle of ‘constabulary independence’ and the tripartite framework of governance that facilitates police policy and practice. Constabulary independence relates to the notion that chief officers are autonomous from political interference concerning police policies and operations (Jones, Newburn and Smith 1994).

Although the principle holds a foundation in legal judgements,<sup>5</sup> Lustgarten (1986) argues that these are beset with flaws. For example, the 'Denning Doctrine' fails to account for nuances which demonstrate that police policy making is entwined with direction from political bodies rather than being a wholly independent process (Lustgarten, 1986). Despite these ambiguities, Savage, Charman and Cope (2000, p31) argue that the principle of constabulary independence holds 'discursive and political power... inside and outside of the police service.'

Although the principle of constabulary independence is vague, it is worth examining in more detail how the political process impacts on the affairs of the police through central and local government. The important milestones concerning the relationship between these parties are the 1962 Royal Commission which reported on the ambiguous nature of this relationship and the subsequent 1964 Police Act that attempted to delineate the boundaries of responsibility between these parties and led to the tripartite framework of governance (Walker, 2000). In summary, the 1964 Police Act outlined that the chief officer of each force in England and Wales holds responsibility for the direction and control of their force whilst the local police authority (consisting of magistrates and elected councillors) are charged with maintaining 'an adequate and efficient force' and hold the power to appoint new chief officers (Jones, 2003). The final part of this framework is the role of central government (through the Home Secretary) that holds the power to *approve* the appointment of chief officers and can ask them to resign on the grounds of efficiency, and also provides funding that enables the individual forces to function (Jones, 2003).

Subsequent to the 1964 Police Act, the relationship between the police, central and local government has evolved through a combination of social change and new legislation (Joyce, 2001; Jones, 2003). An important shift occurred with the introduction of the Police and Magistrates' Courts Act 1994 (consolidated through the Police Act 1996) which changed the composition and function of the local police authority within the tripartite framework (Loveday, 2000). With regards to composition, this legislation reduced the membership levels of local police authorities and required for the first time that independent members must be

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<sup>5</sup> The principle is most closely associated with the outcome of *Fisher v. Oldham Corporation* [1930] and Lord Denning's judgement from *R v MPC, ex parte Blackburn* [1968].

locally appointed to serve with councillors and magistrates (Jones, 2003). In terms of function, the responsibility for financial decision making devolved from the local police authorities to Chief Constables (Loveday, 2001). In addition, chief officers hold a responsibility for drafting local policing plans incorporating national (i.e. set by central government) as well as local objectives which the local police authorities then 'own' (Jones, 2003). The impact of this legislation is complex as Joyce (2001) argues that it can be interpreted as representing: a) an increase in central control through the setting of national objectives to be evaluated by the Home Office's Police Performance Unit; b) an increase in the autonomy of Chief Constables in respect of their financial and local policing plan responsibilities or; c) an increase in the power of the local police authorities due to independent members being assertive in promoting local issues within the local policing plan.<sup>6</sup>

More recent legislation such as the Crime and Disorder Act (1998) – to be discussed in the final section of this chapter – and the Police Reform Act (2002) has also highlighted the changing nature of relationships within the tripartite framework.<sup>7</sup> As with the principle of constabulary independence, this framework represents ambiguity rather than certainty in relation to the regulation of the police at an organisational level. Having briefly outlined the nature of these ambiguities at a broad level, it is worth considering them within the context of tensions between general and specific order.

Lustgarten (1986) presents an analysis of decision making during the 1984-85 miners' strike and argues that the statutory function of the police authority was undermined by chief officers and central government in relation to the provision of mutual aid (i.e. the deployment of officers from one force area to assist in policing another force area). The 1964 Police Act allows for a Chief Constable to request additional resources from a colleague and this is supplemented by the Home Secretary's power to order a chief officer to provide assistance if this request is refused (Lustgarten, 1986). The role of the local police authority

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<sup>6</sup> Savage *et al* (2000) note that the role of local police authorities may be enhanced through the Association of Police Authorities (APA) which is a national representative body and potential disseminator of good practice.

<sup>7</sup> For further discussion relating to police governance and the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 and Police Reform Act 2002 see Jones (2003).

concerns paying for this demand and given the extensive duration and scope of the miners' strike (which will be examined in more detail later) this proved to be expensive. Lustgarten (1986) further argues that the deployment of mutual aid left many force areas depleted in terms of policing resources and this in turn undermined the police authorities' ability to perform their statutory function of ensuring an adequate and efficient force. Therefore, the police authorities are left out of the decision making process and yet hold statutory responsibilities that are undermined.

Lustgarten (1986) is careful to clarify that he is concerned purely with the legal implications in his analysis of mutual aid during the miners' strike rather than the 'rights and wrongs' of the strike and the policing methods employed during it. This analysis demonstrates that constitutional ambiguities are not just the domain of 'low level' order maintenance but are present within the context of police governance: 'these (tensions and contradictions) had been concealed by the assumption that all elements in the tripartite structure would be pulling in the same direction' (Lustgarten, 1986, p115). In addition to Lustgarten's analysis, the proactive role of central government in directing policing operations during the miners' strike is alluded to by senior officers interviewed by Reiner (1991). Also, an article written for the Police Federation suggests that policing strategy (e.g. organising escorts for working miners) was determined by centralised pressures (Judge, 2004). Both Reiner (1991) and Judge (2004) also mention that additional pressures were placed on the police by local police authorities (especially Labour dominated ones). In summary, the policing of the miners' strike demonstrates sectarian problems relating to governance that the tripartite framework is meant to avoid. Therefore, the implication is clear: at this organisational level 'specific order' may be protected (i.e. policing the strike) at the potential expense of general order (i.e. local policing concerns), a notion that, as raised previously, is arguably the antithesis of effective police governance (Walker, 2000).

The factors that have been raised thus far in relation to order maintenance and equity / accountability are replicated in debates concerning public order policing but before engaging with them in more detail, it is important to differentiate 'public order policing' from other forms of order maintenance. Rickman (2001)

provides a definition of public order that emphasises the ‘broad range’ of circumstances in which it is practiced as a form of policing. At one level, it is concerned with ‘keeping the peace’ through ‘patrols and other duties’ (Rickman, 2001, p122). This aspect of public order policing is closely allied to the conception of order maintenance that has been explored thus far. However, Rickman (2001) suggests that it is also concerned with dealing with specific forms of disorder such as disorderly conduct and riot. These are specific offences and whilst it is acknowledged that public order legislation is ambiguous (e.g. P.A.J Waddington, 2001; MacKenzie and Plecas, 2001; Reiner, 1999) it does allow for a crucial distinction to be made. Disorderly conduct is located within section 5 of the 1986 Public Order Act and is applied in cases of abusive, threatening or insulting words and / or behaviour. This legislation is intended to deal with ‘low-level’ disorder, such as drink-fuelled arguments (Brown, 1994). In contrast, the offence of riot requires twelve or more persons present together who use or threaten unlawful violence for a common purpose (Section 1, Public Order Act 1986). Whilst the former is the domain of low-level order maintenance, the latter concerns *groups* acting with a collective purpose. Whilst both forms of legislation relate to ‘public order’, the focus of the remainder of this section will be on the policing of groups, rather than ‘low-level’ order maintenance.

In respect of this, P.A.J Waddington (1996) suggests that public order policing contains a set of intrinsic characteristics that separate it from other forms of order maintenance / police roles. Firstly, it is *highly visible* and therefore ‘open to external scrutiny’ (P.A.J Waddington 1996, p130) and this differentiates it from the low-visibility of routine patrol work. Secondly, public order policing is characterised as encapsulating *corporate action*: groups of officers act under a command structure that encompasses senior officers therefore placing an emphasis on a collective police operation compared to officers working at an individual level. Thirdly, there is an inclination *against* arrests relating to criminality as this holds the potential to antagonise a crowd and promote greater criminality / disorder. Finally, and for P.A.J Waddington (1996) most importantly, these characteristics combine to make public order policing potentially *contestable* – a group is in a better position to challenge the police’s version of

events compared to individuals (especially those considered as ‘police property’) and this is potentially enhanced if the media are present.

At this stage it should be noted that the work of P.A.J Waddington in relation to public order policing is predominantly concerned with protest or, more specifically, the policing of *contention* (P.A.J Waddington, 2003).<sup>8</sup> This presents him with the opportunity to develop a line of argument that encompasses the (morally ambiguous) relationship between the state, the police and ‘citizens with rights’ (P.A.J Waddington, 1999a). It is useful to return to the concepts of general and specific order to briefly outline this position. P.A.J Waddington (1999a, 2000a, 2003) argues that criminals are outside the ‘bounds of the moral community’, and as such the police response to this group is relatively unproblematic in terms of moral ambiguity. In relation to general order, one would argue that this role is crucial if public tranquillity and safety is to be maintained. However, it is also a condition of general order that citizens enjoy rights such as the freedom of expression, association and assembly (Walker, 2000). The policing of protest or contention is potentially a challenge to police legitimacy, especially if coercion is being employed against groups that believe they are morally obliged to take collective action (P.A.J Waddington, 2003). In these circumstances, the police do not hold the moral ‘high ground’ in relation to the actions they take compared to when they are dealing with criminals (P.A.J Waddington, 2000a). This reveals a fundamental tension where the interests of general order conflict with the interests of specific order, thus rendering the policing of contention as being unavoidably ‘political’ in nature (P.A.J Waddington, 2003).

Fielding (1991) argues that it is understandable yet limiting to consider contemporary issues as both ‘unique’ and / or ‘pressing’. A review of the policing of contention and the tensions it raises reveals that it is not an issue unique to contemporary policing. Prior to the establishment of the ‘new police’ in 1829, the response of the state to any outbreaks of large scale disorder (e.g. the Gordon Riots in 1780, the Luddite disturbances in 1816) involved the deployment of

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<sup>8</sup> P.A.J Waddington (2003) draws on the work of Tilly (1995) to suggest that ‘contention’ implies a range of activities that include, but are not restricted to, explicit political protest. This work will be expanded upon in greater detail in section four.



troops (Fielding, 1991). Although the initial instructions presented to the police stressed that their main objective was the prevention of crime, they were also involved in the policing of large scale disorder that equate to the concept of policing contention (Emsley, 1996).<sup>9</sup> However, it should be acknowledged that not all forms of public order policing were ingrained in contention and this raises another crucial issue. Whilst Smith (1985) extensively documents the policing of contention related to Victorian London, relatively little consideration is given to a form of public order policing that encompassed the staging of the Great Exhibition in 1851. This event attracted millions of visitors and involved over 1000 officers (Smith 1985) thus meeting P.A.J Waddington's (1996) characteristics of the policing in this context being highly visible and operating at a corporate (i.e. group) level. In addition to maintaining order at this event, Smith (1985, p123) notes that:

‘The Great Exhibition could be considered another significant milestone for the Metropolitan Police... It strengthened their reputation with property owners and shopkeepers... The pessimists that had feared that Hyde Park would become a magnet for hordes of riffraff, revolutionaries, and criminals were proved wrong.’

The example of the Great Exhibition shows that the policing of crowds does not necessarily have to be contestable. One would argue that this example exemplifies ‘public order policing’ as it meets the characteristics outlined by P.A.J Waddington (1996) with one crucial distinction: the moral ambiguity associated with contention is, for whatever reason, removed or diluted and thus reduces tensions between specific order (i.e. the state) and general order (i.e. public tranquillity and safety). However, it is also important to note that Smith's extract implies that potential interests (e.g. property owners) could have been alienated from the police had there been problems associated with policing the event.

This section has attempted to ‘make sense’ of public order policing. In doing so, it has reflected on the order maintenance role of the police, and the conceptual ambiguities associated with it. These ambiguities include problems of definition,

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<sup>9</sup> For more information relating to the origins – and controversies – surrounding the emergence and role of the New Police see Reiner (2000a, chapter 1).

equity and accountability which any account of public order policing must consider. P.A.J Waddington's (1996) work is particularly helpful in that it provides guidance on what characterises 'public order policing' in comparison to other forms of order maintenance. The following section explores the contribution of social research in relation to the 'broad range' of contexts in which it is practised.

### **3. Public Order Policing in Practice**

The practice of public order policing is best conceptualised as occurring across a spectrum. If one were to consult public order related legislation, such a spectrum would range from the low level (e.g. anti-social behaviour) to 'large scale conflicts with a manifest political dimension' (Reiner, 1999, p165). This extreme end of the spectrum would constitute the gravest threat to both specific and general forms of order. The aim of this section is to *characterise* different contexts in which public order policing is practiced as outlined in the previous section in relation to P.A.J Waddington's (1996) work. Therefore, the predominant objective will be characterising different contexts that involve the policing of different types of crowds. It is not the intention to offer analytical accounts of why disorder / order occur at this stage – that is the subject of the next section – but this exercise will demonstrate that some public order policing contexts have been well documented whilst others are comparatively under-researched.

Returning to the previous section, it was noted that the policing of the Great Exhibition was perceived to be successful. The obvious but important point to make in comparing this event with occurrences of large scale disorder concerns the characteristics and motivations of the crowd. As Slaughter (2003) notes, a 'crowd' might constitute protestors, revellers, spectators or mourners who could be well organised and ordered or alternatively spontaneous and chaotic. Similarly, King and Brearley (1996) distinguish between 'mobs' (with an inclination towards forms of disorder) and 'audiences' (with an inclination towards order). However, an important point made by King and Brearley is that a crowd that is initially an 'audience' (e.g. information seeking / recreational) can become a 'mob' (e.g. aggressive / trying to escape a situation) depending on a number of factors such as

the actions of the police and / or the geography of the gathering (King and Brearley, 1996).<sup>10</sup> Therefore, public order policing encapsulates the policing of a potentially endless list of circumstances in which a crowd is motivated to gather. It also occurs in a context where the *dynamic* of the crowd can potentially change from orderly to disorderly, which will be explored in greater detail in the next section with reference to Le Bon's (1895) 'classical' conceptualisation of the crowd.

In the context of this diversity, the literature offers *typologies* of public order policing that provide a useful starting point for determining context related characteristics (Dunning, Murphy, Newburn and I. Waddington, 1987; King and Brearley, 1996; Baxter 2001). This literature focuses on contexts where *disorder* occurs and thus potentially only tells half the story but it does at least provide guidance. For example, King and Brearley (1996) examine public order policing in the context of political, industrial, festival and urban (inner city / estate) related disorder since the 1960s. Dunning *et al* (1987) offer a similar typology but also consider sport related disorder and review a 75 year period. Baxter (2001) follows a 'conflict typology' that again focuses on political and industrial conflicts but also includes the category 'single issue' conflict. These categories are useful but, as with crowds, they are not concrete. King and Brearley (1996) note that an event categorised as industrial (e.g. a workers' strike) could also be construed as political. Likewise, a festival such as Gay Pride might be celebratory but with a political component (e.g. campaigning for changes in government policy). However, the typology approach does allow for an exploration of different public order policing contexts and as such it is worth adapting the categories devised by the authors mentioned above to examine the policing of a) political protest / industrial disputes; b) community disorders and c) festivals.

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<sup>10</sup> A high profile example of this process occurring concerns the Hillsborough disaster in 1989 where 96 Liverpool fans died attempting to escape from an overcrowded terrace (Taylor, 1989).

3.1 Political Protest / Industrial Disputes

The public order policing of political protest and industrial disputes has been well documented.<sup>11</sup> This section will outline four examples of occurrences of *disorder* in both the political and industrial context:

Examples of Disorder: Political and Industrial	Brief Summary
Anti-Vietnam Demonstrations (Grosvenor Square 1967 / 1968)	Marches in October 1967 (5,000 protestors) and March 1968 (25,000 protestors) against the Vietnam war are subject to the breaching of police cordons and disorder (e.g. missiles thrown at police) – 280 people are arrested in the latter demonstration (D. Waddington, 1992).
National Front Meeting (Southall, 1979)	In the run up to the 1979 general election, the National Front holds a meeting in Southall, an area which has a large Asian population. There is disorder close to the meeting location which the police blame on extremist right and left wing groups. One protestor, Blair Peach, is killed and 345 people are arrested. Asian community leaders call for an investigation into police behaviour during the demonstration and, in particular, the activities of the Metropolitan Police’s Special Patrol Group (SPG) (D. Waddington <i>et al</i> , 1989; Jefferson, 1990)
The Poll Tax Demonstration (Trafalgar Square,	A demonstration on March 30 <sup>th</sup> 1990 against the Poll Tax is characterised by clashes that lead to over 500 arrests and 542 police injuries culminating in ‘the

<sup>11</sup> See Smith (1985); Dunning et al (1987); D. Waddington, Jones and Critcher (1989); Fielding (1991); D. Waddington (1992); King and Brearley (1996).

1990)	most serious outbreak of civil disorder in Central London since the Bloody Sunday riot of 1887' (P.A.J Waddington, 1994b, p370).
The Miners' Strike (Orgreave, 1984)	Over a number of days in late May 1984, police clash with pickets as the British Steel Corporation (BSC) attempt to move coke from a coking plant in Orgreave, South Yorkshire. At its peak, 7,000 pickets clash with 3,400 police. The clashes are characterised by mounted police baton charges and riot shields are deployed for the first time in mainland Britain during the strike (King and Brearley, 1996).

It is possible to draw out some common themes from these examples. Firstly, all were high profile in nature and the sources mentioned above all relate extensive media coverage of disorder. Secondly, the examples demonstrate changing police strategy and tactics in the light of new techniques and technologies (e.g. the use of riot shields). These changes, which can be conceptualised as a drift towards ‘paramilitarism’ (Jefferson, 1987, 1990, 1993; P.A.J Waddington, 1987, 1991, 1993), will be explored in the following section. Thirdly, these examples represent the extreme end of the spectrum in relation to public order policing, demonstrating challenges to both specific *and* general order culminating in ‘broken windows, broken bodies, broken expectations’ (Reiner, 1999, p164).

It is also worth noting two other characteristics of public order policing in relation to political protest / industrial disputes. Firstly, as has been previously mentioned, the majority of public order operations are characterised by the general lack of disorder and few, if any, arrests, and this is consistent with the policing of the majority of political protests and industrial disputes (della Porta and Reiter, 1998). To illustrate this point, it is worth citing P.A.J Waddington’s (1994a) research findings concerning public order policing in London: out of 82 events that were observed over nearly two years, only 9 (11%) resulted in 10 or more arrests. A pertinent recent example that typifies this trend concerns the ‘Stop the War’

demonstration held in London on 15<sup>th</sup> February 2003 – crowd estimates ranged between 750,000 (police estimate) and over two million (organiser estimate) and yet the event attracted no disorder and only 7 arrests were made.<sup>12</sup>

The second characteristic – evident in the ‘Stop the War’ demonstration – concerns the changing dynamics of protest and industrial disputes. With regards to the latter, it is noted that large scale industrial dispute related protest has declined since the late 1980s (Reiner, 1998). In relation to the former, the last 15 years have seen an increase in ‘single-issue’ protest (Reiner 1998; Willis, 2001). Examples of this include animal rights protest (Cricher, 1996; Markham and Punch, 2004); environmental protest (Donnelly, 1996; Villiers, 1997); anti-capitalism protest (Willis, 2001) and, more recently, pro fox hunting groups. It is argued that this form of ‘single-issue’ protest represents a shift from protest / industrial disputes that potentially threatened ‘overall social order’ (e.g. the Miners’ Strike, the Poll Tax demonstration) to protest that reflects societies that ‘have experienced simultaneous processes of greater heterogeneity and economic fragmentation and global diffusion’ (Reiner 1998, p48). In short, rather than threats to specific order that potentially undermine the (national) state, protest will be diffuse, potentially global and issue oriented: the ‘Stop the War’ demonstration typifies this, albeit on large scale, as 450 organisations demonstrated as a coalition with protests occurring simultaneously, and globally, on the same day (February 15<sup>th</sup>, 2003).<sup>13</sup>

### *3.2 Community Disorders*

King and Brearley (1996) suggest that community disorder is characterised as being spontaneous in form and occurring in areas that have a history of social deprivation, unemployment and political marginalisation. Before exploring this further it is again worth presenting a brief overview of examples that constitute this form of disorder:

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<sup>12</sup> *The Sunday Times*, February 16<sup>th</sup>, 2003

<sup>13</sup> *The Guardian*, February 16<sup>th</sup>, 2003

Examples of Disorder: Community Disorder	Brief Summary
St. Paul's (Bristol, 1980)	Disorder occurred following a police drugs raid on a café that culminated in a crowd gathering and stone throwing (Joshua and Wallace, 1983). This was followed by police withdrawal and large scale looting and destruction of a number of buildings until PSU (Police Support Unit) reinforcements arrived under the mutual aid scheme (D. Waddington, 1992, King and Brearley, 1996)
Brixton (London, 1981)	Following a proactive police operation targeting street crime (Operation Swamp), disorder occurred over the weekend of 10 <sup>th</sup> – 12 <sup>th</sup> April 1981 resulting in 7,300 police officers being deployed, 450 people injured and damage to 145 buildings (D Waddington, 1992; King and Brearley, 1996). The events surrounding this outbreak of disorder culminated in a public inquiry and the subsequent publication of the Scarman Report (Scarman, 1981).
Broadwater Farm (London, 1985)	An Afro-Caribbean woman, Cynthia Jarrett, died during a police search for stolen goods. This was followed by a number of meetings between the Jarrett family, community representatives and the police, and (peaceful) demonstrations outside the local police station. At the same time, tensions were mounting on the Broadwater Farm estate as the police increased their presence and there were occurrences of confrontation and disorder. This escalated into a riot involving the throwing of petrol bombs, paving stones and knives and the deployment

Burnley (Lancashire,  
2001)

of police with riot shields. During this disorder PC Keith Blakelock was killed. Following the disorder, and for a period of weeks, between 1,000 and 10,000 officers were deployed in an evidence gathering capacity culminating in 359 arrests (King and Brearley, 1996). As with Brixton, a public inquiry was launched into the events surrounding the disorder in Broadwater Farm, culminating in the Gifford Report (Gifford, 1986).

Between June 23<sup>rd</sup> and June 25<sup>th</sup> 2001 there were violent clashes between members of the white and Asian heritage community in the centre of Burnley. This escalated and culminated in damage to both white and Asian heritage property totalling £1.4 million and 101 arrests were made (Clarke, 2001).

The first point to make for the purposes of this category is that, relative to political and industrial dispute related disorder, the variables and reasons relating to why community disorder occurs are complex.<sup>14</sup> For example, Benyon and Solomos (1988) suggest that disorder occurs as a result of macro factors such as racial disadvantage and discrimination, high unemployment, widespread deprivation, political exclusion and powerlessness. These factors are all pertinent to the examples given above although it should be acknowledged that this form of disorder is not just restricted to minority ethnic communities: Bowling and Phillips (2003) note the outbreak of rioting in Oxford and the North East in predominantly white areas. King and Brearley (1996) refer to these as examples of ‘peripheral estate disorder’ but they share many of the factors (e.g. economic recession and political tensions) relevant to St Paul’s, Brixton, Broadwater Farm and Burnley. It is also important to note that the cited examples are not isolated ‘one offs’: following the Brixton disorder of 1981 there was disorder in a number of other towns and cities including Liverpool, Manchester and Birmingham within

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<sup>14</sup> For further analysis of the examples given above, and in addition to the cited sources, see Benyon (1984), Keith (1993), and King and D. Waddington (2004). D. Waddington (1992) and King and Brearley (1996) provide further examples of this form of disorder.



the year (D Waddington, 1992). There was significant disorder, again in Brixton, one month before the Broadwater Farm disorder (King and Brearley, 1996). Similarly, there was disorder in Oldham and Bradford – both predominantly Asian areas – that occurred within weeks either side of the Burnley disorder (Cantle, 2001).

The role of the police in these forms of disorder is also complex. Unlike the policing of protest that is likely to be transient in terms of people gathering and then dispersing over a limited time, forms of community disorder are often characterised by the police potentially being a factor that leads to disorder and then having to deal with the consequences of policing communities post disorder. To put this into context, it is worth considering the findings of official inquiries. In relation to Brixton, the Scarman Report (1981) alludes to poor police / community relations prior to the disorder (e.g. there was no community consultation prior to the police instigating Operation Swamp). This is echoed in relation to ‘police harassment’ that is mentioned as a factor in the disorder at St Paul’s (Reicher, 1984) and Broadwater Farm (Gifford, 1986). Likewise, the findings of reports into the disorder in Oldham, Burnley and Bradford highlight potential problems between the police and local community in relation to allegations of police racism and the (mis)recording of racist crime: ‘there can be no dispute that policing and the perception of policing was a *contributory* factor behind the riots.’ (Ritchie, 2001, p13, emphasis added). As such, at the heart of recommendations made in these reports, there is an emphasis on the requirement for the police to display sensitivity and awareness in relation to the communities they serve to defuse potential disorder in the future (e.g. through closer working with the community). This spate of disorder in the North of England also led to the promotion of strategies to enhance ‘community cohesion’ with the aims of minimising the risk of community disorder and developing stronger and cohesive communities (Community Cohesion Unit, 2002). Although these strategies involve a number of agencies (e.g. housing and education) emphasis is placed on the police to achieve closer links with local communities through more effective community policing and the use of Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships to achieve the above cited aims (Community Cohesion Unit, 2002).

With regards to public order policing, the important factors to note are similar to those mentioned in relation to the policing of protest and industrial disputes: King and Brearley (1996) and King and D Waddington (2004) outline evolving police strategies and tactics that were used to deal with the disorder *per se* which relate to changes in techniques and technologies. Once again, these issues will be considered in greater detail when examining analytic accounts of public order policing in the next section. However, these must be, and will be, considered in conjunction with other factors when attempting to understand *why* this form of disorder occurs.

### 3.3 Festivals

The public order policing of festivals has generated relatively little attention compared to the previous two categories. Speculation as to why this might be the case is given in the concluding part of this section following an outline as to how public order policing manifests itself in this context. A logical starting point is the Notting Hill Festival which is a carnival that is staged by and for the black community and has been held annually since 1964. King and Brearley (1996) note that the 1976 Notting Hill Carnival was subject to disorder resulting in 60 arrests, 456 injuries and damage to 321 premises. With the exception of 1987 and 1989, there have been no outbreaks of disorder associated with the event (P.A.J Waddington, 1994a). Indeed, the focus of more recent literature has emphasised the police role in terms of maintaining *public safety* as opposed to accounting for disorder, especially given the location and popularity of the event (Cullen and King, 1993). It is also interesting to note that King and Brearley (1996) identify that recent disorder-free carnivals have been characterised by the police operating in a multi-agency capacity in relation to planning the event. This approach to the Notting Hill Carnival is also echoed by P.A.J Waddington (1994a) and Cullen and King (1993) and, in terms of contemporary carnivals, it is proposed by the Greater London Authority, Metropolitan Police Authority and London Notting Hill Carnival Limited (the main organisers) that multi-agency work should continue and that the route should be extended in order to increase public safety.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> Greater London Authority Press Release, 25<sup>th</sup> November, 2004

King and Brearley (1996) also note that policing practices and priorities have evolved in relation to the policing of 'alternative lifestyle' festivals. They cite an example of disorder at Stonehenge in 1985, referred to as the 'Battle of the Beanfield', which resulted in over 500 arrests and then compare it with the lack of disorder during the policing of a New Age Travellers gathering at Castlemorton Common, Worcestershire, in 1992. This latter instance of order being maintained was characterised by a 'softly softly' policing strategy encompassing negotiation between different parties coupled with the use of proactive intelligence gathering methods to ensure a successful outcome (King and Brearley, 1996).

In terms of public order policing and 'orderly' festival events, there is a dearth of literature compared to the public order policing of protest, industrial disputes and community *disorder*. However, two recent pieces of literature that focus on festival events that were characterised by a lack of disorder make some interesting points. Barton and James (2003) note the impact of commercial interests in the policing of festival events. In their analysis, Barton and James focus on the policing of the 'Run to the Sun' festival in Newquay, Cornwall. Rather than preparing for significant disorder, the police are placed in a position where they must protect the interests of the general community whilst also supporting 'entrepreneurial action'. In the case of 'Run to the Sun', this manifests itself as a difficult balancing act as the event brings significant revenue to the area but also rowdy behaviour and traffic congestion that, in another context (e.g. political protest), might lead to greater police intervention than was observed (Barton and James, 2003). The analytic implications of this work will be considered in the following section but it raises the role of partnership working as being important in relation to public order policing. Finally, it is worth highlighting the work of Valverde and Cirak (2003) that focuses on a Gay Pride festival in Toronto, Canada. This work notes that the festival is characterised by forms of self-policing and the use of volunteer marshals and private security in addition to the public police. During this event, the police role involves managing traffic and providing 'site security', the implication being that 'in recent years Pride Day has come to be policed not like an old-time demonstration but rather like a large scale construction site' (Valverde and Cirak, 2003, p107).

With reference to community disorder and public order policing, it was stated that any analytical account must evaluate a number of factors in order to understand *why* the disorder occurred. The public order policing of festivals and the majority of protests suggests that analytic accounts must also explain why order is *maintained* in these contexts (e.g. the manifestation of ‘softly softly’ approaches). This will be the aim of the next section. In this section it has been highlighted that public order policing is practiced in different contexts ranging from large scale disorder (e.g. the anti poll tax riots) through to the policing of events such as Run to the Sun and Gay Pride where order is generally maintained. In addition to providing this summary of different public order policing contexts, the categories highlighted also point to gaps in the literature. These will now be briefly discussed.

Firstly, public order policing and *disorder*, whatever the context, is relatively well documented in terms of official reports and the academic literature. This is less the case for instances of public order policing where order is maintained, although the work of P.A.J Waddington, to be highlighted in the next section, is a notable exception. To account for this, it is useful to cite an appropriate analogy from Reiner (2000a, p9): ‘like riding a bike, policing is the sort of activity that is thought about mainly when the wheels come off. When things are running smoothly it tends to be a socially invisible, undiscussed routine.’ In terms of public order policing, instances of disorder equate most dramatically to examples of the ‘wheels coming off’ (e.g. high profile; large numbers of arrests and injuries; damage to property) and as such generate official, public, media and academic interest. Relatively speaking, and as far as the literature is concerned, instances of public order policing where order is maintained usually fall into the domain of the ‘undiscussed’.

Secondly, relative to protest / industrial dispute and community disorder, the public order policing of festivals is also under researched. Again, this is hardly surprising as the form these events take is unlikely to impinge dramatically on either general or specific order. Although ‘Run to the Sun’ might inconvenience the citizens of Newquay it does not represent a threat to the state and political

institutions in the same way that political protest might.<sup>16</sup> However, as Benewick and Holton (1987) suggest there is potentially a great deal to be gleaned from considering those occasions which are characterised as ‘peaceful’ (i.e. not violent or disorderly) as ‘such crowds may offer vital insights to both social analysts and policy-makers, in the sense that they help to explain why protest and disorder are not endemic’ (p201). With these themes in mind, the following section will explore analytical accounts of public order policing in relation to both disorder *and* order.

#### **4. Analytical Accounts of Public Order Policing**

This section will predominantly focus on analytical accounts that provide a framework to understand the role of public order policing in both cases of disorder and order. It will start by exploring the issue of ‘paramilitarism’ (Jefferson 1987, 1990, 1993; P.A.J Waddington, 1987, 1991, 1993). This will then be followed by consideration of the ‘flashpoints’ model (D Waddington *et al.*, 1987; D Waddington *et al.*, 1989; D Waddington, 1992) which explores the factors which lead to disorder occurring in certain circumstances. Consideration will then be given to P.A.J Waddington’s (1994a) work that focuses on negotiation and compromise within a public order context. As will be revealed, all of these approaches have generated controversy in relation to methodological procedures and conceptualisations. However, these accounts and their respective critiques can offer guidance as to what one should consider when seeking a comprehensive analysis of public order policing, whatever the context it is being practiced in. Following this discussion, attention will be briefly given to other (and more recent) analytical accounts that will set the appropriate context for the final section of this chapter that considers contemporary public order policing policy.

##### *4.1 Public Order Policing: The Rise of Paramilitarism*

Despite holding polarised views on the consequences, both Jefferson (1987, 1990, 1993) and P.A.J Waddington (1987, 1991, 1993) acknowledge that public order policing has been characterised since the late 1960s by a rise in new strategies,

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<sup>16</sup> It does, however, raise interesting issues to be discussed later in relation to police accountability at local levels.

techniques and technologies that equate to the concept of 'paramilitarism'. Examples of this include the development and deployment of mutual aid schemes, specialist public order units (e.g. the Special Patrol Group, now the Tactical Support Group), new command structures and equipment such as riot shields and flame proof clothing (P.A.J Waddington, 1987). P.A.J Waddington and Jefferson also agree that these developments present a number of dilemmas in relation to police legitimacy and the use of restraint in a public order context but this is where their agreement ends. P.A.J Waddington (1987, 1993) suggests that elements of paramilitarism are necessary if appropriate restraint (i.e. the use of 'minimum force') is to be a reality in a public order context. In contrast, Jefferson (1987, 1990, 1993) argues that paramilitarism exacerbates the potential for disorder and presents a significant challenge to police legitimacy. Their respective arguments will now be briefly considered.

P.A.J Waddington (1987) argues that legitimacy in a public order context takes the form of a two way process between the police and participants if the potential for disorder is to be reduced. Disorder is potentially more likely if the police are perceived by participants as partisan but 'the more successful the police are in presenting themselves as impartial guardians of the peace, the more inhibited the crowd become' (P.A.J Waddington, 1987, p38). However, in those situations where disorder occurs it is the characteristic of *corporate action* (i.e. groups of officers acting under a command structure that encompasses senior officers) that presents the most effective mechanism for taking appropriate (i.e. legitimate and restrained) action:

'In sum, one of the defining characteristics of militarism – the co-ordination of squads under superior command – offers the prospect of policing disorder with restrained discipline. Paramilitary organisation is not a sufficient condition for ensuring restraint, but it is a necessary condition: disciplined co-ordination is simply not possible by traditional means'. (P.A.J Waddington, 1993, p357)<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> By 'traditional means', P.A.J Waddington (1993) is referring to ad hoc and reactive types of intervention in a public order context.

P.A.J Waddington (1987, 1993) argues that this disciplined approach is preferable to an uncoordinated response where ill-equipped officers lacking coordinated strategic and tactical supervision might succumb to excessive force in a climate of fear and confusion when disorder occurs. In these latter circumstances, excessive force will in turn reduce both legitimacy and restraint. Although the police might use their 'paramilitary capacity' (e.g. shields) to restore order, the combination of discipline and co-ordination ensures that ultimately *less force* will be deployed *more effectively* compared to 'traditional' (i.e. unorganised) methods (P.A.J Waddington, 1987, 1993).

In contrast to P.A.J Waddington, Jefferson (1987, 1990) argues that the rise in paramilitarism presents fundamental questions relating to police legitimacy and might *exacerbate* the potential for disorder. Rather than taking a 'top down' (i.e. police perspective), Jefferson (1987, 1990) examines the issue of legitimacy from the 'view from below'. This perspective argues that public order policing is no different to other forms of policing in that it encompasses the policing of 'de-legitimated' sections of society and that these groups are subject to increased police attention.<sup>18</sup> It is therefore argued that any notion of impartiality and restraint (i.e. minimum force) in relation to the use of paramilitary policing methods is incomplete unless it applies, and is experienced, by these groups, which Jefferson (1987) argues is not the case. In short, the police cannot and do not fulfil the role of 'impartial guardians of the peace' in a public order context.

In addition to taking the perspective of the 'policed' in a public order context, Jefferson (1987, 1990) also argues that paramilitary policing might contribute to disorder in a public order context through a 'self-fulfilling prophecy', and this is outlined through four stages:

- 1) Preparation – If 'trouble' is expected, the police anticipate the worst and deploy appropriately equipped and trained officers on standby. This is a time when nerves and frustration may take hold whilst the presence of massed police numbers, 'riot' equipment and special vans send out a message to

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<sup>18</sup> This equates to the concept of 'police property' as presented by Reiner (2000a) and highlighted earlier.

demonstrators of ‘provocation’ – it is at this stage that the ‘self-fulfilling’ prophecy starts to reveal itself (Jefferson, 1987, 1990);

- 2) Controlling Space – Physical space is demarcated along lines between which protestors are allowed and excluded. This might be perceived as provocative by the protestors and induce a confrontational response thus confirming to the police that trouble will occur;
- 3) Controlling the Crowd – The police now must contain and control the space and this can raise tensions further, once more confirming that trouble will occur. At this stage, the tactics and equipment associated with paramilitary policing may be deployed thus potentially escalating violence, as protestors will be getting angry (and possibly hurt) in response to the coercive tactics they are facing;
- 4) Clearance – Once the demonstration has passed, the police want a quick dispersal and deploy paramilitary tactics and resources to achieve this. This leads to more confrontation until, at some point the police ‘succeed’ (i.e. dispersal is achieved). During post event reflection, the police might request more resources and equipment for next time in anticipation of further ‘trouble’ and the cycle continues: ‘in the profane world of paramilitary policing, the script for the next crisis in public order policing is thus, unwittingly, being prepared.’ (Jefferson, 1987, p53).

In addition to presenting this model Jefferson (1990) makes a number of recommendations that are pertinent to equity and accountability that he argues would restrain both the rise of paramilitary policing and the escalation and spiral of violence associated with it. This includes acknowledging that discretion, whether it is at the level of Chief Constable (e.g. in introducing paramilitary options) or constable (e.g. in exercising their powers) is selective rather than impartial. It is therefore imperative that there is input from those groups who are ‘routinely policed’ into the form this discretion takes and that this should culminate in guidelines that promote the rights of members from these groups at both the victim and offender level, whom Jefferson (1990) argues are overrepresented in both categories. At the operational level Jefferson (1990) argues that the police should analyse and monitor incidents and activities (e.g. increasing self-awareness of their potential in the ‘amplification’ process,



identifying bias and discrimination in arrests). In addition, public order operations culminating in low arrests, complaints and injuries should be rewarded and a genuine dialogue with the ‘policed’ should incorporate both listening and learning on the part of the police. Finally, Jefferson (1990) suggests that public order policing should be more experimental and innovative with the aim of producing ‘non-discriminatory, trouble free and acceptable (to the policed) policing of public order’ (p144).

The arguments presented by Jefferson (1987, 1990) are criticised by P.A.J Waddington (1993) on analytical and factual grounds. Firstly, P.A.J Waddington (1993) argues that the use of protective clothing – identified by Jefferson (1987, 1990) as a component of paramilitary policing techniques that is potentially provocative – is not problematic as the police have a right to protect themselves during disorder.<sup>19</sup> Secondly, P.A.J Waddington (1993) re-emphasises that disciplined and coordinated responses are preferable to traditional methods and that appropriate training in the use of force means that it can be used more effectively and less often compared to untrained officers facing disorder *without* training or supervision. Thirdly, P.A.J Waddington (1993) argues that, when force is necessary, the deployment of CS gas and water cannons is far less dangerous compared to ‘traditional’ methods such as horse and baton charges although such actions may undermine discipline and coordination.

P.A.J Waddington (1993) also argues that Jefferson’s four stage model is flawed. The first problem relates to generalisation – Jefferson (1990) applies the model to account for three occasions of public disorder and yet he implies that it is relevant to all public order contexts where ‘trouble’ might be expected.<sup>20</sup> By referring to his own fieldwork, P.A.J Waddington (1993) argues that this is unrepresentative of public order policing *per se* where the conditions Jefferson describes are present (e.g. officers held in reserve, dispersal of crowds with officers with shields) but do not lead to disorder in the majority of cases: ‘The *more* the police planned for the ‘worst case scenario’, the *less* disorder there was; when control of

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<sup>19</sup> P.A.J Waddington (1993) states that similar criticisms have not been levelled at the ambulance service who have used helmets / army fortified vehicles when dealing with disorder (e.g. during the Miners’ Strike).

<sup>20</sup> These three instances of disorder include Broadwater Farm 1985, Orgreave 1984 and a protest involving the Manchester University Students Union, 1985.

space and the crowd was at its greatest, violence was its *lowest* (P.A.J Waddington, 1993, p362). It is P.A.J Waddington's (1993) opinion that on those occasions when disorder occurs (e.g. the Poll Tax demonstration) the problems lie with a breakdown in command and control rather than as a result of paramilitary policing methods. Finally, P.A.J Waddington (1993) criticises the 'view from below' perspective, arguing that Jefferson is being selective in his choice of groups that fit this category: if it is applied universally then it must also include football hooligans and National Front demonstrators who have also been involved in disorder with the police. Therefore, in light of these criticisms, P.A.J Waddington (1993, p366) is left to conclude that 'what he (Jefferson) is actually registering is not the empirical connection between certain methods of policing and the likelihood of disorder, but a *distaste* for those methods and what they represent.'

Jefferson (1993) responds to these criticisms by stating that he and P.A.J Waddington will probably never agree on paramilitary policing. Indeed, Reiner (1998) suggests that disagreement is not in the analysis but in the political positions both authors hold. It has also been argued that the term 'paramilitarism' as defined by Jefferson and P.A.J Waddington is inaccurate as both authors fail to equate it with the role and relationship of the military to the police and state (Hills, 1995). However, and for the purposes of this section, what is important to take away from this debate is that police responses to public order policing, in terms of equipment, strategies and tactics, will be influential in either encouraging disorder (if one takes Jefferson's viewpoint) or facilitating order (if one takes P.A.J Waddington's position). Likewise, this debate suggests that a complete account of public order policing must take into account the perspectives of both the police and those participating in public events, whatever the context. Regardless of political positions and the context in which it is being practiced,<sup>21</sup> these represent an important set of variables that an analysis of public order policing must consider.

The primary focus of the 'paramilitary policing' debate concerns the police response and role in relation to public disorder. The arguments raised are

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<sup>21</sup> In terms of the paramilitary policing debate, Jefferson and P.A.J Waddington focus predominantly on the policing of political protest and / or industrial disputes.

important but it is also necessary to understand why citizens engage in public disorder if one is to assess how best the police should respond. In order to achieve this it is worth exploring the contribution of the 'flashpoints model' to the debate on public order policing.

#### *4.2 Public Order Policing: The 'Flashpoints' Model*

The premise of the 'flashpoints' model is based upon the assumption that psychology and sociology fail to offer a comprehensive account of why disorder occurs in certain circumstances but not others (D Waddington *et al*, 1987). For example, it was noted in relation to community disorder that factors such as social deprivation, unemployment and political marginalisation might underpin this form of disorder and yet for every example where this is evident there will be occasions where similar circumstances are present but no disorder ensues. Therefore, D Waddington *et al* (1987) propose that to understand disorder it is important to analyse individual cases at six levels: structural, political / ideological, cultural, contextual, situational and interactional. D Waddington (1992) argues that this approach allows the identification of 'a number of factors most conducive to disorder' (p205) and that they culminate, at the final 'interactional' level, in a 'flashpoint' that 'crystallises grievances, encourages communication and provides an irresistible catalyst for disorder' (p207).

In terms of historical context, the 'flashpoints' perspective offers a 'multi-causal' model of why disorder occurs through analysis of the six levels mentioned above. D Waddington *et al* (1989) argue that this offers the scope for a more systematic analysis compared to prior 'mono-causal' (i.e. single cause) models which accounted for disorder through either psychological reductionism (for example, disorder as a result of the actions of a 'collective' crowd mentality) at the expense of cultural and social context or sociological approaches that offer general explanations (for example, unemployment and deprivation) but do not pinpoint why disorder should occur in one location / context and not another. Having introduced the rationale behind the 'flashpoints' model, it is worth briefly addressing each of these six levels in more detail (D Waddington *et al*, 1989; D Waddington, 1992):

- 1) Structural – Societal inequalities (e.g. in terms of power, material resources and life opportunities) provide a basis for a shared perception of deprivation amongst a group. In another context, a group might not be affected by or experience these social inequalities *per se* but they perceive the state to be involved in policy / activity that they find unjust (what D Waddington *et al*, 1989, term ‘ideological alienation from the state’). If these inequalities or ideological alienation are not addressed by the state (either because it is unable or unwilling) there is the potential for the group to become estranged from the existing political order.<sup>22</sup> This stage sets an important context for the next level;
- 2) Political / Ideological – The relationship between the ‘dissenting’ group and political / ideological institutions is important at this level. This relationship will be determined by perceptions of legitimacy towards the dissenting group via media, politicians and commentators (what D Waddington, 1992, refers to as political and ideological institutions). The nature of this relationship may, a) increase the potential for the group to engage in violence (e.g. if the group is disenfranchised from democratic processes) and, b) impact on how the group is policed (i.e. the police take their cues from political and ideological institutions);
- 3) Cultural – The focus at this level is the ‘accommodation’ between members of the group and the police in certain situations (i.e. what each party will tolerate of the other). This works on the basis that social groups have different ethnic, regional and / or occupational cultures that could clash with those cultures prevalent in the police, for example, Reiner’s (2000a) argument that certain groups are perceived by the police as ‘police property’. This can result in stereotyping on the part of the crowd and the police towards each other but it does not mean that disorder is inevitable. ‘Accommodation’ through compromise might allow for the setting of norms on what is acceptable. As an example, D Waddington *et al* (1989)

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<sup>22</sup> It is at this level that ‘community cohesion’ strategies could make a positive impact (e.g. Community Cohesion Unit, 2002). However, it is argued that the application of such strategies could be undermined by assumptions that, for example, a common set of principles and values can be identified and applied across diverse (i.e. multi-ethnic, multi-faith, multi-cultural) communities – see McGhee (2003) for more discussion.

suggest that behaviour such as pushing and shoving between police and pickets might be tolerated whereas throwing stones would not;

- 4) Contextual – Communication is the key component in whether disorder in a certain situation will occur at this level. The media, rumours and / or prior police / group confrontation could shape the view that violence is inevitable. D Waddington (1992) suggests that negotiation and liaison between groups and the police at this level will decrease the potential for disorder as ‘ground rules’ for accommodative behaviour can be set;
- 5) Situational – This level refers to ‘spatial and social determinants of disorder relevant to the immediate setting in which interaction takes place’ (D Waddington, 1992, p18). Some locations will be more conducive to the potential for disorder due to, a) their ‘symbolic significance’ (territory to be claimed or preserved), b) if ‘targets of derision’ are present and, c) whether it facilitates police surveillance and / or how easy it is for people to leave the scene should the police attempt dispersal. Related to this is how the ‘space is managed’: the presence of stewards and peaceful (and publicised) intentions from the organisers combined with a low key police presence will reduce the potential for disorder. It is at this level that each side will, not necessarily correctly, interpret and judge the motives of the other;
- 6) Interactional – This is the level where ‘flashpoints’ occur and its focus is the interaction between the crowd and the police. Actions such as a rough arrest or violence against a police officer violate the ‘rules of the game’ indicating that accommodation is decreasing and the potential for disorder is increasing. Disorder can still be avoided at this level if actions are taken that demonstrate a willingness to revert back to the ‘rules’ (e.g. the crowd rebukes a violent member, the police release an arrested prisoner). The important point to make is that everything occurring at this interactional level can only be understood with reference to the preceding five levels.

Compared to Jefferson’s four stage model, the flashpoint model has been applied to account for disorder through a number of case studies in different public order contexts (D Waddington *et al.* 1989; D Waddington, 1992). These include the Poll Tax demonstrations in March 1990, the Brixton disorder in 1981, and violent

disputes during the miners' strike (e.g. Orgeave, 1984). More recently, the 'flashpoints' model has been applied to disorder at animal rights protests in Brightlingsea (Cricher, 1996) and the 2001 disturbances in Burnley (King and D Waddington, 2004)

However, D Waddington *et al* (1989) also present case studies where disorder did not occur (the 'Thatcher Unwelcoming' demonstrations in Sheffield, 1983; picketing at Hadfields steel works in 1980). Therefore, in addition to accounting for disorder, the levels of analysis present in the 'flashpoints' model allow for the identification of factors that promote the likelihood of order, even in circumstances where there is the potential for disorder. These factors allow D Waddington (1992) to present a number of recommendations that decrease the chances of disorder. These include enhancing police community relations through improvements in police accountability (e.g. effective minority group representation on consultative committees), changes in public order legislation (e.g. counterbalancing the powers of the police at a demonstration with the rights and needs of the protestors) and alterations in police training (e.g. officers should be encouraged to analyse incidents). At a macro level, it is suggested that media institutions need to reflect on their reporting of disorder whilst the government must invest in eradicating the social inequalities that form the basis of the 'flashpoint' model at the first level (i.e. structural) (D Waddington 1992).<sup>23</sup>

The most prominent critic of the 'flashpoints' model is P.A.J Waddington (1991, 2000b). P.A.J Waddington's (2000b) criticisms are based on conceptual and methodological concerns. In relation to the former, it is argued that in the context of disorder, 'flashpoints' 'can be invoked at will' (P.A.J Waddington, 2000b, p96). Rather than a single incident clearly and definitively precipitating disorder, P.A.J Waddington (2000b) argues that in cases of disorder there are potentially numerous interactions that can, retrospectively, be identified as a single flashpoint. To compound this, there could also be incidents of 'de-escalation' occurring between potential flashpoint incidents. Therefore, P.A.J Waddington (2000b) concludes that attempting to identify one single flashpoint from a

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<sup>23</sup> It is important to acknowledge that these macro features are potentially influenced by 'political' knowledge, for example political appeal to the electorate or public opinion, which could have a greater impact on policy compared to research and / or the experience of relevant organisations (see Garland, 2001).

complex series of interactions is condemned to be conceptually flawed in accounting for disorder: it is essentially a post-hoc account and is non-predictive. In terms of methodological concerns, P.A.J Waddington (2000b) argues that, despite being presented as an objective analysis, the ‘flashpoints’ model relies on partial and subjective analysis. For example, P.A.J Waddington (2000b) notes that observing a large public event – the method employed by D Waddington *et al* (1989) to gather data for their analysis – is a complex task: two observers may present two very different accounts of the same event. In addition, P.A.J Waddington (2000b) argues that D Waddington *et al*’s triangulation of observational findings through the use of striking miners, journalists and ‘police watch’ groups do not represent ‘objective detachment’ but rather reflect the political orientation of the authors concerned.

Having identified the above conceptual and methodological concerns in relation to the ‘flashpoints’ model, it is also important to note that P.A.J Waddington (2000b) holds reservations concerning the *ideological* motivation for the findings of D Waddington and colleagues. These will be explored in greater detail during the evaluation of P.A.J Waddington’s own analytical account of public order policing but, for the purposes of this section, the ‘flashpoints’ model does at least stress the importance of *context* in understanding why some occasions descend into disorder whilst others do not. Although P.A.J Waddington (2000b, p106) dismisses the six levels as offering no more than ‘a checklist of background factors to take into account’, they do highlight the fact that public order policing does not occur in a vacuum. Therefore, and in addition to acknowledging police strategy and tactics, any analysis of public order policing must also consider the wider context in which it is being practiced.

#### *4.3 Public Order Policing: The Work of P.A.J Waddington*

The previous two analytical accounts predominantly focus on public order policing in relation to disorder. The work of P.A.J Waddington (1993, 1994a) posits a different approach: his work, based on extensive fieldwork, attempts to understand why the vast majority of public order occasions are staged without

disorder.<sup>24</sup> Despite the police having recourse to significant legal resources (e.g. the Public Order Act, 1986) and paramilitary 'muscle', P.A.J Waddington (1994a) argues that they are respectively not rigorously enforced or fully employed. Instead, underpinning P.A.J Waddington's thesis is the notion that the police avoid 'trouble'. Taking a lead from Chatterton (1979, 1983), P.A.J Waddington argues that the police strive to avoid '*on-the-job*' and '*in-the-job*' trouble. In a public order context, '*on-the-job*' trouble refers to dealing with issues such as arrests whilst '*in-the-job*' trouble refers to having to account for one's actions either to superiors or, at worst, independent public enquiries (e.g. post any incident of large scale disorder). The aim of public order policing is therefore to reduce the potential for both '*on-the-job*' and '*in-the-job*' trouble (P.A.J Waddington, 1994a).

This aim is primarily achieved through negotiation with organisers, a process that P.A.J Waddington (1994a) characterises on the basis of his observations as 'ordinary and amicable'. In order to maintain as much control as possible (and thus decrease the potential for both '*on-the-job*' and '*in-the-job*' trouble), it is in the interests of the police to succeed at this level and they do so by 'winning over' organisers through a combination of interactional ploys (e.g. 'spurious' friendships and favours) and compromise rather than overt coercion (e.g. enforcing public order legislation).<sup>25</sup> P.A.J Waddington (1994a) argues that these processes culminate in a lack of disorder because the police are offering a service to organisers and the net result of negotiation meets each side's aims: the organiser can hold their event whilst the police have significant input into controlling proceedings thus avoiding the potential for trouble. This process is referred to as 'institutionalisation', where 'dissident groups exchange their capacity to disrupt for the opportunity to exert modest influence on decision making' (P.A.J Waddington 1994a, p196). P.A.J Waddington therefore suggests that the police attempt to 'institutionalise' protest whenever possible as the end result for them is the avoidance of trouble. However, it is interesting to note that P.A.J Waddington (1994a) highlights not a potentially troublesome protest but 'Pavarotti in the Park', a free classical performance, as being problematic for the

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<sup>24</sup> P.A.J Waddington's (1994a) work focuses predominantly on the policing of protest / industrial dispute but attention is also given to events such as the Notting Hill Carnival.

<sup>25</sup> P.A.J Waddington acknowledges that he is unsure whether organisers thought coercion would have followed had they not complied during the negotiation stage.



police during the planning stages. The organisers of this event were not awed by the police as an organisation and were knowledgeable of the law thus resisting and challenging the police rather than allowing themselves to be 'steered'. In response, the police were confrontational during the negotiation stage (P.A.J Waddington notes to little avail) and demonstrated more antipathy to this event compared to others, including political protest (P.A.J Waddington 1994a).

Maintaining control (i.e. avoiding trouble) is also a key concern for the police during the policing of an event (P.A.J Waddington 1994a). From the policing perspective, this is demonstrated by senior police personnel imparting strategic and logistical information to their subordinates via a briefing process prior to the staging of an event (although P.A.J Waddington cites senior officers' scepticism as to the briefing's effectiveness) and the command structure. As has been noted in relation to 'paramilitary' policing, P.A.J Waddington (1994a) argues that a co-ordinated command structure is effective for the policing of public order operations. However, during an operation, and in contrast to the arguments of Jefferson, the emphasis is placed on facilitation and negotiation with event organisers / attendees rather than confrontation as this represents the best method of maintaining control (P.A.J Waddington 1994a). As a form of 'insurance' against losing control, trained (paramilitary) resources are available in the form of the Territorial Support Group (TSG) and / or SO19 (the Metropolitan Police's firearms support unit) but these are rarely deployed: 'although the police frequently had the iron fist available, it was normally enclosed within a velvet glove' (P.A.J Waddington 1994a, p156).

Although predominantly concerned with understanding the processes that ensure order is maintained in a public order context, P.A.J Waddington (1994a) suggests that the threat of disorder is heightened when the police decide that they must 'die in a ditch'. This refers to a stage during an event when some form of confrontation is required to a) regain perceived loss of control and b) avoid potentially worse 'on-the-job' and 'in-the-job' trouble. P.A.J Waddington (1994a) states that such occasions are rare (he notes two, one ending with disorder, the other without) because of the potential consequences of the unknown once this confrontational step is taken. As an example, the anti poll tax riot in March 1990 highlights why

senior officers are reluctant to take this step: ‘on-the-job’ trouble on this occasion is represented by hundreds of arrests and police injuries, whilst ‘in-the-job’ trouble ultimately came in the form of an inquiry – albeit from within the police – and the potential of officers suing on the grounds that they had suffered needless injuries (P.A.J Waddington 1994a).

P.A.J Waddington’s (1994a) work – described by Reiner (1998) as ‘seminal’ – allows for the identification of motivations and processes that contribute to the maintenance of order in a public order context. However, D Waddington (1998) does present two criticisms. Firstly, and echoing P.A.J Waddington’s criticisms of Jefferson’s work and the ‘flashpoints’ model, it is argued that P.A.J Waddington’s (1994a) *own* analysis is selective and partial as it is predominantly informed by observing the police: ‘it is therefore inconsistent of (P.A.J) Waddington to demand that civilian accounts be treated with an “agnostic scepticism” when he remains so trusting of the more manufactured police perspective’ (D Waddington, 1998, p390).<sup>26</sup> D Waddington (1998) also criticises P.A.J Waddington (1994b) for displaying a reluctance to engage in a critical analysis of police *conduct* and *tactics* during disorder involving Poll Tax protestors in 1990. D Waddington (1998) argues that this is compounded by P.A.J Waddington’s reluctance to consider perspectives other than the police. This leaves D Waddington (1998, p391) to conclude that the ‘partisanship, polemic and selectivity’ that P.A.J Waddington criticises in others is in fact inherent within his own work.

It is not the intention to dwell on whether P.A.J Waddington’s work is ‘pro-police’ or that Jefferson’s arguments and the ‘flashpoints’ model are ‘anti-police’ in relation to public order policing. As has been highlighted, each account has something useful to offer in relation to guiding analysis in relation to public order policing. In summary, Jefferson’s arguments highlight the need to consider strategy and tactics, the ‘flashpoints’ model demonstrates that the context in which public order policing is practised is important, whilst P.A.J Waddington’s work presents a number of factors (e.g. negotiation and compromise / facilitation) that contribute to order. The arguments raised in relation to *where* data is attained suggests that both the police *and* organiser perspectives together offer a more

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<sup>26</sup> As noted previously, civilian accounts were used by D Waddington and colleagues to inform the ‘flashpoints’ model.

comprehensive appreciation of the issues compared to focussing on one at the expense of the other. Therefore, given that the accounts raised thus far hold entrenched positions in relation to each other, it is important that additional accounts are generated to examine the validity of the arguments presented which combine the perspectives of the police and organisers.<sup>27</sup> This thesis will attempt to achieve this although there are methodological considerations which will be addressed in the next chapter. However, for the purposes of the current line of argument, it must be concluded that all three analytic accounts presented thus far offer useful insights and suitable guidance.

#### *4.4 Public Order Policing: Recent Analytical Accounts*

From the three analytic accounts that have been explored, the literature would suggest that the work of P.A.J Waddington (1994a) is the most applicable to the general practice of public order policing. The trends that are noted (e.g. under-enforcement of legislation, the promotion of facilitation and negotiation) in P.A.J Waddington's account have been documented in relation to public order policing internationally (della Porta and Reiter 1998; Willis, 2001). However, it must be noted that these trends have been predominantly documented in relation to the policing of *protest*. In this context, P.A.J Waddington (2003) suggests that the analysis of *social movements* presents an alternative paradigm to, for example, the 'flashpoints' model. Drawing on the work of della Porta and Diani (1999), P.A.J Waddington (2003) argues that in order to understand when and why *contention* occurs (and possibly violence), one must explore three factors: political opportunities, mobilising structures and framing processes. This approach then reveals changing dynamics in relation to contention. For example, a series of political opportunities may allow a social movement to form.<sup>28</sup> There then follows the concept of the 'protest cycle', where 'early risers' may use innovative tactics to engage public attention and are met by a coercive state response. However, over time, radicalism is replaced by compromise in order for the movement to

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<sup>27</sup> It is also important to note that these accounts were generated prior to legislation such as the Human Rights Act 1998 and banning orders under The Football (Disorder) Act 2000.

<sup>28</sup> P.A.J Waddington (2003) cites the civil rights movement in America as an example of a social movement. In relation to political opportunities for it to prosper, P.A.J Waddington notes the migration of labour to the cities from the South; black colleges and churches providing a 'networking' capability; and the rise of national organisations (e.g. National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People) that could promote civil rights issues.

maintain momentum (i.e. public support) and this process is mirrored by the police who resort to less coercive tactics (P.A.J Waddington, 2003). However, compromise on the part of the movement may lead to factions emerging who engage in a new cycle of disruptive campaigning which will, again, be met by a coercive response (P.A.J Waddington, 2003).<sup>29</sup>

The major point that P.A.J Waddington (2003) makes in relation to social movements is that the process mentioned above creates a great deal of heterogeneity within a movement that is reflected through mobilising structures: the organisation of a movement may contain both moderates and militants that lead to internal tensions which can impact on the framing process (i.e. how a 'cause' is presented as important and worthwhile to the general public). In turn, this heterogeneity has important implications for the policing of social movements which is best explored through work with a social psychological orientation (Reicher *et al*, 2004).

Reicher *et al* (2004) acknowledge that D Waddington *et al* (1989) and P.A.J Waddington (1994a) recognise that crowds, in whatever context, should not be viewed from a 'classical' perspective. The 'classical' perspective is most closely associated with the work of Le Bon (1895) who argued that, when gathered as a crowd, individuals will lose their own identity with potentially disorderly results:

'As a consequence they forget their normal values and standards, their ability to think and to reason and to judge. So when a suggestion comes along that normally they might consider and reject, crowd members no longer have the ability to resist. They are, quite literally, mindless. Ideas, and more particularly, emotions, become contagious. They spread through the crowd like wildfire. Sometimes crowd members may be heroic. More usually, like primitive beings, they are barbaric and destructive.' (Reicher *et al*, 2004, p559)

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<sup>29</sup> This perspective can be applied to contemporary protest. For example, the Countryside Alliance – a pressure group which campaigns for the countryside, country sports and the 'rural way of life' – has spawned splinter groups such as the 'Real Countryside Alliance' and 'Countryside Action Network' which proclaim that they are more prepared to use illegal direct action to pursue their causes as opposed to lawful protest (*The Times*, November 20<sup>th</sup>, 2004).

In contrast, Reicher *et al* (2004) reinforce the heterogeneity associated with any crowd and argue that there is a great danger in the police succumbing to a view that any crowd is homogenous, especially in the context of disorder. Echoing the work of P.A.J Waddington (1994a), Reicher *et al* (2004) argues that it is important that the police *interact* as this allows for the identification of different dynamics within a crowd and allows trust to develop. In addition, and echoing Jefferson's arguments (1987, 1993), Reicher *et al* (2004) suggest that this is preferable to controlling and disciplinarian tactics as these may increase hostility towards the police and enhance disorder (Stott and Reicher, 1998; Stott and Drury, 2000; Stott, Drury and Hutchinson, 2001). Reicher *et al* (2004) also argue that interaction, as opposed to controlling and disciplinarian tactics, allow the police to deal more appropriately with crowd 'agitators' (i.e. by isolating them) and enhance self policing. Therefore, and acknowledging their importance as a factor in public order policing, Reicher *et al* (2004) suggest that the police, through interaction, can *enable* a crowd to maintain order.

The next section will demonstrate the importance of Reicher *et al*'s (2004) work as it has been influential in determining contemporary public order policing practice through ACPO's (2001) 'Keeping the Peace' manual of guidance. However, there is one final important factor to consider. Reicher *et al*'s (2004) work is informed by research into disorder (e.g. the anti-poll tax riots and football related disturbances) whilst social movements are associated with contention (P.A.J Waddington, 2003). Whilst these accounts offer further guidance in relation to understanding public order policing (i.e. reinforcing the role the police play within a crowd context), a specific account for non-contentious (e.g. festivals) public order policing is lacking. Barton and James' (2003) work is useful in this context as it argues that the *community* will impact on policing strategies within certain public order contexts. In relation to their 'Run to the Sun' case study, Barton and James (2003) argue that the business community played an important role in determining police strategy. Within this research, the role of the business community is framed as potentially conflicting with other sections of the community. Although care must be taken in generalising from one case study, Barton and James' (2003) work suggests that even at this local level and away from overt contention, there are important issues concerning accountability in

relation to public order policing as divergent interests compete for influence on policing strategies.

This section has reviewed a number of analytic accounts that offer important insight concerning public order policing. Although the majority of this work is concerned with understanding the police role in relation to contention and / or disorder, it does highlight a number of factors and variables that can inform an analysis of public order policing in relation to non-contentious contexts such as festivals and / or community celebrations. These issues will be returned to when outlining the research objectives of this thesis but, before this can be done, it is important to outline factors that manifest themselves in relation to contemporary public order policing. This requires consideration of both police and organiser resources and this further illuminates the processes associated with public order policing and acts as suitable guidance for the framing of this thesis.

## **5. Contemporary Public Order Policing: Resources for the Police and Organisers**

This section introduces the appropriate context for understanding the public order policing of community-based events. Whilst the accounts raised so far are useful for informing analysis of the empirical content of this thesis, none of them focus specifically on non-contentious public order contexts. In addition, if one is to fully appreciate the context in which public order policing is practiced then, as D Waddington (1996) notes, the ‘changing architecture of policing’ must be acknowledged. Therefore, the aim of this section is to briefly outline the resources – specifically ACPO’s 1999 Public Safety Policy; ACPO’s 2001 ‘Keeping the Peace’ manual of guidance and the HSE’s (1999) ‘Event Safety Guide’ – that are available to the police and organisers in relation to the planning and staging of a community-based event / festival. This in turn raises further issues that can inform the analytic processes that will be outlined in later chapters.

### *5.1 ACPO's (1999) Public Safety Policy*

ACPO's 'Public Safety Policy' is concerned with public safety at events (ACPO, 1999). This document stresses that a perception exists amongst the public that the police are the lead agency for approving public events. The reality is that the police do not have the authority to approve or ban public events nor the responsibility to 'preserve public safety... except where there are imminent or likely threats to life' (ACPO, 1999, p1). The document then suggests that the responsibility (i.e. potential litigation) for any public event could lie with the organisers, landowners and, if any aspect of the event should take part on the road, possibly the local authority (ACPO 1999). From this rather ambiguous starting point, the policy then suggests that a form of partnership working between various parties involved in the event should be established, and, in order for the 'public perception' mentioned above to be gradually changed, the police should not take the lead in planning:

'The Police Service is often viewed as the first point of reference for those who organise public events, the assumption being that the Service can authorise or ban them. That is not the case, and it is vital that this perception is changed. The Police Service will, therefore, encourage Borough and District Councils and Metropolitan Authorities to establish a standing Safety Advisory Group. The Group should be comprised of Senior Officers or Executives from the Fire Service, Ambulance Service, Highways Authority and Police: it should be chaired by the Local Authority.' (ACPO, 1999, p2)

The purpose of the Safety Advisory Group (SAG) is to assess an event's potential risks to public safety and then discuss and devise the methods to reduce these.<sup>30</sup> However, there is currently no legislation stating that SAGs must be formed and, even if they do exist within a local authority, an event organiser does not, a) have to refer an event to it or, if they do, b) enact any of its recommendations (ACPO, 1999). On this point, Sexton (2003) cites an unpublished ACPO survey that suggests only 50% of local authorities actually have any SAGs operating. The

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<sup>30</sup> The term SAG is not necessarily uniform across the country. For example, some local authorities have Events Safety Groups (ESG) although the composition and intended function are consistent.

only suggestion offered by the ACPO document to solve this potential problem comes in the form of an appendix outlining a template from which the SAG can identify potential risks and what actions they intend to implement in order to moderate those risks. However, the conclusion to the policy reiterates the ambiguity concerning the public safety of events:

‘The current policing dilemma is created by a number of conflicting issues, although the lack of legislation to regulate public events is a major factor. Inconsistency has resulted. This has the potential to cause disaffection between the Police and the public and to significantly damage community relationships, which are vital to the Police Service... The Police Service will, therefore, encourage the promotion of legislation to properly regulate and control such events in the future.’ (ACPO, 1999, p4)

Sexton (2003) suggests that such legislation could come in the form of a ‘Public Event Management and Safety Act 200?’ with the SAG holding legislative powers to bring event organisers and other authorities (including the police) together to effectively conduct risk assessment and therefore enhance public safety at all types of events. At the time of writing, there are no published plans to develop this despite a flurry of recent legislation – both planned and on the statute – concerning policing (e.g. The Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005; The Serious and Organised Crime Act 2005; Police Reform White Paper 2004).

The first point to make is that research relating to the conduct and practice of SAGs is lacking. However, there is a vast literature relating to partnership approaches in respect of community safety and crime reduction.<sup>31</sup> This is perhaps best represented through the introduction of Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships (CDRP) arising from the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. In contrast to Safety Advisory Groups, this legislation makes it a statutory requirement for the police to engage and work with other agencies (e.g. local authorities, health and probation services) to produce and implement a strategy that reduces crime and

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<sup>31</sup> For a general overview of this area, see Crawford (1997, 1998); Hughes, McLaughlin and Muncie (2002); and Byrne and Pease (2003).



disorder in a local area via a process of consultation, audit and evaluation (Newburn 2002). It is now worth briefly exploring the processes that are associated with these forms of partnership.

With regards to these types of partnership in practice, Crawford (1997, 1998) suggests a number of factors that impact on their effectiveness. Firstly, the agencies involved hold diverse cultures, ideologies and traditions that Crawford (1998) notes lead to underlying 'structural conflicts' that are present during the partnership process. Despite these structural conflicts – which manifest themselves through differential power relations – Crawford and Jones (1995) find it striking that overt conflict is conspicuously absent from partnership working. Rather than not occurring, Crawford (1998) suggests that those involved in partnership devise strategies to avoid conflict (e.g. senior members of a group re-negotiating objectives / the setting of multiple aims and objectives), rather than resolving it. The net result is that differential power relations remain unchallenged and this can lead to erosions in trust which will impact on effective long term partnership working: in short, such avoidance strategies represent an ends oriented 'quest for unity' (Crawford 1998).

A second factor concerns 'informal' versus 'formal' partnership working. With regards to the former, 'informal' working practices are reliant on good interpersonal relations and the prioritisation of action over formal 'talking shops' (Crawford 1998). However, this presents a dilemma as these informal practices might enable greater flexibility and communication and yet they could also facilitate conflict avoidance strategies, and actions become unaccountable (Crawford 1998). In contrast, 'formal' partnership working with a 'top down' emphasis (i.e. strategy set amongst the higher echelons of organisations) might not translate to the 'front line'. Crawford (1998) suggests that effective co-ordination is therefore a key requirement of partnership working although it is essential that this process does not hinder collaboration (i.e. the 'co-ordinator' takes on too much responsibility and tasks are not devolved to the rest of the group).

Another factor that Crawford (1998) considers as important in partnership working is trust. This is enhanced when individuals appreciate the limitations of

their own and other organisations and the project they are involved in, and there is mutual respect for the contribution that each agency can make. In addition, training and secondments can breakdown stereotypes that can form the basis of mistrust. For the partnership to work effectively, Crawford (1998) considers it imperative that these trust relations are monitored and nurtured. Further, Crawford (1998) identifies three remaining factors that could prove problematic for effective partnership working. These include, a) problems of accountability (i.e. who and what are responsible for outcomes is characterised as fragmented and dispersed), b) intra-organisational relations and conflicts that could impact on inter organisational process and finally, c) the principles of 'managerialism' which could foster narrow perspectives and competition rather than reciprocity.

Phillips (2002) reviews the impact of moving from voluntary to statutory partnership working across three case studies. The findings suggest a commitment to partnership working at a strategic level with statutory agencies leading the process but not to the extent where other partners feel disempowered. The findings also suggest a lack of covert or overt conflict, although Phillips (2002) suggests that this could be a result of the partnerships being in a 'honeymoon' phase. On the negative side, Phillips (2002) highlights that the partnerships have been hampered by a lack of time, resources and appropriate expertise and an increase in administrative work to meet the demands of centrally set national targets, a factor that was not present prior to the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. In conclusion, Phillips (2002) suggests that the future for partnerships could therefore be subject to political pressures: 'quick' approaches prescribed by central government could undermine longer term measures to impact on crime and disorder.<sup>32</sup>

These observations about partnership working in the context of crime and disorder reduction may be useful in understanding the operation of SAGs in relation to community-based / festival events. Although the substantive outputs are different between crime reduction and public order policing, the practice of partnership working which is explored by Crawford (1998) and Phillips (2002) present a

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<sup>32</sup> For further discussion on more recent (and critical) evaluative work concerning the politics and practice associated with partnership working in relation to Crime Reduction, see Homel, Nutley, Webb and Tilley (2004).

number of factors that can be explored during the planning of such events, even if SAGs are not formally involved. It also raises the prospect of comparing the outcomes of partnership working in a public order context with the recommendations of Jefferson and D Waddington *et al* in relation to reducing the potential for disorder (e.g. through effective and consultative accountability mechanisms). It is also interesting to compare partnership working in a public order context with the findings of P.A.J Waddington (1994a) in relation to the planning stages (i.e. the negotiation between event organisers and the police) that he observed during the policing of protest. Within the context of this thesis, the combination of partnership practices from both the crime reduction and public order context offer an opportunity to explore this area in relation to the planning of events where contention appears not to be as explicit compared to the policing of protest.

## 5.2 ACPO's (2001) *'Keeping the Peace' Manual of Guidance*

The 'Keeping the Peace' manual of guidance (ACPO, 2001) is a resource that is available to the police and organisers in relation to the planning and staging of a community-based / festival event. The forward to this document illustrates that its remit includes public safety at events but in a wider context compared to ACPO's Public Safety Policy:

'For many police officers the term disorder no longer reflects the serious urban violence seen in the 1980s. Instead, at the start of this new millennium, we may be facilitating the right to engage in or protest against lawful activity, or helping to ensure the safety at large scale public celebrations. Our commitment to law however requires us to be capable of dealing with significant disorder should it arise.'

(ACPO, 2001, Forward)

It is important to note that Reicher *et al* (2004) were advisors to ACPO during the drafting of this manual of guidance. As such, the themes that they raise in relation to the importance of interaction and an appreciation of crowd heterogeneity permeate throughout the document and these manifest themselves through the

highlighting of strategic and tactical considerations (specifically in the context of command and planning) that can aid the police as an organisation in preparing for the policing of a public event. These will now be briefly outlined in relation to strategic considerations; command issues; planning, information and intelligence.

The *strategic considerations* essentially encompass pre-event preparation. It is important that the dynamics of the situation are understood, ranging from information such as the size and timing of an event through to wider issues such as community feeling and media interest. The manual also states that it is important for relevant stakeholders to be identified and partnerships developed and maintained. The logic is that this will enhance cohesion when it comes to identifying and promoting the intentions of both the police and organisers. These strategic considerations are a guide to good practice for a plethora of event types and situations and, although no explicit mention is made, any SAG would potentially be a vehicle from which these could be met.

At the practical level for police planners, it is crucial that the correct resources and skills base are utilised and provision made for any subsequent financial implications. In addition, consideration must also be given to ethical and legal matters that may arise. As an example, a planning officer may consider the role of the police in the event from a human rights perspective. The manual states that whatever the form any partnership working and pre event planning takes it must be thorough and all necessary contingencies formulated.

With regards to *command issues*, the chain of command that is implemented for any event is described by the manual as 'a long established and nationally accepted structure' that is used by both the police and other agencies (ACPO 2001, p35). It follows a 'metallic hierarchy' and was incorporated into the police in 1986 (Morrell, 1994). It also represents the coordinated and disciplined structure that P.A.J Waddington (1987, 1993) argues represents the best method of reducing the potential for disorder. Within this hierarchy, taking overall command and responsibility for the police involvement in an event or incident is a 'Gold Commander' who will oversee strategic development. Supplementing 'Gold' and next in the command chain is the 'Silver Commander' whose role is to develop

the relevant tactical planning to facilitate Gold's chosen strategy. It is the responsibility of the 'Bronze Commander' to implement the tactical plan formulated by 'Silver' and implement the relevant tactical decisions at an operational level. It is also the responsibility of 'Bronze' to update 'Silver' on any relevant developments as an event or situation develops. At a large event, a number of 'Bronze' commanders may be given responsibility for a specific geographical area or specialism (e.g. traffic). Depending on the scale or nature of the event or situation, the Bronze Commander may have a number of PSU (Police Support Units) under their command, comprising of an Inspector, three sergeants, eighteen constables and three drivers. It is important to note that this command structure is not rank-related, rather it is *role related* (e.g. a traffic bronze may be lower in rank than a geographical bronze).

Referring briefly away from the ACPO manual, problems have been identified concerning the flow of information along this chain of command: it has been noted that on some occasions Gold will abandon their strategic role and start administering tactical decisions to Bronze commanders (P.A.J Waddington 1991). It is also suggested that if the Gold commander takes on both a tactical and strategic role during an operation, it could be at the expense of maintaining other key functions that are critical to their role (e.g. consulting with community leaders) (P.A.J Waddington 1991). Another important issue is to what extent this chain of command can effectively implement Gold's strategy and Silver's tactics to all officers involved in an event or operation. In this respect the briefing is critical but P.A.J Waddington (1994a) notes that it has little impact on determining the behaviour of officers 'on the ground'. However, and despite these issues, it is worth reiterating that P.A.J Waddington (1991) believes that this command structure is more effective compared to previous command mechanisms (e.g. officers being deployed as individuals rather than co-ordinated and disciplined squads).

In relation to *planning, information and intelligence*, once notification of an event has been received it is essential that, through liaison with the organisers, the dynamics of the event (e.g. time, location, numbers) be ascertained as comprehensively as possible. This information can then be incorporated into

strategy and tactical planning meetings, culminating in the generation of an operational order. In 'Keeping the Peace' it is suggested that a strategy meeting should address the following 'IIRMAC' mnemonic that will form the operational order (ACPO 2001, p45):

- **I**nformation / Intelligence (to include threat assessment for the event);
- **I**ntention(s);
- **R**isk Assessment;
- **M**ethod (in line with risk assessment and health and safety factors);
- **A**dministration;
- **C**ommunication.

It is expected that the order 'should demonstrate resilience and cater for both the expected and unexpected. It must reflect the duration and complexity of the event' (ACPO, 2001, p46). Key to achieving this goal are effective communication processes, both within the police and through circulating information from the police and their partners to the wider community. On the first point, it is the responsibility of the Gold / Silver / Bronze command structure to ensure that strategy and tactics are disseminated to all officers through relevant briefings. Debriefings are also required to identify any applicable shortcomings or good practice that can be acted upon and incorporated into the planning of any future events. On the second point, an effective public relations strategy with clearly defined objectives (e.g. illustrating police professionalism) and arranged methods of communicating these objectives (e.g. identifying key audiences, agreeing key messages with partners) will facilitate the relationship with the media and aid wider dissemination.

The manual suggests that effective intelligence can inform and guide the planning and communication processes prior to and during an event. This can be attained from both national and local sources. At a national level, the National Public Order Intelligence Unit (NPOIU) can be accessed through a force's own Special Branch and may be consulted in circumstances where 'there is a substantial threat to public order, which arise from political extremism or protest activity' (APCO, 2001, p49). The NPOIU offers operational support, strategic analysis (to assess

and develop trends) and contacts to other national police agencies (ACPO, 2001). At a local level, ACPO (2001) recommend that intelligence is assessed through the mechanisms associated with the National Intelligence Model (NIM), for example developing intelligence products that can inform the command structure. When the ACPO manual of guidance was published in 2001, NIM was the domain of national agencies such as the National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS) and the National Crime Squad (NCS) but it is now established as a model of policing that all forces adopted in April 2004.<sup>33</sup>

Also at a local level, forward intelligence teams (FITs), evidence gatherers and local intelligence can contribute to an event / situation specific intelligence unit. This unit can utilise intelligence from both a national and local level to inform Gold and Silver prior to and during an event. As with tactical and strategic considerations, the intelligence gathering, assessing and dissemination processes, along with specific intelligence, may be employed post event to inform or guide the planning of any future events.

Both the Public Safety Policy (ACPO, 1999) and this manual of guidance offer the police general principles from which to work. In respect of community-based / festival events, the police would ideally be part of a pre-established SAG, working well with other agencies and organisers, and, come the event, would be able to organise an efficient and effective police response that maximises safety and minimises the potential for disorder. It is now pertinent to briefly overview the resources that are available to event organisers.

### *5.3. The Event Safety Guide*

The HSE's (1999) 'Event Safety Guide',<sup>34</sup> is aimed specifically at event organisers and the intention of this document is to offer logistical and legislative advice that relates to health and safety management and risk assessment at events. The emphasis is on the organisers to consult this document rather than the HSE being

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<sup>33</sup> The national implementation of NIM across all forces was applied through the National Policing Plan 2004 – 2007 (Home Office, 2003). For more detail on the mechanisms and rationale of NIM, see NCIS (2000). For a critical evaluation of the implementation of NIM in three forces prior to its national rollout in April 2004, see John and Maguire (2004).

<sup>34</sup> This is colloquially referred to as 'the Purple Guide'.

proactive in identifying organisers / events and alerting them to its existence. The focus is on guidance rather than a definitive formula for event planning and it includes recommendations relating to the following:

- *First Aid Cover*. This involves assessing the nature of the event and then using this information to calculate appropriate cover – a chart is provided for this purpose within the ‘purple guide’;
- *Developing a Safety Management Plan*. This should consider relevant health and safety considerations and be conducted through regular event safety meetings with appropriate partners (i.e. liaising with police and local authorities, although the SAG format is not specifically mentioned by name.);
- *Stewards*. The guide suggests the recruitment of a chief steward and senior supervisors to aid the safe staging of an event. It must also be ensured that all stewards are competent, trained and appropriately briefed;
- *Legislative Requirements*. The guide states that consideration must be given to relevant legislative procedures that need to be observed and / or followed. For example, this could refer to a public entertainment licence in addition to Health and Safety at work legislation (e.g. the working hours and conditions for employees / stewards).

In addition to emphasising general planning and partnership working, it is important to briefly reflect on the work of stewards and / or private security in relation to public order policing.<sup>35</sup> Despite their analytic differences, D Waddington (1992) and P.A.J Waddington (1994a) highlight the important role that stewards potentially play during public order operations. At the situational level of the ‘flashpoint’ D Waddington (1992) suggests that the effective marshalling of a crowd by stewards is a factor that can reduce the potential for disorder. P.A.J Waddington (1994a) suggests that the organisation of stewarding arrangements reinforces the issue of responsibility on the organisers during the preparation and staging of an event. Organisers are reminded that they require effective briefing and the implicit message is that if anything goes wrong the

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<sup>35</sup> Both ‘stewards’ and ‘security’ are mentioned in the Event Safety Guide but no distinction is made between the two.



consequences will rest with them rather than the police. P.A.J Waddington (1994a) notes from his observational fieldwork that the stewards often deal with what the police perceive as 'extremists' (i.e. potential troublemakers) during an event. Although the police welcome this aspect of the stewarding role, P.A.J Waddington (1994a) suggests that stewards are perceived by officers as being generally poor and are a constant source of police complaint.

In relation to the use of private (i.e. commercial) security, P.A.J Waddington (2003) notes that this resource is increasingly being used in the private sphere (e.g. forms of protest that occur on private land). Button (2002) states that in the context of environmental protest, private security has been used to evict protestors leading to confrontation. It is suggested that this tactic is problematic as the security personnel have minimal training and the attitude of managers can be overtly confrontational; this therefore raises issues of accountability (Button, 2002). Within this context, Button and John (2002) argue that the police are akin to 'referees' between protestors and private security personnel operating under the direction of an under-sheriff who enforces evictions as a result of civil litigation. In a different but more recent context, it is also interesting to note that private security personnel who are involved in events (including festivals) after March 2006 require a security license issued by the Security Industry Authority (SIA) under legislation from the Private Security Industry Act 2001 although this does not apply to stewards (Security Industry Authority, 2005).<sup>36</sup> However, from an empirical perspective, the role of private security has not been explored in relation to other public order policing contexts (e.g. community-based / festival events). In addition to the use of stewards, this is another variable that is explored in this thesis.

It is pertinent in an analysis of contemporary public order policing to draw on Loader's (2000) work that outlines the relation that different forms of policing hold to the state which in turn emphasises the 'pluralisation' of contemporary policing.<sup>37</sup> Loader's (2000) conceptualisation of this pluralisation raises issues of

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<sup>36</sup> Other sectors within the security industry (e.g. Security Guarding; Cash and Valuables in Transit; Public Space Surveillance CCTV and Close Protection) will also require licensing under the Private Security Industry Act – to obtain a license, applicants must undertake specialist training (Security Industry Authority, 2005)

<sup>37</sup> See also Jones and Newburn (1998) and Crawford (2003)

accountability. For the purposes of this thesis the focus will be on policing *beyond* government (i.e. commercial security) and policing *through* government (i.e. multi agency partnerships; the role of volunteer stewards) in addition to policing *by* government (i.e. the public police) in maintaining safety and order at community-based / festival events.

This section has provided an overview of contemporary public order policing policy (ACPO 1999, 2001) and resources for event organisers (HSE, 1999). This in turn has raised a number of additional variables that are worthy of exploration in the context of this thesis (i.e. the role of partnerships; the role of private security and / or stewarding arrangements). In relation to understanding the public order policing of the types of events raised in the introduction, these factors provide fruitful leads for subsequent analysis.

## **6. Conclusion and Research Aims**

This chapter has demonstrated that, as a concept, public order policing forms part of the police's order maintenance function. Whilst this is an ambiguous and contested facet of the general police function, the issues of equity and accountability are important in considering public order policing. In addition, there is a large volume of social research pertaining to public order policing in practice. However, the majority of this research focuses on the policing of contention and / or disorder. Therefore, there is scope for greater exploration of public order policing in (relatively) non contentious circumstances and this is essentially the focus of this thesis.

It is also the case that the majority of analytical accounts are concerned with contention and / or disorder (with some notable exceptions such as P.A.J Waddington 1994a and Barton and James 2003). These are useful as they allow for the identification of factors and variables that could prove insightful in relation to the public order policing of community-based events. However, it was also noted that some of these accounts (i.e. Jefferson's arguments, the 'flashpoints' model, P.A.J Waddington's work) have generated debate that reflect polarised opinions on public order policing. At this stage, it is useful to note that Reiner

(2000b) equates police related research in the late 1970's and 1980's as representing a *conflict* stage in the (40 years plus) history of police research. Reiner (2000b) argues that this stage was characterised by radical conceptualisations (e.g. Marxist) and criticisms of the police and this perspective permeates through Jefferson's arguments and the 'flashpoints' model.<sup>38</sup> In contrast the objective of this thesis is to take the philosophy of Banton (1964) and attempt to understand the processes that appear to make some forms of public order policing *work* (i.e. the maintenance of order and safety, even when there exists potential conflict to be resolved between different parties). Therefore, the aims for the thesis are as follows:

- To investigate the processes associated with the planning and staging of 'community-based events', which as a category can be placed within the context of the public order policing of festivals;
- To explore the input and role of the police in relation to such events;
- To explore the input and role of organisers in relation to such events;
- To analytically account for the above factors and their relation where appropriate to either issues of order and / or disorder, drawing where necessary from existing accounts;
- To generate 'good practice' for both the police and organisers that can be used to inform community-based / festival events and other public order policing contexts in relation to planning and staging that minimises the potential for disorder.

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<sup>38</sup> This is made explicit through P.A.J Waddington's critiques of these analytic accounts.

## **Chapter Three: Methodology**

### **1. Introduction**

The purpose of this chapter is to present an account of the logistics associated with conducting the research process. It therefore explores the origins and context of the CASE PhD process and acknowledges the importance of the research proposal in guiding this work. As a qualitative methodology was used, the specific field methods (i.e. observation and interviewing) used to collect data are also examined. There is also consideration of sampling in relation to the choice of field sites and each of the events that formed the basis of the field research is introduced. In addition to the logistics associated with these aspects of the methodology, reflection is provided on how the research process progressed ‘in the field’. Finally, the analytic process is introduced and examined. This section highlights the methodological criticisms that have been directed at previous public order policing research and considers how these have to an extent been avoided in this work. This is followed by presenting an overview of grounded theory which provided the analytic framework that accompanied the data collection process.

### **2. The Origins and Context of the Research**

Before exploring methodological issues in relation to this thesis, it is important to introduce the origins and context surrounding this research. To achieve this, it is relevant to provide an overview of the rationale and structure behind the ESRC CASE studentship. This will be followed by outlining the work of the non-academic partner involved in this research and, finally, there will be discussion of the research proposal that was developed prior to the commencement of the PhD.

#### *2.1. Overview of the ESRC CASE Doctoral Process*

This thesis is the product of a full time ESRC CASE studentship involving the University of Surrey and the National Crime and Operations Faculty (NCOF) who are based within the National Centre for Policing Excellence (NCPE) at Centrex. Before examining in more detail the nature of the NCOF’s work, it is worth

briefly outlining the aims and objectives associated with this form of studentship. CASE studentships place an emphasis on collaboration between a Higher Education institution and commercial / public sector / voluntary sector partner. It is this collaborative approach which distinguishes CASE awards from other types of postgraduate funding. The ESRC identify a number of benefits associated with this collaborative approach including the provision of 'real life' research experience for the student and the opportunity for partner organisations to explore projects which, for any number of reasons, might not be achievable 'in house'.<sup>1</sup> This process also differs from other types of studentship in that additional funding is provided to the student and academic institution from the non-academic partner and the research proposal is designed exclusively by these parties rather than there being an input from the student, although the student can revise this as the research progresses. In relation to this research, the CASE studentship has been supervised by Professor Nigel Fielding (University of Surrey) and Dr Kate Paradine (NCPE). The supervision process (i.e. meetings, discussion of progress, and feedback on work) is no different to structures that exist with other forms of doctoral studentships. In addition to this, and as recommended by the ESRC, a document will be produced post PhD specifically for the NCOF which will contain an overview of the research findings and policy recommendations.

## *2.2. Overview of Centrex and the National Crime and Operations Faculty (NCOF)*

As has been previously mentioned, the non-academic partner for this research is the National Crime and Operations Faculty (NCOF). It is worth briefly outlining the nature of the work that this department is involved in. The NCOF is part of Centrex<sup>2</sup> which was established on April 1<sup>st</sup> 2002. Prior to this date, the organisation was collectively known as National Police Training (NPT). As a result of the Police Reform Act 2002, the NCOF is now part of the NCPE (National Centre for Policing Excellence) which was established in April 2003. It should also be noted that in April 2002 Centrex gained the status of a non-

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<sup>1</sup> Further information on the CASE rationale / format can be located at the postgraduate funding opportunities section of the ESRC website ([www.esrc.ac.uk](http://www.esrc.ac.uk)). An overview of advice and 'good practice' in relation to this form of studentship is also available from the ESRC (Bell and Read, 1998).

<sup>2</sup> Centrex is the working name for the Central Police Training and Development Authority.

departmental body (i.e. funded by central government but not managed by it). From their website, the stated aim of Centrex is to ‘define, develop and promote policing excellence’. Tasked with achieving this are a series of departments including:

- the NCOF;
- National Specialist Law Enforcement Centre (NSLEC);
- National Police Leadership Centre (NPLC);
- The International Faculty;
- National Training Centre for Scientific Support to Crime Investigation (NTC);
- Foundation Training.

Each of these departments has their own specialist remit and work in collaboration with police services, other police organisations (e.g. ACPO), HM Inspectorate of Constabulary, central government, the private sector and academia. The departments listed above are located at a number of sites across England and Wales but there is also an emphasis on international collaboration.<sup>3</sup>

The NCOF represents the amalgamation of two separate departments, the National Operations Faculty (NOF) and the National Crime Faculty (NCF) who merged in December 2001. The NCOF comprises of a number of teams and is involved in a number of tasks including training, operational support, serious crime analysis, reassurance, incident management and information services. The NCOF can be consulted on these areas by any force in the country and it provides a resource for the dissemination of good practice. During this research, I collaborated most closely with the Public Order Team which provides training and operational support in a number of areas related to both strategy and tactics. Reference will be made to the benefits and implications of this collaboration as the chapter develops.

### *2.3. The CASE Proposal*

Marshall and Rossman (1995) suggest that a formulated research strategy will act as a ‘road map’ that will guide the research process. Before presenting a detailed

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<sup>3</sup> For more information on Centrex and the departments mentioned, see [www.centrex.police.uk](http://www.centrex.police.uk)

exploration of the research methods utilised in this thesis, the role of the CASE proposal must be acknowledged as influential in dictating the route taken during the research. As mentioned previously, the CASE proposal was formulated prior to the commencement of the studentship. In broad terms, this proposal offered a starting point in terms of identifying a number of aims and objectives along with research methods to be used. In relation to the aims and objectives, the proposal identified the requirement to focus on three different community-based events. As a term of reference, the proposal suggested that these events should be organised and supported by 'significant minority interests in the community, occur at predictable and publicly-announced times, and require some form of police involvement. The proposal also stated that the Notting Hill Carnival would not form one of the chosen events due to potential logistical difficulties associated with the size of the event. In addition, the proposal recommended that one event would involve a minority religious and / or ethnic group and that another event would be organised by a minority sexual preference group. Finally, for the purposes of comparative analysis the proposal suggested that at least one of the three events would be observed over two consecutive years. With regards to specific research methods, the proposal recommended a qualitative methodology encompassing interviews with key players involved with each event and some form of observational fieldwork. The proposal provided a robust starting point from which to work. The next section will explore how the research progressed and explain why a qualitative methodology presents the best approach to address the research aims and objectives mentioned at the conclusion of the previous chapter. It will also explore the contribution of existing research literature on public order policing in guiding the research process.

### **3. Developing a Research Strategy: The Potential of a Qualitative Methodology**

It is important to recognise that a number of options are presented when considering different forms of research strategy and consideration of these in respect of this research highlights the suitability of a qualitative methodology. For example, Yin (2003) suggests that the researcher needs to ask three questions when choosing a relevant research strategy. a) what is the form of the research

question, b) does the researcher have control over behavioural events and, c) is the research focused on contemporary (as opposed to historical) events?

In consideration of questions b) and c), the previous section highlighted that a qualitative methodology encompassing interviewing and observation was recommended. It is worth noting at this stage that by engaging in these forms of field research a 'naturalistic' position would be adopted (Bryman 1988). This position equates to understanding the phenomenon (i.e. the public order policing of community-based events) without imposing experimental controls on the settings I would choose to participate in. By adopting this position there would be no control over behavioural events. The CASE proposal also stated that the research focus would be contemporary: the settings would be 'live' in the sense that they would be ongoing and ever evolving and not rooted in the past. From Yin's (2003) advice for formulating a research strategy, these decisions rule out an experimental, archival analysis and an historical based approach to the research.

With reference to question a) and in the context of this thesis, there are a number of factors characterising the form of the research question. The previous chapter argued that whilst a large volume of research has been conducted on public order policing and *contention*, relatively little has focussed on the policing of events which are similar in nature to those under study in this thesis. Therefore, to gain knowledge of this area, I would have to explore something 'new' as no specific template exists that can be followed or tested. In respect of this, Marshall and Rossman (1995) elaborate on Yin's ideas on the research strategy by introducing exploratory, explanatory, descriptive and predictive typologies relating to the purpose of research. The questions this thesis addresses fall most comfortably into the exploratory (i.e. what is happening?) and the explanatory (i.e. what factors are causing this to happen?) categories. Marshall and Rossman (1995) suggest that by considering exploratory and explanatory forms of research questions, the most suitable methodologies include field research that in turn might include interviewing and observation.



Singleton, Straits and Straits (1993, p316) suggest that it is potentially possible to 'build a general, abstract understanding of social phenomena' through field research. With reference to the exploratory approach embedded within the research strategy of this thesis, field research is considered as productive when relatively little is known about the phenomenon under examination (Jorgensen 1989). Rather than holding pre-conceived ideas one is placed in the position of having to consider all possibilities and angles when in the field (Singleton *et al* 1993). On a similar theme and if one is participating in a setting over a period of time, field research also provides the flexibility to cope with the potential ever-changing nature of the phenomenon under investigation (Singleton *et al* 1993). This flexibility therefore allows the researcher to keep true to the exploratory form of research question (i.e. what is happening). It is also possible to simultaneously identify problems and concepts through exposure to settings which can enhance the answering of explanatory questions (Jorgensen, 1989).

Having established that field research offers a framework to explore, it is worth further highlighting how it can contribute to *explaining*. Lofland and Lofland (1995) suggest that the researcher must achieve two important processes when attempting to collect the 'richest' possible data from the field. The first of these is to become well versed and familiar within the settings that one is investigating. Secondly, by interacting with those in the setting it becomes possible to 'participate in the minds' of those who will generate the understanding that will ultimately lead to the research findings (Lofland and Lofland 1995). The combination of these two processes will leave the researcher in the best possible position to attain an 'insider's view of reality' (Singleton *et al* 1993, p318) and therefore answer with clarity the exploratory and explanatory forms of question.

Insights from the methodological literature demonstrate the suitability of a qualitative methodology to address the research questions in this thesis. It is also important to acknowledge that the use of field research is well documented in the literature relating to police research. For example, the origins of this body of research are rooted in these methods (Fielding 2000) and in relation to public order policing the analytic accounts presented in the previous chapter (i.e. paramilitarism, 'flashpoints' model, the work of P.A.J Waddington, social

psychological approaches) have all used qualitative research methods. From this body of research, useful methodological insight is evident in P.A.J Waddington's (1994a) work on the policing of various types of events in London.

As noted in the previous chapter, P.A.J Waddington (1994a) observed the meetings between the police and the organisers in addition to the actual staging of nearly 100 events. In relation to methodology, P.A.J Waddington (1994a, p208) argues that 'the greatest advantage of observational methods is their flexibility'. In the context of P.A.J Waddington's research this flexibility ensured that both the planning and staging of events were observed ensuring an insight that led to his main conceptualisations in relation to the issues under scrutiny. At another level this observational perspective led to the challenging of pre-conceived beliefs about public order policing, especially in light of the policing of ceremonial events:

'It never occurred to me that the policing of ceremonials might be of such significance... A methodology that did not allow for redefinition of the problem in the light of experience might have led this research seriously astray' (P.A.J Waddington 1994a, p208).

As a methodological template to follow, P.A.J Waddington's approach is useful as it demonstrates the benefits of both flexibility and problem redefinition that are key components of field research. However, P.A.J Waddington (1994a) does present a number of potential limitations associated with observational methods. These limitations are not limited to P.A.J Waddington's account of public order policing and are relevant to this thesis. They will therefore be explored in section seven which explores the analytic process associated with this thesis.

#### **4. Selecting a Sample of Community-Based Events**

The potential of a qualitative methodology and its suitability to this research strategy has been outlined in the previous section. To summarise, participation in a setting over time offers an opportunity to answer 'exploratory' and 'explanatory' types of research questions which form the cornerstone of this research. It has also

been acknowledged that there is a precedent in the use of qualitative methods in relation to public order policing research. This section will present an overview of how different events were chosen for the purposes of field research and will highlight the risks associated with embarking on research that potentially involves a lengthy period of time in the field. The section concludes with a descriptive overview of the events that were finally chosen to form the basis of the field research.

Underlining the research strategy is the *case study methodology*. The advantage of adopting this approach is that it ‘allows investigators to retain the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life events’ (Yin, 2003, p2). This is particularly useful when the researcher wishes to assess the impact (or otherwise) of *context* in relation to the phenomenon under investigation (Yin, 2003). In this respect, the case study methodology allows for both ‘exploratory’ and ‘explanatory’ enquiry through the use of multiple research methods (Yin, 2003). With regards to this thesis, this was achieved by using observation and interviewing during the planning and staging of four community-based events.

A ‘purposeful sampling strategy’ was utilised to select relevant field sites at the outset of the research process. The rationale behind purposeful sampling is defined as ‘selecting *information-rich cases* for study in-depth’ (Patton 1990, p169) and a number of options are open to the researcher. Patton (1990) outlines sixteen different purposeful sampling strategies and this thesis employed two of them. The first and initially most important strategy to be employed was a ‘criterion-based strategy’. The logic behind criterion-based sampling is simple: identify cases where information is likely to be rich on the basis of certain characteristics. The guidance for selection using this method came from the CASE proposal and efforts were focussed on identifying potential events that:

- Were promoted and supported by a minority section of the community (e.g. ethnic minority; gay / lesbian community);
- Occurred on a regular and predictable basis;
- Required the input and presence of the police during the planning and staging phases.

Having identified the criterion for selecting events, the next stage was to try and find relevant 'gatekeepers' to locate potential sites. This process reflects what Patton (1990) terms the 'chain sampling strategy' where one identifies potentially information rich sites by utilising the expertise of relevant practitioners. In the case of this research, initial contacts were made through the NCOF who employ police officers from a number of UK forces. These officers were asked if they knew of colleagues either directly involved in the planning of events fitting the criterion, or of colleagues who would know the right people to contact.

This process yielded a number of possibilities and certainly aided in gaining access to the final events that were chosen. However, it also highlighted a fundamental risk with the research strategy. Before entering the field it was anticipated that the planning and staging of an event could potentially take a number of months. However, as an observer I had no control over whether an event would progress from the planning phases to actually being staged and this did create logistical difficulties.

Using the criterion and chain sampling methods mentioned above, I had been presented with the opportunity to observe the planning and staging of an event for the gay community in the north of England. This opportunity arose during the first six months of the PhD process and access had been successfully negotiated with both the main police representative involved in the planning process and the main organiser. Just as I was set to embark on observing the first planning meeting, I received an e-mail from the main organiser stating that the event would in all probability be cancelled due to a lack of funding. I acted on the organiser's advice, along with that of the police representative, not to pursue this as one of the main events.

The short-term impact of this experience culminated in having to find another potential site. However, as it happened relatively early in the research process it added two new dimensions to the research strategy. Firstly, it became apparent that during the initial stages of negotiation as much information as possible would need to be gathered concerning the likelihood of an event going ahead. All I could

go on was the word of the police and / or organisers but from this information I could withdraw at an early stage if the collective consensus was that an event might not realistically go ahead.

Secondly, this experience effectively ruled out undertaking research at events that were being held for the first time as these represented the greatest risk of not being staged. It would have been interesting to have been involved in an event of this nature as there would have been the opportunity to compare it with more 'established' (i.e. longer running) events. However, to have committed myself to an event for a number of months that did not ultimately go ahead would have been detrimental to the research process as it was confined to a finite timescale. Ironically and despite these precautionary measures an 'established' event that was chosen did present significant access problems during one cycle of observations and this is discussed later in the chapter.

Following the 'near miss' mentioned above, the sampling strategy did yield three field sites that matched the characteristics outlined through the criterion sampling method. These events formed the basis of the observational fieldwork and subsequent interviews and will be referred to as 'Mela' / 'Multicultural Festival'<sup>4</sup>, 'Pride' and 'Solstice'. Chapter four presents a comprehensive overview of the characteristics associated with each of these events but for the purposes of this chapter it is useful to present a brief descriptive account.

#### *4.1. Mela / Multicultural Festival*

The observed Mela event was held in the north of England and represented the first event where access was gained. Mela type events are held all over the country and are predominantly aimed at and attended by members of South Asian communities living in the UK. During the second year of observation, the organisers wished to integrate other parts of the community into the event hence the change of name to the 'Multicultural Festival'. On both occasions, the event was characterised by stalls, music and other forms of entertainment taking place in

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<sup>4</sup> This event was followed over two consecutive years and the name / focus of the event changed during this period although it was held at the same location.

a large park. Approximately 5,000 people attended each of these events and both were staged over one day during the summer.

Access to the initial event (i.e. Mela) was negotiated through a superintendent based in the force where it is held. This officer then put me in contact with the main police liaison for the event who invited me to an initial planning meeting with organisers. At this meeting I was able to secure permission from the organisers to observe the planning and staging of the event. This culminated in observing the two planning meetings that were held prior to the event. I observed the actual staging of the Mela by shadowing a number of officers who had been assigned to police it.

Following the staging of the Mela, contact was maintained with the main organisers who announced that the focus for the following year would change. This culminated in changes of personnel and increased frequency with regards to planning meetings. Having established links during the planning and staging of the Mela, access to the planning process for the Multicultural Festival was straightforward. The logistics of observing this event involved attending four of the five meetings prior to the event and observing the staging of the event by shadowing the main organisers rather than the police.

#### *4.2. Pride*

The observed Pride event was held in a city in the south of England and it is a celebration aimed at the lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) community. The event consists of a parade followed by a large gathering on an open park and other spin off special events. The festival is held over a weekend in the summer. Access to this event was secured early in the first year of the PhD through a chief inspector who attended a NCOF organised conference and was due to be a silver commander at the event. Following this, I attended a planning meeting and secured permission from the event organisers to observe the planning process. For reasons to be explored later, fieldwork at Pride ceased after this planning meeting despite securing this initial access.

A year later, I gained access to observe the same event through a different police officer who was acting as the main police liaison. There were four meetings between the police and the event organisers prior to the staging of the event and observation was conducted at two of them. The missed meetings were called at short notice as and when members of the planning group could assemble. On one

occasion I was alerted to a change in dates *after* the meeting had occurred. However, I was able to obtain minutes for these meetings. The staging of the event was observed by following both the police and organisers during the parade and celebration on the park. The event attracted between 60,000 and 90,000 people.

#### *4.3. Solstice*

Access to this event was secured through a chief superintendent who was the silver commander at the event and acted as a liaison between the police and event organisers during the planning stages. The observed Solstice event was held over one night / morning (twelve hours in duration) in the summer and it is an event that holds significance for members of pagan and druid communities although other members of the public attended. Over 30,000 people attended and I shadowed police commanders on site for the majority of the event. However, I was also able to observe some elements of the event as a member of the public. With regards to the planning process, meetings between the police and organisers were held on a monthly basis and the six meetings prior to the staging of the event were observed.

### **5. Reflections on Observation**

Having presented an overview of the sampling procedures and introduced the events that formed the basis of the fieldwork, the aim of this section is to reflect on the logistics of undertaking observational research. This requires consideration of the different types of roles that are adopted in the field and how these relate to ethics. The unpredictable nature of fieldwork will also be considered by elaborating on issues that led to the aborted attempt to observe Pride in my first year.

With regards to the role of the researcher during observational fieldwork, Gold (1969) distinguishes between four types of observation: i) 'complete observer', ii) 'observer-as-participant', iii) 'participant-as-observer' and iv) 'complete participant'. These four types of observation occur along a continuum and it is acknowledged that an observer will shift between them depending on the opportunities that present themselves during their exposure to the field (Singleton

*et al*, 1993). This typology has been adapted by Van Maanen (1978) in relation to police research and this will be discussed later with reference to research ethics.

From Gold's typology, the first three roles were utilised at some stage during the observational fieldwork although the majority of time in the field centred on fulfilling and then moving from an 'observer as participant' to a 'participant as observer' role. I started from the 'observer as participant' role through initial logistic constraints as I had no prior knowledge of who might be attending the first Mela, Pride and Solstice meetings and none of these people would have known that there was to be a researcher amongst them (the exception being the 'gatekeepers' who had facilitated access). In this respect I was entering the field as an 'outsider' and placing myself in a 'closed' setting (Jorgensen 1989) as these were not open meetings where it was possible to arrive and take notes without negotiating access. At the first Solstice and Pride meetings I was introduced to the group by the chair and police representative respectively whilst at the first Mela meeting I was able to introduce myself as a researcher before the meeting officially started due to a delay incurred by the late arrival of the police representatives.

At these initial and subsequent meetings I often sat either at the meeting table or, when numbers were high and space was limited, in a position that afforded a suitable vantage point for listening and observing events as they proceeded. This remained constant throughout the observation of the planning meetings at all the chosen events. However, as time passed I started to become a 'known face' and people would openly ask how the research was going. This was due in part to a consistency in attendance: it was routinely the same people attending on a regular basis. This process of integration marked the subtle shift from 'observer as participant' to 'participant as observer'. People were increasingly becoming more comfortable with my presence and would openly relay information and opinions outside the confines of a 'formal' meeting.

The impact of this was twofold. Firstly, it allowed me to present myself as a person who was genuinely interested in how the planning proceeded (thus breaking down a 'formal' researcher image) and it provided the opportunity to



understand the roles of people involved in the planning process both formally (through the meeting) and informally (either before or after, during a break or even over e-mail). This process also helped identify possible participants for interviewing. Secondly, it became apparent through increased interaction with group members that decision making was occurring both inside and *outside* of these formal meetings. This is analogous to Goffman's (1959) conceptualisation of the 'front stage' (i.e. the observed meetings) as it became evident that this was being influenced by a 'back stage' (i.e. informal and 'unseen' discussion away from these meetings).

To illustrate the growing awareness of a 'back stage' it is worth outlining two examples from this phase of the research. The first example could be conceptualised as 'structural' as I became aware of a meeting involving representatives from the police and the main organising body (including the chair) that was *separate yet related* to the Solstice meetings I was observing. I was not allowed to participate in these and neither were members from the pagan or druid community. The second example could be conceptualised as 'attitudinal'. Following a Pride meeting, a member of the main organising committee confided that he believed the police were poor in dealing with a) the local LGBT community and b) demonstrating sensitivity in policing the event on previous occasions. Such comments were not made during the meeting and thus further potential avenues to explore were being presented as I became more immersed and familiar with the people in the settings I was observing.

In general, this shift in roles from 'observer as participant' to 'participant as observer' did not impinge on the research settings. I cut an unobtrusive figure whose presence was never challenged, even when new people became involved in the planning process. However, there was one occasion at a Multicultural Festival planning meeting when I briefly skirted with the extremes of the 'participant as observer' role. At the start of my second year of observing the planning for this event the (then) committee had to dissolve their membership, be re-elected and then re-draft a constitution. The dissolution of the existing committee was simple enough but it was identified that a set number of people were required to 'vote in' new members before the constitution could be re-drafted. Unfortunately, the

combined number of people present, excluding myself as observer, was one short. One of the organisers asked if I would become a member of the committee to remedy this situation. To take this role would have seriously impacted on the organisation of the event that I wished to observe from as naturalistic a position as possible. I was ambivalent but fortunately a further reading of the constitution revealed that they did have enough people present.

Lofland and Lofland (1995) suggest that in order to maintain access it is not unusual for the researcher to make a 'trade-off' in return for acceptance in the research setting. With regards to this meeting, I was later asked if I knew of any police contacts through whom the committee might be able to secure additional funding for the Multicultural Festival. I explained that funding might be available through section 17 of the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act and suggested they contact a local superintendent. This could be interpreted as 'influencing' the field but I believed that they would a) have found the information through other contacts in time and b) this represented a reasonable 'trade-off' for the access that this group had granted.

In relation to observing the actual staging of Mela / Multicultural Festival, Pride and Solstice, I was granted access to 'closed' settings (e.g. police command posts) at the invitation of the police / organisers that I had met through the planning and this supplemented observations from 'open' settings (i.e. where the public were allowed access). Given that so many people were involved in the running of each event, it was relatively easy to observe without having to obtrude on the setting and my presence was never challenged. However, there were some occasions during the staging of the events when I found myself again at the extreme of the 'participant as observer' role. During the staging of the Multicultural Festival, I shadowed one of the organisers and effectively became an organiser for a few hours as I helped manage access to and from the park for a large number of vehicles prior to the start of the event. At the other extreme of the observation continuum, the staging of each event also presented the opportunity to fulfil the 'complete observer role': I made sure that I found the time to walk around the sites away from the police and / or organisers and simply observe all that was occurring around me. To make myself as unobtrusive as possible I made sure I

was not wearing anything that could identify me with the organisers and police until I was ready to assume the role of a 'participant as observer' once more.

At no stage of the research did I adopt the 'complete participant' role that requires deceiving members as to being a researcher. However, this shift between different types of organiser role does hold ethical implications even though there was no need to conceal my identity as a researcher. Van Maanen (1978) presents an account of how these roles impact on ethics in relation to observational work that involves the police and it is worth considering here. Demonstrating a similar approach to Gold (1969), Van Maanen (1978) notes that as observational research proceeds, the researcher will switch between the roles of a 'fan', 'member', 'voyeur' and 'spy' and these fall into line with an 'overt' or 'covert' position in relation to ethics. The roles of 'fan' and 'member' are overt positions. In the context of this research, I was predominantly a 'fan' and the research was 'overt' as group members at meetings knew I was a researcher and I had made them aware of my research topic from the outset.

However, at no stage did I state that I would be writing up the observations as fieldnotes, to be later analysed, and there were inevitably moments when I was adopting the 'covert' role of 'voyeur' (e.g. by interacting with group members outside of the confines of the meeting, for example, getting a lift to the station) and 'spy' (i.e. subsequently writing these observations as fieldnotes). This raises the important issue of informed consent, which leads to a delicate 'balancing act' for observers in the field. Gaining formal informed consent from every member present at a meeting would have required ascertaining permission to note, write up and then analyse each meeting that was observed. This could have presented logistical difficulties given the time constraints placed on meetings and there was a chance that I could have been denied access to the settings from the outset. However, I was effectively deceiving members as to the true nature of my research by not gaining this formal informed consent despite the fact that every facet of the field that I observed was providing important data.

Informed consent is complicated even further when the numbers attending the actual events are taken into account. During the observation of the staging of each

event, there were fleeting exchanges with tens, if not hundreds of people, and a combined total of over 100,000 people attended them. Securing informed consent from all these people, who potentially could have been the subject of my research, would have been impossible logistically.

To overcome this problem, I was able to formulate a suitable ethical framework at an early stage of the fieldwork process. Norris (1993) notes that an ethical spectrum exists that ranges from a 'legalistic' position at one end (i.e. strict adherence to a professional code of conduct such as the British Sociological Association code of ethics) to an 'antinomian' position (i.e. the means justify the ends, whatever the ethical implications, in attaining knowledge) at the other. From this spectrum, Norris (1993) suggests that numerous field-workers opt for a 'situational' position: the emphasis is on the researcher in the field to devise and work to their own ethical codes, based on their individual conscience. In the context of informed consent, this approach enabled me to proceed from an ethical framework that was neither constricted by guidelines that would make the research impossible to conduct or would reject the notion of ethics in the field.

In terms of this approach in action, formal informed consent was not gained during the observational fieldwork. However, all other aspects of the research adhered to the code of research ethics as presented by the British Society of Criminology.<sup>5</sup> For example, the names of people involved during this process have been anonymised (through the allocation of random initials) to protect their identity. In addition, any context that could identify them (e.g. names of places / organisations) has been removed from extracts that are presented in the subsequent analysis chapters. Given the confines noted above with attempting informed consent in all cases, this situational approach presented the most suitable ethical framework for this research.

### *5.1. Difficulties in the Field*

It was previously noted that the observational phase of the fieldwork suffered from some difficulties in relation to the Pride event. This impacted on the research

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<sup>5</sup> See <http://www.britisoccrim.org/ethics.htm> for more details.

strategy and it is worth reflecting on it before exploring the interviewing component of the research process. It also highlights the flexibility that is required to overcome problems with observational fieldwork. To summarise, I was invited to observe the planning of Pride by a police representative who was attending a conference run by NCOF. Although I had missed the initial meetings, I received permission from the members of the planning group that incorporated event organisers and the council to observe the run up to that year's Pride event. This initial meeting went well and I was set to return for the next meeting some weeks later.

Unfortunately, this next meeting never transpired due to the staging of a large event in the same area that generated extensive media criticism. The event in question made the national news as there was serious overcrowding and two fatalities. This occurred prior to the next Pride meeting I was due to attend and I received an e-mail from the police representative stating that the situation between the police and local council was fraught in relation to who was to blame for the problems caused at this event. He advised that I should not attend the next meeting due to these tensions and I duly took his advice.

After a number of weeks I re-established contact to try and attain access to the next Pride meeting. An e-mail from the same police representative stated that the situation was still tense but he did not mind me attending if I could secure permission from the council. This then prompted an ultimately unsuccessful attempt to establish contact with the council. E-mails were unanswered and phone calls were never returned. Although the police representative was helpful in trying to overcome these problems, he contacted me to say that he was moving from his position and suggested that I abandon any notion of observing the remaining Pride meetings. This effectively ended my association with Pride during my first year. However, this police representative stated that he would help facilitate access for the following year which he did by giving me some relevant contact details a few months later. Fortunately, these tensions were not evident during the second year of observation and access was secured for a number of meetings in addition to the staging of the event.

The impact of this situation was unfortunate but manageable. The first consequence for the research strategy impacted on the timetable and logistics. I had hoped to track two events over consecutive years, but it was decided that I would focus only on the Mela to fulfil the comparative criterion of the research strategy. I have previously alluded to the second consequence: I was being made increasingly aware of the 'back stage' to the planning and staging of the observed events. As an observer I was conscious that there was a limit to what data I could glean from simply attending meetings and even though I knew from the outset that my membership was peripheral. To overcome this and attempt to elicit the richest possible data meant employing the second methodological component of the research strategy: interviewing.

## **6. Reflections on Interviewing**

The aim of this section is to present an overview of the interviewing methods and procedures that were employed for this research. This includes exploring the rationale behind this method alongside issues of selecting an interview sample and logistical concerns. Starting with the rationale, the previous section highlighted that the existence of a 'back stage' became apparent as the observational phase of data collection progressed. Beyond the confines of a formal meeting, a group member might pass comment on an issue that in turn presented a context that would not have been available by simply limiting the data collection process to observing the meetings and the events that could be attended.

Therefore, to maximise data collection from the sites, interviewing is a valuable research method as it can reveal information that cannot be observed and 'yield rich insights into people's biographies, experiences, opinions, values, aspirations, attitudes and feelings' (May 2001, p120). To advance the data collection process, an 'unstructured' interviewing strategy was utilised. Part of the appeal associated with this approach is the relative flexibility it offers compared to 'structured' and 'semi-structured' interview strategies: the interviewer has an interview guide but there are no 'set questions' that must be asked of each interviewee (Fielding 1993). To restrict a diverse array of participants ranging from senior police

officers to pagan activists to a pre-determined and non-changing set of questions would have been futile as the potential for rich data would be compromised.

The adoption of the unstructured interview strategy and the flexibility associated with it is further enhanced when the timing of the interviews is considered. A conscious decision was made to conduct the interviews *after* the planning and staging of each event. It was possible to work out the roles of individuals during the observational fieldwork and, as a consequence, interview guides could be tailored for each interviewee depending on their role within the planning and staging of each of the events. Compared to conducting interviews during the planning / staging process, interviewing post event therefore increased what could be explored with each interviewee. For example, it was possible to gain reflection on the entire process taking into account the start, middle and end of the planning and staging of each of the observed events. In addition to gaining greater levels of insight, there is also a positive benefit of conducting the interviews post event for what Kvale (1996) terms 'validation in situ'. This process allows for factual validity as it is possible to check elements of an account against what I had witnessed myself during the observational phase of the research.

There is also a pragmatic reason for staging the interviews post event and this concerns the rapport process. Spradley (2003) suggests that the ethnographic interviewer will move along four stages as rapport with interviewees develops. This process involves moving from 'apprehension' to 'exploration' which is followed by 'co-operation' and, finally, 'participation'. The first two stages are characterised by an uncertainty and then a gradual 'working out' by the interviewer and interviewee as to what they want and expect from each other (Spradley 2003). The timing of the interviews meant that I (and the interviewee) had passed through the first two stages as rapport had been developed with all interviewees during the observational stages of fieldwork. The interviews were therefore taking place in the context of 'co-operation'. At this stage, both the interviewer and interviewee are clear as to what they expect from each other along with the purpose of the interview process.<sup>6</sup> It is also a characteristic of this stage

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<sup>6</sup> The final stage, participation, occurs when the interviewee is taking an assertive role in the interview process and it is not reached in all cases – Spradley (2003) suggests that this could take

that the interviewee potentially finds interaction during the interview rewarding. For example, the interviews allowed participants the opportunity to reflect on the processes that they had gone through and ascertain how the research might benefit them as individuals or organisations in relation to their work.

In addition, developing rapport prior to the interviews also presents a practical benefit. By starting from the position of co-operation, valuable time is saved *during* the interview as neither the interviewer or interviewee have to 'work out' each others roles which maximises the (often) limited time and culminates in 'richer' data.

### *6.1. The Interview Sample*

Finding a sample for the observational phase of the fieldwork involved the utilisation of 'criterion based' and 'chain sampling' strategies. With reference to the interviewing phase, 'stratified purposeful sampling' (Patton 1990) was adopted. The rationale behind this particular strategy allows comparisons between sub-groups to be made which highlights variation around a phenomenon (i.e. the public order policing of community-based events). To illustrate this in concrete terms, the observational fieldwork highlighted different roles and processes. To maximise the data collection I did not want to focus on primarily one 'sub-group' involved in the phenomenon (e.g. the police) and then use only this data as the basis for analysis. A myriad of different roles were identified during the observational phase and this sampling strategy allows for the exploration of different perspectives on the phenomenon. The inevitable impact of taking into account these different perspectives is a greater understanding of the phenomenon and therefore a more informed analysis. The benefit of the 'unstructured' interview technique is that it widens the scope for this exploration to occur as it is not confined to 'set' questions.

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weeks to occur and interviewees effectively become participant observers that the researcher can guide. This stage was not reached in this research.



## *6.2. The Logistics of Interviewing*

Relative to the observational fieldwork, the logistics of arranging the interviews was much more demanding. In a few cases it was possible to interview relatively soon (i.e. a couple of weeks) after each event but this was a rarity. In most cases I had to wait and this delayed the data collection process. For example, a key organiser from the Solstice event could only find a free slot four months after it had been staged. Another organiser from Solstice was enthusiastic about participating in an interview but I had to wait three months before he returned from working on a world cruise! This was not surprising as, post that staging of the various events, the people involved soon had other concerns such as relocating and finding new jobs; running businesses and councils; taking on new policing responsibilities and so on. Conducting interviews was therefore more demanding than was initially anticipated.

However, despite these logistical difficulties it was at least possible to secure formal informed consent and this was achieved by sending each interviewee an information and consent form (see Appendix A). In all but one case, each interviewee consented to a tape-recorded interview which allowed for full transcripts to be produced. This significantly aided the analytic process as these accounts provide a complete account relative to note taking during an interview. The one participant who did not wish to be tape-recorded did so because he wanted to discuss some of the issues arising from the event that impacted on the aborted observation of the first Pride event. With permission, notes were taken during this interview (the participant would occasionally stop so that verbatim quotes could be noted) and these were written up after the interview. There was the option for interviewees to check typed transcripts post interview but this was only taken up on one occasion when the person concerned wanted to check a number of dates that he had referred to. In total, twenty seven interviews were conducted with the police and organisers involved with the planning and staging of the four observed events. The interview sample reflects the size of the respective events and the committees dealing with them: five interviews were conducted at the Mela (three police / two organisers); five interviews were conducted at the Multicultural Festival (one police / four organisers); eight

interviews were conducted at the Solstice (three police / five organisers); and finally nine interviews were conducted at the Pride event (three police / six organisers).

### *6.3. Reflective Considerations*

An important issue associated with interviewing is that, as Weiss (1994) notes, any information gained will always be context dependent and this must be acknowledged at two levels in relation to this research. Firstly, the interviews were arranged to suit the often busy schedules of the participants. This resulted in interviews being conducted at different times of the day and in a variety of locations which was not ideal when the aim was to try and gain the richest possible data. For example, one senior police officer was interviewed whilst he was simultaneously responding to a missing persons inquiry. This officer was keen to be interviewed at this time as a previous interview date had been cancelled even though it was not ideal for either party as there were frequent disruptions. Although this constituted the most extreme example, other interviews with working participants were also prone to distractions (e.g. phone calls, other people around). However, providing this level of accommodation to interviewees proved to be another example of an appropriate ‘trade-off’ as all the interviews did generate additional and important data that supplemented the observational phase of the research.

The second issue relates to a more individual context and concerns the potential impact of ‘interviewer effects’. For example, prior to an interview with an organiser from Pride, I was asked upfront whether I was gay. I responded that I wasn’t and the interview started and proceeded for over an hour and half.<sup>7</sup> This interview yielded relevant and important data but I am aware that if I had been gay, a very different interview *may* have taken place. Of course, a similar point could be made concerning the fact I am not, for example, a Muslim or a pagan and yet I was interviewing people who were. Despite differences in personal biography, the rapport process that had been built up with participants prior to the interviews will hopefully have limited the extent to which this issue could be

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<sup>7</sup> This represented the longest interview of all those conducted.

potentially problematic in relation to the quality of information gained. The fact the interviewee asked if I was gay demonstrates that both of us were comfortable with the issue of sexuality. Had I met him for the first time in a 'cold calling' interview context I very much doubt that this would have been raised but a very different interview might have resulted.

To conclude this section, the observational fieldwork raised awareness of an important 'back stage' context to the events that could not be directly observed. Interviewing enabled this 'back stage' to be explored and it has proved to be an important and valid method that has supplemented the observational fieldwork. A combination of these two methods allows for a robust analysis in respect of the research questions but it is now important to place these methods in the context of other public order policing research. This will be explored in the next section along with discussion of the analytic process that developed during the research.

## **7. Reflections on the Analytic Process**

The previous sections have examined the origins and context of the research, the suitability of a qualitative methodology, selection of the field sites and observation and interview based research methods. This final section will focus on the analytic process that evolved during the research. Consideration will therefore be given to a number of methodological issues that have been highlighted in previous research on public order policing as these hold implications for this research. This will then be followed by discussion of 'Grounded Theory' which was employed as the analytic framework as this research progressed.

Before focussing on methodological issues raised by previous research, it is relevant to acknowledge the position of the researcher during the research process. Brown (1996) distinguishes between four types of research investigator in relation to the police: 'inside insiders', 'outside insiders', 'inside outsiders' and 'outside outsiders'. These types represent the position of the researcher in relation to the police as an organisation (i.e. 'insiders' = police officers, 'outsiders' = non-police personnel). Within the context of this thesis, the affiliation to the NCOF means that an 'inside outsiders' position was adopted. This position relates to non-police

personnel who are trained in research methods but work within a police environment (Brown, 1996). This position holds an advantage over ‘outside outsiders’ (i.e. the position that would have been adopted had there been no formal connection with the NCOF or the police) in that access to aspects of the police for research purposes is typically easier to gain. However, Brown (1996, p183) notes that potentially “‘inside outsiders” cannot step back and take a dispassionate view of institutional structures because they have a vested interest in the organisation that employs them’.

As has been previously mentioned, the association with the NCOF allowed for the identification of potential ‘gatekeepers’ from the police in relation to the observed events. This was achieved by establishing good working relations with members of the NCOF who were happy to recommend colleagues in forces who could potentially accommodate me as a researcher. Securing access would at the very least have been more time consuming without these links and at worst might not have been granted without the association with the NCOF. In terms of the concerns raised by Brown (1996) in relation to the ‘inside outsiders’ position, there has been no pressure from the NCOF or the forces involved during the research process to amend either the research methods or emerging findings. It should also be stressed that the affiliation with the University of Surrey has also allowed me the opportunity to remain independent of the police as an organisation *and* develop research method skills. In this respect, the CASE structure has provided the opportunity to remain independent of the organisation (i.e. through the University of Surrey) whilst facilitating effective access to the police (i.e. through the NCOF).

To summarise, the ‘inside outsider’ position provided benefits to the research process (i.e. access) but at no time was there any pressure from the NCOF or police service to produce anything other than an independent and critical account of the phenomenon under investigation. This is important to stress as previous research on public order policing has raised controversy concerning the positions adopted by researchers. This was explored in the previous chapter when outlining the analytical accounts of Jefferson, D. Waddington *et al* and P.A.J Waddington. To briefly re-iterate, P.A.J Waddington (1993) argued that Jefferson’s (1987;

1990) work on 'paramilitarism' was undermined by a selective interpretation of the subject that focussed predominantly on the position of the 'view from below'. P.A.J Waddington (1991, 2000b) criticises the work of D Waddington *et al*'s 'flashpoint' model on the grounds that it presents a partial and selective analytical account (e.g. through the 'post-hoc' application of the flashpoint) that is ideologically driven. Finally, D Waddington (1998) argues that P.A.J Waddington's (1994a) analysis of public order policing is also selective, and by implication ideologically driven, as it only represents a police perspective.

It is worth considering these issues in relation to this thesis. P.A.J Waddington (2000b) argues that D. Waddington *et al*'s (1987; 1989) 'flashpoint' model aspires to 'omniscience' as an analytic account. In contrast, P.A.J Waddington (2000b, p99) suggests 'all that participant observation can hope to represent, in my view, is *a* perspective'. This is an important point and provides a baseline for this research. It is logistically impossible to observe every facet of the planning and staging of an event and previous sections have highlighted that decision-making during the observational phase of the research was occurring at locations and in formats that could not be accessed. Therefore, the output from this research should not be considered definitive as much of the phenomenon under investigation was not subject to observation.

This raises a related issue: how can the 'perspective' to be presented in this research be maximised to account for as much of the phenomenon as possible? The inclusion of interviewing at least increases the potential scope of this thesis' 'perspective' but it serves another important function. Not only does it potentially access data which is impossible to directly observe (e.g. opinions, values and attitudes), it also negates the criticism that has been applied by D Waddington (1998) to P.A.J Waddington's work concerning the adoption of a perspective that is oriented around the police. In contrast to P.A.J Waddington (1994a), the research strategy employed in this thesis includes taking into account perspectives in *addition* to the police (i.e. organisers) through the interview process.

The final issue concerns the ideological position of the researcher. It could be interpreted that the affiliation with the NCOF and the adoption of an 'inside

outsider' perspective might lead to a piece of work that is potentially perceived as 'pro-police'. In response to this, the case has been made above that there were no pressures, or indeed expectations, to be anything but an independent researcher. To conclude, the issues raised in this section highlight that the analytic output from this research can only represent a 'perspective' and not a definitive account of public order policing. It is also hoped that by incorporating observation and interviews with both police and non-police personnel, this research can avoid some of the methodological criticisms that have been applied to other analytic accounts of public order policing. Having addressed these issues, it is now pertinent to focus in detail on the potential of 'Grounded Theory' as a suitable analytic framework.

### *7.1. Grounded Theory as an Analytic Framework*

Grounded theory is most closely associated with Glaser and Strauss (1967) and was developed as a response to the prevailing epistemology in sociology towards the verification of theory. Glaser and Strauss (1967) argue that theory verification is often conducted at the expense of theory *generation*. When considering the role of theory, Glaser and Strauss suggest that it should predict and explain behaviour; advance theoretical knowledge in sociology; provide some form of practical application and guide further research. It is further argued that the best method for achieving this is through 'an initial, systematic discovery of theory from the data of social research' (Glaser and Strauss, 1967, p3). To elaborate on these points, Charmaz (1983, p110) suggests that 'the grounded theory method stresses discovery and theory development rather than logical deductive reasoning which relies on prior theoretical frameworks'.

Grounded theory therefore presents an ideal analytic framework for this research as it can potentially cater for 'exploratory' and 'explanatory' research questions. Rather than testing a prior hypothesis (e.g. directly applying the 'flashpoints' perspective), the analysis aims to generate theory from the collected data which will provide an explanatory account of the phenomenon under investigation (i.e. the Public Order Policing of Community-based Events). It is also noted that

results of this analytic approach are potentially beneficial to both the academic community and practitioners:

‘The sociologist thereby brings sociological theory, and so a different perspective, into the situation of the layman (sic). This new perspective can be very helpful to the latter.’ (Glaser and Strauss, 1967, p34)

As it is a requirement of the CASE process to produce relevant research and policy findings for the non-academic partner, this output from grounded theory presents an attractive proposition.

However, the process of actually undertaking grounded theory requires careful consideration. This is in part due to the divergence in opinion over what actually constitutes grounded theory. The original authors of this approach have subsequently published conflicting accounts over what the method entails (Strauss and Corbin, 1990; Glaser, 1992). In response to this, Dey (1999, p2) is correct to state that ‘when even the major authors disagree over fundamentals, there seems little point in arguing over what is or should be regarded as the “correct” or “authorised version” of grounded theory’. The remainder of this section will therefore explore how various facets of grounded theory were applied during the analytic process.

Despite the divergence mentioned above, Strauss and Corbin (1990) offer a step-by-step approach to grounded theory and to an extent this informed the analytic approach used in this research. The CAQDAS program Atlas Ti (version 5.1) was used to store and analyse the collected data (i.e. completed field notes and interview transcripts) and this was then subjected to a process of ‘open coding’. Following Strauss and Corbin’s (1990) advice, this procedure involved the systematic identification of distinct concepts that were evident in the data. The first set of field notes to be analysed in this manner resulted in the generation of approximately 70 different codes. These ranged from the specific (e.g. ‘event cost’ related to financial issues) to the more abstract (e.g. ‘police / organiser relationship’) and this process was repeated as more data was collected and added

to Atlas Ti. This procedure ultimately culminated in the identification of 104 different codes.

Data collection and analysis was conducted simultaneously and as time progressed it became possible to compare codes across different contexts and develop them further. For example, the code 'police / organiser relationship' originated from field notes taken at a Mela planning meeting but it was subsequently explored across the other observed events. This process led to the code being developed to encompass different dimensions of this relationship (i.e. 'police / organiser relationship positive', 'police / organiser relationship negative' and 'police / organiser relationship neutral'). As the analysis continued, structure and process started to emerge from the data (i.e. how does a code manifest itself and why should this be happening). This process is loosely analogous to the concept of 'axial coding' (Strauss and Corbin, 1990) although no formal paradigm was developed to systematically explore these two concepts. Instead, these ideas of structure and process were explored through diagrammatic experimentation on paper and through Atlas Ti. The ideas which surfaced from this process did however lead to some emerging findings which were subsequently explored by revising the coding (e.g. collapsing separate codes into one encompassing 'super code') and collecting additional data that incorporated this emergence into interview guides. For example, as the data collection progressed it became important to ascertain *why* social order and safety was maintained at the observed events. The collected responses in turn allowed for greater insight and context relating to the earlier interview transcripts / field notes that had been analysed.

Strauss and Corbin (1990) argue that analysis continues during the writing phase of a project. In relation to this research, this aspect of the analysis enabled further exploration of the data through the development of themes which could effectively answer the research questions. This involved further testing and revision (e.g. accounting for circumstances when a theme did not 'fit' with the data from one context compared to others) so the building of theory continued during this phase. The culmination of these efforts is presented over the next four chapters in the form of an 'analytic story' (Strauss and Corbin, 1990) whilst chapter eight presents a model that encapsulates both the structure and process



associated with the sites that formed the basis of the observational fieldwork and interviews.

To conclude this section there are a number of logistical concerns associated with grounded theory that require acknowledgement. Firstly, Bryman (1988) argues that the rigours associated with field research limits the scope for comprehensive grounded theory as it is simply too demanding. Although the approach of Strauss and Corbin (1990) was followed during this analysis, there was not complete adherence to all their procedures. For example, a 'conditional / consequential matrix' was not devised as it did not appear to significantly advance the analysis – ironically Glaser (1992) criticises this device as potentially convoluting the analytic process. A second concern from Bryman (1988) relates to the role of 'formal theory'. Glaser and Strauss (1967) argue that existing formal theory (and by implication potential pre-conceived ideas) should not dictate the development of grounded theory. However, Bryman (1988) argues that it is doubtful whether theory-neutral research / analysis can be conducted within this analytic framework. Strauss and Corbin (1990) recommend that the researcher maintains an 'objective stance' in relation to this issue. For example, if pre-existing theory offers an insight this should be tested by considering *multiple* insights as to its relevance (i.e. across events and across interviews). With regards to this research, academic literature (e.g. P.A.J Waddington etc) was consulted prior to the analysis as it is a purpose of this research to explore the relevance or otherwise of existing accounts to the phenomenon under investigation. The influence of this work on the analytic process must be acknowledged. For example, the code 'event context / politics' was developed to account for important concepts arising in the data and yet it was partially inspired by the first stage of D Waddington *et al's* (1987; 1989) 'flashpoint' model. Preventing such pre-conceptions from 'fitting' the data required careful analysis and reflection: extraneous influence was avoided through this approach.

These concerns are obviously compounded by the ambiguity that exists over what constitutes grounded theory. It might therefore be more appropriate to argue that the analytic process for this research represents a grounded *approach* rather than 'strict' grounded theory. Whilst the philosophy and procedures of Glaser and

Strauss (1967) and Strauss and Corbin (1990) have been followed, there has been flexibility in terms of specific analytic procedures being employed. However, the employment of this analytic framework has generated an analysis that can effectively address the research aims and objectives.

## **8. Conclusion**

This chapter has presented an overview of a number of methodological components associated with the research process. The CASE proposal and the affiliation to the NCOF aided in guiding this process and it has culminated in the collection of both observational and interview data at three main field sites. Reflections on the research phase of the fieldwork demonstrate that there were some logistical difficulties but these were successfully overcome. Finally, consideration of the analytic process demonstrates that a ‘grounded approach’ was adopted in relation to the analytic framework that accompanied the data collection. A number of methodological concerns raised in relation to previous public order policing research have also been addressed.

The aim of the data collection and simultaneous analysis is to provide a set of answers that inform a ‘perspective’ on the phenomenon under investigation (i.e. the Public Order Policing of Community-based Events). This process is directed at the research aims that were established in the previous chapter. The endeavours of this work will now be presented over the following four empirical analysis chapters culminating in chapter eight with the generation of a model to account for this particular ‘perspective’ on public order policing.

# Chapter Four: Case Studies of the Observed Events

## 1. Introduction

The format for this first analysis chapter will involve reviewing in detail each of the observed events that formed the basis of the fieldwork. Rather than present a thematic analysis from the outset, the presentation of each event as a case study provides the opportunity to highlight important background information and context that allows both differentiation and commonality to be identified across all four observed events. This exercise is also pragmatic: by outlining in detail various characteristics of each event, the following thematic analysis chapters can focus on the minutiae of various processes associated with the planning, staging and aftermath of each event without having to refer to swathes of background detail and context. This chapter therefore offers the opportunity to comprehensively ‘set the scene’ for the following analysis chapters by outlining a diversity of elements associated with each event relative to each other. In addition, this approach also allows for the drawing out of common characteristics and the presentation of topics for thematic analysis.

In order to meet these objectives, the chapter will focus on the following features of each event:

- Event Purpose* - Who the event is aimed at and what the event entails in terms of the character of proceedings.
- Event History* - An identification of salient incidents that occurred at previous events. The focus in this chapter will be on highlighting these issues rather than explaining in detail how they have impacted on the present – this exercise will be considered in greater detail in forthcoming analysis chapters.
- The Planning* - The format of the planning process will be outlined (e.g.

<i>Process</i>	number of meetings)
<i>The Police and the Planning</i>	- This will focus specifically on the police involvement in the planning process.
<i>The Organisers and the Planning</i>	- This will identify the organisers' involvement in the planning process. Each of the four events had a diverse range of organisers – for the purpose of these case studies the 'organisers' for each event are those that are affiliated to agencies that facilitate the planning alongside members / groups from local communities.
<i>The Community Organisers and the Planning</i>	- This is as above but will focus on those members of groups (or indeed just individuals) that are involved in the planning and are from the communities that each event is aimed at.
<i>Event Context</i>	- This section identifies issues that impacted upon both the planning and staging of each event. These include both internal, event-related factors and external factors related to these processes.
<i>The Staging of the Event</i>	- This will outline aspects of how each event was staged in terms of logistics.
<i>Event Outcome and Event Future</i>	- This is a summary of the outcome of the event and speculation on how the event might evolve in the future.

This template will now be applied to the following events:

- Solstice
- Pride
- Mela
- Multicultural Festival

## **2. Solstice 2003 Case Study**

### *2.1. Solstice Event Purpose*

The Solstice is traditionally celebrated by different pagan and druid groups who gather at an open site (the Solstice location) to witness the sunrise (the focal part of the event) at the four equinoxes that fall during the year (i.e. spring, summer, autumn, winter). The largest of these gatherings, and the Solstice event that formed the basis of the fieldwork, traditionally occurs at the summer equinox.

### *2.2. Solstice Event History*

The location where Solstice is celebrated has been of religious and ceremonial significance for thousands of years. The focal point of the event, namely witnessing the sun rise, has also remained consistent throughout this time. However, during the recent history of the event (from the 1970s to the present day), the act of celebrating Solstice, in particular the summer equinox, has been the centre of high profile controversy and at times disorder between event attendees and the authorities who maintain and police the Solstice location.

Preceding the mid 1980s, the event took the form of a festival and it was not uncommon for event attendees to remain at the Solstice location for a number of weeks and then move on as a 'convoy'. As one of the community organisers from Solstice 2003, who has been involved in the Solstice since 1974, recollects:

*“People would gather at [Solstice Location] from all over the place... people were too paranoid to leave on their own so it was the evolution of the peace convoy as such and yes, it was invasive to any community it landed on... so it gradually became for the authorities in [Solstice County] a thorn in their side, it would cost a lot of policing and yet nobody would do anything about it politically” – KM (Community Organiser, Solstice 2003)*

This period referred to by KM marks a time when the event was growing in attendee numbers and taking the form of a festival around Solstice rather than an event specifically focussed on the summer equinox. These gatherings were tolerated by the authorities in that there were no overt moves to ban gatherings. However, by the mid 1980s and coming relatively soon after the national coal dispute, there was one year when would-be Solstice attendees clashed with police in the weeks preceding the summer equinox. The disorder that occurred led to hundreds of arrests and was widely reported in the media.

This thesis does not explore the context around this particular incident of disorder (i.e. the possible political motivations of government and police at the time, the media coverage of the event) but it is important to highlight how this one incident impacted on subsequent Solstice events. Up until 2000, there was no officially sanctioned open access to the Solstice location for people to gather and celebrate. Instead, the authorities (including the police and other agencies) placed exclusion zones around the Solstice location at the time of the summer equinox. On the odd occasions when a very limited number of people were allowed on the site to celebrate, there would often be protracted and sometimes violent stand offs between large numbers of people attempting to access the site and police / private security personnel.

During the 1990s there were movements to try and remedy this situation to the benefit of the authorities and those wishing to attend the Solstice by moving away from restricted access and exclusion zones to managed open access for all event attendees. This became a reality in 2000. The basis for this shift came from both

the druid and pagan communities and the authorities. Firstly, the druid and pagan communities created an open meeting forum with an aim of increasing dialogue between these communities and all those agencies, including the police, involved in and around the Solstice location. The aims and format of these meetings was inspired by the truth and reconciliation process that was occurring in South Africa at the same time. This forum is still active but it plays no part in the planning of Solstice events: its goal remains to promote dialogue and reconcile a historically difficult relationship between the druid and pagan community and the authorities. However, the key players in organising the Solstice event in 2003 from both the druid and pagan community and the authorities have had, and continue to have, some input in these meetings.<sup>1</sup>

In terms of the authorities, the mid to late 1990s marked the arrival of new personnel and a fresh perspective on how to manage the event. The druid and pagan communities had long wished for a form of open access but it was not contemplated by the authorities until the arrival of new personnel in positions of authority. Amidst the context of exclusion zones and the potential for disorder at the Solstice, the early dialogue between the communities and these new personnel in authority raised the possibility of moving away from misunderstanding between the two groups and towards a form of Solstice event (i.e. open access) that would be beneficial to all parties:

*“So we set up a series of meetings and some of them were really very good. However, it set me on a mission, we had to find a way forward and the one thing I distinctly remember coming out of these meetings was actually the ground we were talking about was very similar. There was common ground, it was just that we were coming at it from completely different angles and I felt that what I needed to do was take on board the fact that there was this commonality, there was common ground to work with and find a way forward and I actually... to some*

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<sup>1</sup> The druid and pagan community had been meeting together on matters relating to Solstice for a number of years before these ‘truth and reconciliation’ meetings. The group from which these meetings originated is heavily involved in the planning process and will be explored in greater detail in the section on community organisers.

*extent until that point I thought that the organiser [The Government Agency that maintains the Solstice location], were seen as the great 'No' whereas that is not how I saw myself, leading the organisation... I just saw it as a huge opportunity and what I find is that I got to know the key characters initially and there was this undeniable incredible passion that they had and it was very infectious.” – SM (Organiser, Solstice 2003)*

The arrival of new senior personnel at the government agency that maintains the Solstice location also coincided with a fresh policing perspective with the arrival of a newly appointed Chief Superintendent in the late 1990s:

*“Superintendent [Anon] took over at [local police HQ] and he had come from policing [Inner City area with history of disorder], so he was used to dealing with heavy shit and couldn't believe how archaic and medieval [the local] police were so that was certainly a big step because he was able to see that we were talking some sense in that, yes the only way forward was public open access.” – KM (Community Organiser, Solstice 2003)*

With a dialogue in place and a willingness on the part of the (new) organisers in authority towards ‘moving on’ from a period of tension towards an event that benefited all parties, the first Solstice with ‘open managed access’ (i.e. open access to the site for all who wanted to celebrate) was staged in 2000. At this event, people were allowed to gather for around twelve hours at the Solstice location to celebrate the summer equinox. In total between 6,000 and 8,000 people attended the event and there was no disorder or arrests. The access to the Solstice location was managed by the government agency charged with maintaining the Solstice location throughout the year and the planning had also involved the police and the druid and pagan community. The event was considered to be a success by all parties. If the mid 1980s marked a watershed for the event in terms of years of tension and frustration, 2000 set a precedent for subsequent trouble free Solstice events in the run up to 2003.



Post 2000, the event format for the celebration of Solstice has stayed consistent. Open access has been planned for, and granted by, the authorities in consultation with members of the druid and pagan community throughout the planning and staging processes. Rather than a 'festival' format (i.e. gathering for weeks at a time), this access has been limited to the hours preceding and following the sunrise. The Solstice events in 2001 and 2002 showed an increase in numbers (approximately 14,500 and 25,000 respectively) and these events also passed peacefully without any disorder. In summary, the post 2000 precedent is markedly different from what preceded it. The expectation, from both the authorities and the druid and pagan communities, was of a trouble free and enjoyable event, something that until recent shifts in dialogue and planning appeared unlikely:

*"When you compare the situation as it was in 1999, when the fence came down and people pushed in who were not supposed to be there according to the authorities, and the situation today where 30,000 people are welcomed in by [The Government Agency that maintains the Solstice location] when we came in at 1230... it was supposed to be one o'clock, but we came in at 1230 or something like that, but we were welcomed in and facilities were provided. I mean everybody has to admit that is progress." – WP (Community Organiser, Solstice 2003)*

### *2.3. Solstice 2003: The Planning Process*

The planning for Solstice 2003 started in the September of the previous year and two groups were involved in the planning process. The first group predominantly consisted of community organisers from the druid and pagan community but also included representation from the police and a national charity that manages the land around the Solstice location. These meetings were chaired by SM, a senior member of the government agency that runs and maintains the Solstice location. These meetings were informal in nature (i.e. no formal agenda and no minutes) and were an opportunity for members to discuss issues around the planning of

Solstice. For ease of reference, this group will be referred to as the ‘Solstice Consultation Group’ (SCG).<sup>2</sup>

The second group had a more formal planning and decision-making remit and consisted of representatives from the county council, fire and ambulance service, private security, RSPCA and a representative from the SCG in addition to further representation from the police, the government agency that maintains the Solstice location and the national charity. The organiser SM chaired these meetings in addition to chairing the SCG. This group will be referred to as the ‘Solstice Planning Group’ (SPG). The two groups met on a monthly basis and both meetings were held on the same day. The SCG always preceded the SPG.

#### *2.4. Solstice 2003: The Police and the Planning*

A Chief Superintendent (RB) based in the force area where the Solstice takes place represented the police at both the SCG and SPG meetings. He attended all the meetings that I observed. This officer has been involved in the planning and policing of all Solstice events since the initial open access of 2000. On occasions, Chief Superintendent RB would be joined at the SCG by other police personnel, including a Superintendent to whom RB hoped to pass on the responsibility of planning for Solstice post 2003.<sup>3</sup> Greater numbers of police personnel attended the SPG meetings relative to the SCG and these were officers who would hold command positions during the staging of the event.

#### *2.5. Solstice 2003: The Organisers and the Planning*

The main organiser with responsibility for facilitating the open access at the Solstice event was the government agency that maintains the Solstice location. The organiser SM, who chaired the SCG and SPG, was the main representative from this agency. As with Chief Superintendent RB, she was accompanied at both

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<sup>2</sup> The reader is reminded that a glossary of acronyms can be located on page 277.

<sup>3</sup> Chief Superintendent RB had been a Chief Inspector in 2000 and subsequently promoted to Superintendent for 2001 and 2002. His reasons for passing on the police representation post 2003 were due to a heavy workload brought on by being a Chief Superintendent and a divisional commander.

sets of meetings by a colleague who it was anticipated would take over her role in organising Solstice post 2003.<sup>4</sup> As has been previously mentioned in the planning process section, other agencies involved in the SPG represented the county council, fire and ambulance service, private security, RSPCA and a representative from the SCG.

## *2.6. Solstice 2003: The Community Organisers and the Planning*

The community organisers of Solstice 2003 were predominantly involved in the SCG meetings. As has been previously mentioned the only community organiser involved in the SPG acted as a liaison between the two groups. The majority of the community organisers were drawn from either the pagan or druid community but there were also individuals from neither of these communities who were involved in the planning. This included people who have been involved in the Solstice over a number of years and in a variety of ways. For example, KM has been involved in the Solstice since the mid 1970s and was influential in attaining open access through his elected position as a local mayor during the mid and late 1990s. Although no longer in this position, he was an active participant – described by one organiser as ‘a voice of reason’ – during the SCG meetings. None of the community organisers were elected onto the SCG and most had been involved in the planning of previous Solstice events.

## *2.7. Solstice 2003: Event Context*

During the planning and staging process there were a couple of major issues that demanded the attention of all organisers, including the police. Although the historical expectation (post 2000) suggested that a ‘managed open access’ Solstice would not lead to confrontation or disorder between the event attendees and the authorities, there were still potential threats to the event that would have possibly jeopardised a peaceful and successful outcome.

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<sup>4</sup> Post 2003 SM had been promoted within the government agency that she represented to a senior national co-ordinating role that took her away from primarily focussing on the Solstice event and maintaining the Solstice location.

During the planning stages, the biggest dilemma facing all the organisers was the date on which to stage the Solstice. A standard aspect of celebrating the summer equinox is that the sunrise occurs on the dawn of the longest day of the year. However, for Solstice 2003 this proved problematic. As I noted in my field notes during an early SCG meeting:

*“The date of the Solstice is determined by when the sun reaches a certain point in a solar calendar. For this year (2003), this point on the solar calendar occurs on the evening of Saturday June 21<sup>st</sup>. As the Solstice is celebrated on the morning closest to this point, the Solstice technically falls on the morning of Sunday June 22<sup>nd</sup>.”* (Fieldnote - Solstice 2003)

The ‘solar calendar’ basis for this date-related dilemma came from the druid and pagan community but the debate was not just along community organiser versus police / organiser lines. There was also significant debate occurring within these two sets of organisers (namely the police / government agency that maintain the Solstice location and the national charity; internal disagreements between community organisers). Resolving this dilemma of when to stage the Solstice would dominate the planning process. The pros and cons of each date were widely debated with each having its own potential complications. Again, from my field notes I summed up this dilemma as follows:

*“This problem is dictated thus (as presented by **Government Agency that maintains the Solstice location** and the police) – if the Solstice is held on the 21<sup>st</sup>, it will cater for the majority of attendees who do not know / appreciate the true meaning of Solstice (i.e. "stand on the stones and ring home with their mobiles at dawn!"). However, members of the **SCG** would want to celebrate on the 22<sup>nd</sup> (the correct date). The 22<sup>nd</sup> presents the problem that thousands will still turn up on the 21<sup>st</sup> and the **[Solstice location]** would not be open, although this would alleviate any potential overflow to **[External Solstice Celebration]**.”* (Fieldnote – Solstice 2003)

The 'external Solstice celebration' is another location with ceremonial significance where event attendees have historically gathered either before or after the summer equinox but is a few miles away from the Solstice location. This external Solstice celebration is managed by the national charity rather than the government agency that maintains the Solstice location, although the local police force is involved at both locations.

A decision was finally reached that the event would go ahead on the 21<sup>st</sup>. However, in addition to impacting on inter and intra organiser relationships, this decision prompted a new potential problem: protest. During the later stages of the planning process the police and organisers were concerned about the threat of a protest occurring at the Solstice location on the 22<sup>nd</sup>. This threat of organised protest came from individuals external to the SCG and SPG and was orchestrated on the internet. In terms of salient event context during the planning of Solstice 2003, the date dilemma and threat of protest dominated this process.

### *2.8. Solstice 2003: The Staging of the Event*

Solstice 2003 shared many of the characteristics of previous managed open access Solstice events. The focal point of the celebration was the sunrise, and event attendees were allowed into the Solstice location a number of hours before and after this event. There were no other ceremonial events during this time apart from a torch-lit procession before dawn. All the members from the planning process had a role to play during the staging of the event.

In terms of the policing, Chief Superintendent RB acted as a silver commander based at a silver control post at the Solstice location.<sup>5</sup> This was supplemented by gold and silver command posts that were based off site. There were three bronze command positions whose areas of responsibility encompassed the location which formed the focal point for the celebrations, the car park and a specialist traffic role for the roads on and around the Solstice location. In addition to an entourage of

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<sup>5</sup> A review of the gold / silver / bronze command structure is presented in chapter two.

tactical advisors, over 100 officers were deployed at any one time during the Solstice event and these were drawn from five separate forces under the mutual aid scheme. The police federation also had a representative from the local force liaising with the silver control post to address issues of officer welfare during the course of the event.

The organisers ran a separate command post that was located next to the on-site silver control post. This organiser command post had no radio communication link with the police. As the main government agency for maintaining the Solstice location, this command post was headed by SM, who had chaired the meetings throughout the planning process. This organiser command post had a link with the private security personnel who patrolled the Solstice location during the event. Both the organiser and police command posts had press officers attached to them. The other agencies involved in the SPG had their own command structures and separate channels of communication.

The community organisers from the SCG fell into two categories. Some of these people were loosely involved with the organiser command post in organising ‘peace stewards’ who were on hand to advise event attendees on a number of issues. These ‘peace stewards’ did not have the same role as the security personnel or other stewards.<sup>6</sup> Other community organisers simply immersed themselves in the event. This was either through organising and leading the torch-lit procession or being at the centre of the celebration at the time of sunrise.

## *2.9. Solstice 2003: Event Outcome and Event Future*

Despite the potential threats to the event that were raised in the event context section, the Solstice event passed without any major incident. Approximately 30,000 people attended the event and there was no protest. Only 16 people were arrested and these were predominantly on alcohol related charges. Out of these 30,000 people, it was anticipated that 70% would not be present for any

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<sup>6</sup> The complexities of the provision and roles of security and the different forms of stewarding are considered in chapter six.

ceremonial / religious purpose but were just ‘curious’ members of the public<sup>7</sup>. Members from the druid and pagan community did seem to be in the minority but there was no official audit of the event attendee demographics. As has been the case with previous Solstice events, there were a number of media organisations covering the event for newspapers and television.

From the field notes during the staging of the event and the interviews after it, members from the police, organisers and community organisers involved in the SCG and SPG declared that they were happy with the outcome, especially considering some of the complexities around the planning in terms of the date of the event and the threat of protest.

However, an issue that did prove problematic during the staging of the event related to communication. It was highlighted that having two command posts (i.e. police and organisers) with separate communication channels was an issue that would require improvement at any future Solstice event. Some senior police personnel also questioned the worth of having two silver posts in the police command structure as it was perceived that this created confusion. In addition to these communication issues, there were also problems relating to vehicles being abandoned (195 cars had to be towed away) on the roads around the Solstice location leading to severe congestion – a problem that was not foreseen during the planning process.

Future Solstice events are expected to be staged in its current form (i.e. managed open access). However, as was highlighted earlier, they will be planned without some of the senior, and influential, personnel from the main organiser agency and the police. It is anticipated that these Solstice events will be less difficult to manage as there will not be any confusion concerning the date on which the event will be held.

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<sup>7</sup> A claim made at a SCG meeting (Fieldnote - Solstice 2003).

### **3. Pride 2003 Case Study**

#### *3.1 Pride Event Purpose*

Pride is a celebration predominantly aimed at the lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) community in the south of England, although it attracts event attendees from all over the world. The main focus of Pride is a morning parade through the city where the event takes place involving a large number of floats and participants. The parade ends at a large park which then hosts a gathering that incorporates a number of dance tents, entertainment facilities, bars and a fairground. This event lasts until the late evening and is followed by a 'post Pride' party in a large nightclub in the city.

#### *3.2 Pride Event History*

The city in which Pride takes place has held an annual Pride event for over ten years. The format of a parade followed by a gathering has been at the centre of the event during these years, although the locations have changed as the event has grown in terms of numbers attending. The staging of an official 'post Pride' party, held in the evening of the event, has been a more recent development in the event's history. The driving force for organising all aspects of the event has come from the local LGBT community (through a specific Pride committee) with other agencies (e.g. the police, council) aiding the planning process.

Relative to Solstice, Pride has not been subject to the same turbulent event history. There have been no outbreaks of disorder associated with the event or any threats to its continuation. However, there have been tensions between the police and the LGBT community arising from Pride 2002 and these dominated the planning and staging of Pride in 2003.

As was highlighted in chapter three, I only had partial access to Pride 2002 but from the planning stages before Pride 2003 through to the interviews after the event it is clear from both the police and organiser (including community



organiser) perspectives that Pride 2002 had been policed insensitively. To briefly re-iterate, the problems around Pride 2002 followed a high profile event that occurred a month before where both the police and council were heavily criticised for mishandling a large crowd and narrowly avoiding a major incident resulting in multiple deaths. The officer who had acted as a liaison between the police and organisers during the planning of Pride 2002 had been involved in the planning and staging of this high profile event and was removed from an operational role – he was due to be a bronze commander – prior to the staging of Pride.

Post Pride 2002, the police were criticised by the LGBT community based in the city and the Pride organisers for policing the event insensitively. Although not involved in the policing operation at Pride 2002, the chief inspector charged with liaising with Pride in 2003 stated what, from a policing perspective, had gone wrong:

*“At the previous year’s [2002] event we had treated it rather than a celebration, we treated it more as a public order operation and there was no intelligence to suggest that but nevertheless we had gone ahead and done it. We had also had external players coming from outside to manage the operation due to annual leave and it meant a recipe for failure in hindsight. We deployed evidence gathering teams in line with how public order units are deployed and that really hit at the sensitivity of the issue. In real terms we were filming people if you listen to the LGBT community who hadn’t come out and they viewed it as a threat, quite rightly they viewed it as a threat, and it was a particular own goal...” – AC (Chief Inspector, Pride 2003)*

The consequence of this deployment along ‘public order’ lines led to dissatisfaction being expressed through a widely distributed and influential LGBT magazine and a local politician. A community organiser who has been involved in the planning and staging of Pride for a number of years recalled how this ‘public order operation’ had impacted on both the main event and those who attended the Pride 2002 post-event party:

*“Everyone was just shaking like mad and they had so many police trained in repelling crowds, they had SWAT teams, there were so many police officers with video cameras that were being shoved in faces, they were going into first-aid posts and filming people right up close and intimidating people. Intimidating my own members, my own members complained about the attitude of the police and there was an event at the post pride party [**Held in a club**], and there was an evacuation because the DJ let off so much smoke it set off the smoke detectors and the door staff were too slow in responding to the alarm and it went through to the Fire Brigade so they had to evacuate the building... the police arrived in their vans, black uniforms, padded jackets, riot gear, cameras, you know filming everyone and there were arguments breaking out. I believe that someone from the crowd was actually taken down to the police station but I don't think any charges were made. Two people were intimidated and upset by the police; one was the Lib Dem leader down here and also Dave [**Local Gay Magazine Editor**]. Dave upset the police by going up to them and taking a photograph of them photographing him.” - JM (Community Organiser, Pride 2003)*

In addition to the tactics employed during the policing of the event and the post Pride party, there were also complaints made stating that the police had been unnecessarily intrusive in relation to licensing issues at gay pubs and clubs in the area during the event.

It is speculation to suggest whether this policing operation would have manifested itself in the same way if the original police liaison officer had been kept in post – as an individual he was liked by community organisers who suggested that he could have been a scapegoat for the failings of the police and council in relation to the mishandling of the event preceding Pride 2002. However, the combination of breaking the continuity during the planning, the subsequent employment of officers external to the city that hosts Pride and the implementation of a policing

operation that lacked sensitivity sets the scenes for the relationship between the police and community organisers / LGBT community during Pride in 2003.

### *3.3. Pride 2003: The Planning Process*

In relation to the planning of Pride 2003, four meetings were held consisting of the police, organisers and community organisers. The first of these meetings was held four months prior to the staging of the event. The aim of these meetings was to identify and plan for any issues relating to safety at the event. The community organisers involved in these meetings held separate meetings concerned with event logistics that were not connected to safety issues.

The final meeting was followed by a ‘tabletop’ exercise involving all those involved in the planning process. The objective of the tabletop exercise was to run and respond to potential scenarios that could occur at the event. All four meetings were minuted and chaired by an organiser from the city council. The format of these meetings followed those advocated by ACPO (1999) in relation to Safety Advisory Groups although to maintain consistency these meetings will be referred to as the Pride Planning Group (PPG).

### *3.4. The Police and the Planning*

The police representative at the PPG meetings was a Chief Inspector (AC) from the events planning department in the city where Pride takes place. This officer attended all four meetings. He was also accompanied at these meetings by an Inspector from the same department. There was additional police involvement in the tabletop exercise in the form of the gold and silver commanders for the event.

### *3.5. The Organisers and the Planning*

The main organisers involved with the PPG were affiliated to the city council where Pride takes place. These included a senior member from the council’s events planning department, a senior environmental health officer and a

representative from the highways department. A representative from a private security firm that would be involved in providing security personnel to the Pride event also attended these meetings. Finally, there was also representation from the ambulance and fire service.

### *3.6. The Community Organisers and the Planning*

All the community organisers at the PPG were elected members of a committee drawn from the local LGBT community that organises Pride. This included the chair of this committee, a representative in charge of issues relating to financing and securing sponsorship for the event, a representative who organised the parade and a representative who was involved in organising and staging many of the events at the gathering at the park.

### *3.7. Pride 2003: Event Context*

Not surprisingly given the tensions raised in relation to the Pride event history, the main issue during the planning and staging of Pride 2003 was how the police would approach the policing of the event. The need to improve on the policing at Pride was highlighted after the negative feedback arising from Pride 2002 at a debriefing involving community organisers:

*“It was a fall on the sword, profuse humble apologies and a statement that we must do better and we must get a close link with the organisers at a very early stage so that they can be heavily involved in the planning of the operation and any decision made by the police would be shared with them prior to the operation and in fact during the day so they felt that there was a high degree of openness and that was the intention of the way that we would plan this year [2003].” – AC (Chief Inspector, Pride 2003)*

Following this debriefing, two senior police personnel attended an LGBT forum in the city and received heavy criticism relating to the policing of Pride 2002. This

was then followed by the local Chief Superintendent, and gold commander for Pride 2003, calling a meeting with the community organisers of Pride. As well as apologising again it was agreed that the police and community organisers would work together with the objective of running a successful Pride in 2003. Prior to the PPG meetings this involved liaison with licencees at the city's gay venues, the involvement through consultation of the local police force's gay police association during the planning and staging of the event and the publication of a set of joint statements of common purpose (e.g. preventing homophobic crime) that were signed by the police, council, licensees and community organisers which were published and promoted amongst the local LGBT community. The aim of these activities was to promote cohesion between all those involved in the planning and staging of the event, something which had been lacking the year before:

*"Everybody was singing from the same hymn sheet which hadn't been done on previous events."* – AC (Chief Inspector, Pride 2003)

In relation to the policing of large events, the local force has experience of being involved in the planning and staging of a major pop concert, football matches and, given the backdrop to the planning and staging of Pride of the Iraq war, organised protest.

### *3.8. Pride 2003: The Staging of the Event*

Pride 2003 followed the format of previous Pride events with a parade, gathering and post event party. For the first time, there was also a ticketed event held on the park (in the form of an award ceremony) the night before the main celebrations. The parade and main gathering followed a specified theme.

In relation to the policing, Chief Inspector AC acted as a bronze commander at the gathering on the park. The silver and gold commanders were based off-site at the local police station. There was also a bronze commander who held responsibility for policing the parade leading to the park. The policing operation incorporated a number of specialists such as traffic officers and tactical advisors to both the

bronze and silver commanders. A PSU consisting of public order trained officers was held in reserve at the local police station – they were not called upon during the operation. In total, 95 officers were involved in the operation and, in contrast to the previous year, all were drawn from the local city, a pledge that had been made during the planning stages of the event. In addition to the police operation, eight different forces held recruitment stalls at the main gathering.

In contrast to the Solstice, the police were involved in a joint command and control centre on the park that incorporated all the organisers and community organisers from the PPG meetings. Every one and a half hours, these personnel would meet and evaluate how the event was progressing and then act on any issues arising. A member of the local LGBT community was also involved with the policing operation at the silver command centre at the local police station. This individual acted as an advisor to the silver commander.

In addition to the policing operation, a number of security personnel were operational at both the parade and gathering. These security personnel were supplemented by stewards drawn from the local LGBT community.

### *3.9. Pride 2003: Event Outcome and Event Future*

No official crowd number was ascertained for the event, partly because the local police force helicopter was not used to photograph the event after the problems arising from the event in the previous year. The consensus between the police, organisers and community organisers was that between approximately 60,000 and 90,000 thousand people had attended the event over its entirety. In addition to there being no outbreaks of disorder, no arrests were made during the event.

All those involved in the PPG agreed that the event had been very successful. To date, it is the biggest Pride event in the city's history in terms of numbers attending. After the problems of the previous year, it was accepted that the police had made significant steps in rebuilding trust with the LGBT community through the way in which they approached the planning and staging of the event:

*“The feedback we have had from various people, unsolicited feedback, is that the policing this year was brilliant... certainly the statement of common purpose was a step forward, the pre-planning and publicity of it we both did before the event to sort of say we want to get things right this year and we don't want a repeat of last year and I think the police did take that opportunity.” – WP (Community Organiser, Pride 2003)*

The police were also pleased with how the event had progressed after the problems arising from Pride 2002. One incident highlights in great clarity the difference between Pride 2002 and Pride 2003: following the criticism the police received from community organisers, the local LGBT community and the gay press from the previous year, Chief Inspector AC was presented with an award after Pride 2003 in appreciation of how he had worked towards regaining lost trust and his input in staging a successful event.

*“It is one of the proudest moments I have had in my 23 year career - knowing that after last year's event, the LGBT community had such a downer on [the local] police that you had to go to the meetings to see how sad the situation had got, but with the strategies we had put in place, with my boss getting people to the meetings and the openness that developed to at the end of it have a presentation plaque and a heartfelt speech, from a personal point of view I don't think I can put a price on it.” – AC (Chief Inspector, Pride 2003)*

Following Pride in 2003, it was anticipated that future events would be held on an annual basis. It is planned that these will follow the same format as previous Pride events, albeit with a different ‘theme’. However, there is some concern from community organisers that Chief Inspector AC has moved positions within the local police force and will not be involved in future planning – it is feared that all the progress made post Pride 2002 could be reversed if the wrong police personnel are involved in future events.

## **4. Mela 2002 Case Study**

### *4.1. Mela Event Purpose*

The translation for the word ‘Mela’ is ‘fair’, which encapsulates what the event entails. The town where the Mela took place is based in the north of England and is resident to a large Pakistani / Kashmiri population to whom the event was targeted. The observed Mela was one of many to be held in the county where the town is located. Relative to these other Mela events, it is a small affair that occurs over one day and was characterised as being a day for the family that involved stalls, music and a handful of fairground attractions.

### *4.2. Mela Event History*

The observed Mela was held in the summer of 2002. Prior to this event, there had been other Mela events held at the same town in 1995, 2000 and 2001. The first of these Mela events in 1995 was facilitated by the local town council and a partnership group that had been formed to build links and understanding between the different faith groups that reside in the town. From the policing side, a Sergeant who was to play a key role in the planning of the Multicultural Festival was involved in this partnership group and helped liaise with the community and organisers.

Following a gap of five years, all Mela events were facilitated by a European funded arts charity that had a remit to tackle issues of regeneration and social inclusion through the arts. Mela formed part of its portfolio of events in order to meet this remit. In terms of salient event history, external factors created tension for the event in 2001 when the planning occurred against a backdrop of disorder between the police, members of far right political parties and members from Asian communities. Although the disorder did not occur in the town where the Mela took place, a few miles down the road it was making national headlines. This



inevitably meant that there was great concern as to whether the event would go ahead and this was only resolved very late in the planning process:

*“We couldn't be sure that they [the **British National Party**] were not going to use Mela as some kind of opportunity to express themselves because at the time they were shipping in people from all over the place on buses for protests, demonstrations, you know, victory to the BNP, so we also talked about whether the police felt or had any information on that Mela might be a good place for people to gather... actually that year it went right up to the wire again in that they [the **police**] said they would let us know the week before whether they had any information and they came back and said they didn't have any particular information and there were no problems.” – FM (Organiser, Mela 2002)*

Despite this potential threat from the BNP in 2001, all the Mela events prior to 2002 have been staged without any incidents of disorder breaking out around the event.

#### *4.3. Mela 2002: The Planning Process*

Two meetings were held that involved both the organisers and the police during the planning of Mela 2002. The first of these meetings was held five months before the event. The second meeting was held a few weeks before the event and involved a site visit to the park where the event took place in order to assess potential health and safety risks. The purpose of both these meetings was to plan for safety and security issues with a separate Mela committee meeting to consider issues of event funding and logistics. These two meetings involving the police and organisers will be referred to as the Mela Planning Group meetings (MPG).

#### *4.4. The Police and the Planning*

There were two officers who liaised with the organisers at the MPG meetings. One was an Inspector who had just moved to the area and held responsibility for local policing issues and the other was a Sergeant who was also based at the local police station.

#### *4.5. The Organisers and the Planning*

The main organiser at the MPG meeting was a representative (FM) from the local arts charity who acted as the main facilitator for the event in terms of funding and organisation. Also present was an organiser who was involved in the planning of all Mela events occurring in the local county.

#### *4.6. The Community Organisers and the Planning*

There was only one community organiser involved in the MPG meetings. He was a local councillor who had been involved in the planning of previous Mela events.

#### *4.7. Mela 2002: Event Context*

During the planning stages of the event, there were local elections held around the country which resulted in a number of BNP members gaining council seats. A member of the BNP did stand in the town where the Mela is located. However, he was defeated by the councillor who acted as a community organiser and it was felt that the BNP were not as much of a threat to the event as they were during the planning for the previous year.

However, there was another potential threat to the event that dominated the planning stages for Mela 2002. This concerned the possibility of 'gang related' violence breaking out between two (Asian) groups at the event. Both of these groups had a recent history in relation to violence in the town where Mela is staged:

*“About six weeks before Mela there was a big event going on the college site which was an Asian event primarily for the Asian community, I think there was Kabbadi<sup>8</sup> and stuff going on there and there had been a big crowd of people and there had obviously been some trouble and somebody got stabbed. One person from the other gang got stabbed. And I think it was in retaliation for something that had happened previously and that's what happens, you know, in [Mela Town]. It builds up, it builds up, tit-for-tat, tit-for-tat and something big happens and so there had been a stabbing and it had been in broad daylight in front of hundreds of people and the community had closed in and obviously gone quiet. I think there had been an arrest or they had brought somebody in but I think the police have found it incredibly difficult to find any witnesses and that kind of thing... People started to say in the community and outside of the community, is it a good idea to be having another big public gathering that's primarily for the Asian community?” – FM (Organiser, Mela 2002)*

In relation to the local police, Mela is one of a number of different public events that they are involved in. These include other festivals, a fairground and a jazz and blues music event.

#### *4.8. Mela 2002: The Staging of the Event*

Both the main organiser FM and the community organiser were present when the event was staged. The main organiser FM was responsible for the running of the event on the day and was aided by other organisers that were affiliated to agencies that worked with her charity and by other members of the Mela committee. There were also stewards and private security present. The community organiser attended the event but was not involved in the organisation on the day. As with

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<sup>8</sup> Kabbadi is a game that is thought to have originated in India over 4000 years ago but is now played throughout Asia and other countries. It is described as a cross between wrestling and rugby and involves two teams. For more information see [www.kabaddi-games.com](http://www.kabaddi-games.com)

previous Mela events, there were a number of activities during the day including stalls, live music, dancing and various food outlets.

The Inspector who had been involved in the MPG was not present at the event as he was on leave. The policing for the event was organised by the Sergeant who had attended the MPG meetings. She was a bronze commander for the event, although she was not present on the site for its entirety. There was no specific silver or gold commander for the policing of the event although a locally based Detective Chief Inspector was on call to assume this role in the event of any major incident.

Two PCs were initially deployed to police the event and they patrolled the site during the morning and afternoon. They were relieved by two officers in the early evening who in turn were joined by three additional officers to aid traffic dispersal and ease congestion as the event came to a close. The local police force had a recruitment stall present on the park for part of the day.

#### *4.9. Mela 2002: Event Outcome and Event Future*

It was estimated that 5,000 people attended the Mela during the day it was held. There were no outbreaks of disorder and no arrests were made at the event. Both organisers and the police were happy with how the event had progressed, especially given the potential for violence. However, the main organiser FM was concerned that there would have to be some changes to the way that any future event would be planned in terms of increasing the number of organisers and resolving issues around the recruitment and role of community organisers. Rather than dwell on these issues here, it is appropriate to examine them in relation to the next observed event: the Multicultural Festival.

## **5. Multicultural Festival 2003 Case Study**

### *5.1. Multicultural Festival Event Purpose*

The aim of the Multicultural Festival, held at the same location as Mela 2002 and involving many of the same organisers, was to hold an event that would appeal to all communities that reside in the town and local borough where the Mela had been held. Although the event had changed its emphasis away from being specifically focussed towards the local Asian community and was aiming for a broader community appeal, the format of the day was essentially the same. There were various stalls, live music, fairground attractions and other attractions which were aimed at all communities.

### *5.2. Multicultural Festival Event History*

The event had evolved from the previous years Mela and thus shares the same heritage with regards to past threats from the BNP, gang related violence and disorder arising from clashes between members from the Asian community and far right groups nearby. This evolutionary process from Mela to Multicultural Festival will therefore be considered in greater depth in the section examining salient event context.

### *5.3. Multicultural Festival 2003: The Planning Process*

Compared to the planning for Mela 2002, the Multicultural Festival comprised of more meetings involving a larger number of people. The planning started five months before the event and meetings were held on a monthly basis. The purpose of these meetings was slightly different compared to the MPG. There was still a focus on safety and security issues but these were combined with more general logistical considerations (e.g. securing funding, appointing organiser positions) involving the Multicultural Festival committee which had evolved from the old Mela committee. The police were involved in these meetings but did not attend

every one. These meetings will be referred to as the Multicultural Festival Planning Group (MFPG).

#### *5.4. The Police and the Planning*

As with Mela 2002, two officers attended the MFPG meetings. The Inspector who had been part of the MPG planning the previous year was present during the MFPG meetings. He was joined by a different Sergeant, who was locally based and had been instrumental in the planning of the Mela in 1995.

#### *5.5. The Organisers and the Planning*

The main organiser (FM) from the previous year was again heavily involved in the planning although an early part of the MFPG process was to delegate planning tasks to a larger number of organisers. Other representatives involved in the MFPG process included members of youth projects, the borough council, a local women's forum, organisers from other local events and a local government arts co-ordinator.

#### *5.6. The Community Organisers and the Planning*

The community organiser from the Mela was invited to participate in the MFPG process but chose not to. This led to community organisers being drawn from community networks and, in one case, an outreach worker from a local school.

#### *5.7. Multicultural Festival 2003: Event Context*

The reason why Mela 2002 evolved into Multicultural Festival 2003 is twofold. Firstly, there was a sense from the main organiser FM of Mela 2002 that the event had become 'stuck in a rut' and needed re-invigorating. Secondly, there were issues around the nature of community involvement in the planning process that had dominated previous events and these needed resolving. Both of these issues would dominate the planning process.

Starting with the community involvement issue, there was a feeling that party politics was unnecessarily dominating the planning process during previous Mela events and this would impact on the planning for the Multicultural Festival if left unchecked:

*“There were major, major problems and there are major problems in [Mela / Multicultural Festival Location] around the council and its power, the affiliations of Asian councillors to political parties and also to local groups that are set up in order to serve the Asian community and some of those gentlemen are extremely hard to work with because it really is about power and what they are involved in and not an awful lot of action and that is true for councillors across [the local borough council]. I mean, if you look at how many councillors actually attended the festival, came and showed their faces, I am not sure there were any there this last year, any, so that is not just about working in the Asian community that is about working with the council.” – FM (Organiser, Multicultural Festival 2003)*

It was for this reason that additional agencies became involved with the MFPG process in order to try and encourage members from the local community to take a proactive role in the event planning that would not be dominated by party political interests. This required a break from the past:

*“The first step, I thought, was that we had to finish off what was the old Mela committee and we had to look at the constitution and decide what changes we needed to make it a more sustainable event and more sustainable in the way of that organisational committee.” – RP (Organiser, Multicultural Festival 2003)*

The old committee from Mela 2002 was dissolved at the first MFPG meeting. A new committee was established and members attending this first meeting were elected to positions and roles (e.g. chair, secretary, finance officer) and the

constitution was amended to incorporate a change in direction towards a multicultural event. From this point on, the major issue was one of securing funding for the event. In comparison to previous years, there was no external threat to the event in terms of the BNP or possible gang related conflict occurring at the event.

#### *5.8. Multicultural Festival 2003: The Staging of the Event*

The event was held at the same location as the Mela and followed a similar format in terms of the activities that were available (e.g. stalls, music, dancing). All organisers (including community organisers) from the MFPG were involved in running the event on the day. Some of these organisers had extensive experience of hosting large public events that was not the case at Mela 2002. A different security firm was employed and there were more stewards compared to the previous year.

From the policing perspective, neither of the two officers involved at the MFPG meetings attended the event. Eight officers were involved in policing the event, with a maximum of two at any one time patrolling the park where the event was held. As with the previous year, the local police force ran a recruitment stall. There was a gold / silver / bronze command structure in place on the day of the Multicultural Festival but it catered for three large events, of which the festival was perceived by the police to be at lowest risk in terms of disorder. The other two events occurring locally included a football ‘friendly’ match involving two sets of fans with a history of confrontation, and a BNP gathering. Neither of these events impacted on the Multicultural Festival during the planning or staging processes and those policing the event did not have to access the gold / silver / bronze command structure. According to the Sergeant involved at the MFPG, had the Multicultural Festival been staged in isolation such a command structure would not have been utilised.



### 5.9. Multicultural Festival 2003: Event Outcome and Future

Despite the stresses of resolving intra-organisational relationships, forming a new committee and apprehensions over receiving funding, the event took place without any problems. The evolution from a specifically Asian event to a Multicultural Festival was reflected in a much more diverse range of performers compared to Mela 2002 and more diversity in the crowd profile. The number attending the event was slightly higher than Mela 2002. There were no outbreaks of disorder or any arrests made at the event and both the police and the organisers declared that they thought that the event had been a success.

In terms of the event's future, the plan is for the festival to take place over two days in subsequent years with a continuing emphasis on making it relevant to all local communities and not just the local Asian community *per se*.<sup>9</sup> The 'new' committee format had certainly addressed and resolved problems from previous years in respect of placing community interests (through recruiting community members) above party political interests and delegating tasks away from one organiser. However, the organisers hope that in time the role of the agencies involved in planning the event will gradually shift from leading the planning process to facilitating local community members who will plan it themselves.

## **6. Conclusion**

This first analysis chapter has outlined the structure and processes associated with each of the observed events. The first point to make is that the policing associated with these events broadly meets the characteristics of public order policing as outlined by P.A.J Waddington (1996). The policing was *highly visible* and conducted as *corporate action* (i.e. collective police operations under a defined command structure). In addition, there was an inclination *against* arrests which is another factor identified by P.A.J Waddington (1996). However, the events were not *contestable* relative to the policing of political protest / industrial disputes.

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<sup>9</sup> As a postscript to the Multicultural Festival, events held in 2004 and (most recently) 2005 moved to a two day format. There have also been subsequent Pride and Solstice events held on an annual basis.

These events therefore represent a relatively under-researched set of event types in relation to public order policing. With regards to the typology presented in chapter two, these events do not constitute ‘political protest / industrial disputes’ or ‘community disorder’ public order contexts which have generated the majority of research findings on public order policing (e.g. D. Waddington *et al*, 1989; P.A.J Waddington, 1994a; King and Brearley, 1996). Instead, these events would appear to constitute a sub-group of the ‘festival’ category where some research has focussed on community / commercial events that do not culminate in disorder (e.g. Barton and James, 2003; Valverde and Cirak, 2003). This research can therefore contribute knowledge to this particular public order policing context.

Whilst the observed events correspond to this ‘festival’ category, there is a great deal of diversity across them in relation to their histories, logistical concerns, the agencies involved in the planning and extent of police involvement. However, it is also possible to draw out common characteristics across the four case studies and it is important to present them here:

- Each event has a history, rather than being staged for the first time;
- The most salient characteristic of all four event histories is that order has been maintained, even in light of previous difficulties (e.g. BNP at Mela, the tensions around Solstice pre 2000, troubled police / community relations at Pride);
- Moving to the observed events, there is interaction between police, organisers and community organisers through a planning process;
- Despite the previous precedents of order being maintained at all four events, there are potential ‘threats’ that could compromise order / safety maintenance and / or the event future. These can be external to the planning process (e.g. gang violence at Mela), internal to the planning process (e.g. the police / PPG relationship arising from Pride 2002) or a

mixture of the two (e.g. protest at Solstice arising from decisions made during the SCG / SPG);<sup>10</sup>

- Following the planning process, the events are staged and these potential ‘threats’ are not reported to impact on order at the event. That is, these ‘threats’ have in one form or another been reduced or eliminated;
- Following the ‘success’ of each event, it is anticipated that they will re-occur at a future date but there will be some form of evolution (e.g. new personnel involved – such as Pride and Solstice; new event formats such as the proposed two day Multicultural Festival).

This commonality provides an analytic baseline from which to work. The next three chapters explore each of these entwined features through thematic analysis by considering in detail the ‘planning process’ (chapter five), the ‘staging process’ (chapter six) and ‘post event issues’ (chapter seven). In addition to what has been presented in this chapter, this form of thematic analysis culminates in a grounded model presented in chapter eight that attempts to explain *how* and *why* these events are orderly and safe. This process will therefore contribute to meeting the aims of this thesis which are presented at the end of chapter two.

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<sup>10</sup> It is important to acknowledge that the terrorist attacks in London 2005 could also lead to new forms of ‘threats’ to these types of events (especially Muslim oriented-festivals, but not exclusively) through, for example, resource issues or community tensions.

# Chapter Five: The Planning Process

## 1. Introduction

The previous chapter highlighted that the four observed events contained a set of common attributes which require further exploration to meet the aims of this thesis. This second analysis chapter therefore focuses on the interaction between the police, organisers and community organisers during a planning process that occurred at all the observed events. Firstly, consideration is given to the concept of ‘event safety’ as a potential key function for the various planning groups. This is followed by an exploration of the dynamics that were associated with each of the different planning groups in relation to an array of potential threats to either event safety, order or the future of the event. Finally, the chapter concludes by briefly comparing the findings from this exercise with partnership working in other policing contexts (i.e. crime reduction and community safety). However, before embarking on this, it is useful to offer a reminder of the basic structural characteristics of the observed planning meetings. These are summarised below:

**Figure 1.** Summary of the Observed Planning Formats

Event	Name of Group	Number of Meetings pre Event	Number of Personnel Involved (average)
Mela 2002	MPG	2 – Infrequent	> 5
Solstice 2003	SCG	9 – Monthly	15 – 20
	SPG	9 – Monthly	15 – 20
Pride 2003	PPG	4 – Approx. Every Six Weeks	10
Multicultural Festival	MFPG	5 – Monthly	10

## **2. The Importance of Event Safety**

Chapter two highlighted that in respect to the planning of public events, ACPO (1999) recommend that Safety Advisory Groups (SAG) consisting of representation from the event organisers, the police and other agencies (especially the local authority and other emergency services) should meet, identify risks and plan contingencies to increase public safety at events. It was also highlighted that the SAG is a voluntary rather than statutory requirement (ACPO 1999; Sexton, 2003).

With regards to the observed planning meetings, each group (i.e. MPG, SPG, PPG, and MFPG) dealt with the aims of the SAG as outlined by ACPO, albeit to varying degrees. Although agencies other than the police, a national charity and the main organiser were absent, the Solstice Consultation Group (SCG) also discussed issues concerning risk and safety connected with the staging of the Solstice event.

For each planning group (including the SCG) the majority of issues relating to public safety at the event were discussed and dealt with in an uncontroversial and efficient manner. As examples, these typically included discussing and arranging first aid cover, conducting risk assessments including ground plans and identifying emergency vehicle access routes. It is therefore reasonable to argue that, as a common thread underpinning the purpose of the different planning groups, planning for a safe event was the main concern of the police, organisers and community organisers. This represents a focus on maintaining *general* order rather than potentially contentious specific order (Marenin, 1982): the safety of those attending the observed events was more important than protecting vested interests.

However, even though the majority of issues were unproblematic, the previous analysis chapter outlined a number of significant ‘threats’ associated with each event that potentially threatened order and / or the future of the four observed events to different extents. These included the threat of protest at Solstice; the threat of gang related violence at Mela; deteriorating police / LGBT community

relations arising from Pride 2002 and the potential for disruption to the planning of the Multicultural Festival through conflicts originating from the political interests of previous community organisers. The previous analysis chapter also highlighted that, despite these threats, the events ultimately had successful outcomes from the perspective of all parties.

Therefore, the remainder of the chapter will delve beyond the overt ‘public safety’ remit that dominated the planning process and will attempt to locate and understand what factors were contributing prior to the staging of the event that aided in the reduction and ultimate non-impact of the highlighted threats.

### **3. Experience and Expertise in Planning the Events**

The first factor to consider is the varying degrees of experience and expertise that the members comprising each of the planning (and in the case of Solstice, consultation) groups had in relation to a) planning previous Pride, Solstice and Mela / Multicultural events and b) planning other events. The purpose of such an exercise is twofold. Firstly, it will demonstrate the diversity of this experience and expertise across the planning processes associated with each of the events. Secondly, it provides a baseline from which to judge how prepared each group was in relation to dealing with the more ‘significant’ threats mentioned in the previous section.

#### ***3.1. Pride***

There is a considerable spectrum of experience and expertise in relation to planning on both the part of the police, organisers and community organisers across the four observed events. The most experienced and ‘expert’ planning group was the PPG involved in Pride 2003. For example, this was the only group of all the four observed events that held a ‘table top’ exercise as part of the planning process. Although termed the ‘Pride Planning Group’ for the sake of consistency, this group was actually an operational Safety Advisory Group and the format, instigated by the police, has been in place since 1999:

*“[City where Pride takes place] never ran SAGs at all and I arrived here pre the millennium, I arrived in September 1999, and they didn't have a safety advisory group as such so we hastily put one together with the intention of managing the millennium celebrations which proved to be a particularly good move...We involved what I call statutory partners, we played ball in relation to the ‘purple guide’<sup>1</sup> for policing pop concerts and similar events, we had somebody from the council and in September the police used to chair the meetings but my opinion was it is not a police event, why are we leading on it? Meetings were being held at the police station, why? We are a part player in relation to this and we needed to change the emphasis from the police chairing and driving this thing through to putting the ownership elsewhere. So at that early stage it was decided that **LK [Organiser Pride 2003]** from the events Department would chair, that I would represent the police, that there would be representatives from fire, ambulance at one stage we even had a health authority and I can't remember the other sort of partners... we would look at the safety aspects but I'm not particularly interested in how we get the fencing in to the venue, that is something that people working for me and for the other main players need to get their heads around and manage.” – AC (Chief Inspector, Pride 2003)*

As well as outlining the origins of the format of the PPG, the above quote effectively notes the police role in the planning process – they are there to *advise* and don't mind forsaking what P.A.J Waddington (1994a) terms ‘home advantage’. One could interpret this as the police losing ‘control’ of proceedings but counterbalancing this is the fact that ownership of the event is placed elsewhere and therefore potentially reduces the potential for ‘on-the-job’ and ‘in-the-job’ trouble should anything go wrong.

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<sup>1</sup> Health and Safety Executive (1999) – see section 5.3. in chapter two for an overview of this document.

In addition to a SAG format being in place for the planning of Pride 2003, it is also important to note that the police representatives, including Chief Inspector AC, belonged to a specialist event-planning department with a wide remit:

*“The only operation that this small unit here at [city where **Pride takes place**] doesn’t get involved with or isn’t responsible for is the planning of political party conferences... Probably the largest operations that we in this office plan are obviously Pride, a large commercial pop concert [that takes place in park where Pride is held] every year and certainly some of the larger, what we call the category C, football matches when there is intelligence to suggest that public order problems will be taking place, and all operations of that nature, they all have a SAG and obviously table top exercises.” – TN*  
(Police Civilian / Special Constable, Pride 2003)

The police representatives at the PPG had a great deal of experience and expertise in relation to the planning of public events. In addition, this experience and expertise was also shared by the organisers and community organisers involved in the PPG. As mentioned above, the chair of the PPG came from the events planning department of the city council and had held this role for three years. The traffic management representative, health and safety officer and private security representative had all been involved in planning events and planning Pride specifically for a number of years. There was also a great deal of consistency amongst the community organisers involved in the PPG – only one community organiser involved in the group was new to the process in 2003 and he had previously been a police officer for eighteen years! The community organisers had not just been involved in planning previous Pride events in the city but had experience of a) in one case being involved in the planning of other Pride events across the country and b) the parade director also inputted in safety advisory groups for other local events as a St. John Ambulance representative.

To summarise, there was a great deal of experience and expertise available for the planning of Pride from the police, organisers and community organisers. The ‘structure’ of the PPG was also tried and tested across both Pride and a number of



other events through the safety advisory group format. In terms of judging the PPG's 'structural' capabilities to deal with risks relating to *event safety*, this combined experience and expertise would suggest that these risks should be significantly reduced:

*"You put all those people in a room together and ask them to make a decision on a safety issue at an event that they know about; I wouldn't think that you are going to make many mistakes. You could, but it is unlikely."* – CB (Community Organiser, Pride 2003)

It transpired that there was no threat associated with *event safety* per se that threatened order / the event future at Pride 2003. However, the previous chapter highlighted that the policing of Pride 2002 was the source of the greatest 'risk' to order / event future because it created a great deal of resentment from the local LGBT community towards the police. How this risk was reduced through the PPG at Pride 2003 will be discussed in section four.

### *3.2. Mela / Multicultural Festival*

Returning to the issue of experience and expertise, if the PPG represented the organised end of the spectrum, the MPG involved in Mela 2002 represented the unprepared end. The police representatives, organisers and community organisers simply did not share the same experience or expertise as their PPG counterparts. The MPG format was specific to Mela 2002 and did not follow a formal template such as the safety advisory group. From the police perspective, the involvement in the MPG consisted of an inspector and sergeant who were based at the local police station and held general 'geographic' policing responsibilities. Given this more general remit it is hardly surprising that they were only involved in the policing of a limited number of public events. However, notification of the intention to stage the event came directly from the main organiser rather than any other channel and the police were left feeling distinctly underwhelmed by the organisational capabilities of the organisers and community organisers:

*Out of the blue to a large extent came a telephone call following a letter from people known as the [arts charity that organise Mela]... so we got a fair bit of warning that they were considering having such an event and they invited myself and one of my sergeants along to a meeting to discuss the practicalities of organising such an event and to seek our input on the event to try and minimise the possibility of any difficulties... my first impression was that the organisers and the organising committee were a little bit naïve with a small letter 'n' as to their responsibilities as organisers when they are basically going to invite a potentially very large number of people to come along to an event that they were organising, and they didn't seem to have much cognisance of the types of safety requirements which may befall upon them as members of the organising committee and they were looking for a good deal of guidance from us... I found that a little bit dispiriting and ideally I feel they should have had a better cognisance of guidance and best practice that people should adhere to when organising public events... I got the feeling, rightly or wrongly, that they were happy to make us aware of it and then, if you will, to leave us owning a good deal of the organisation and one thing and another... Well, I'm afraid that circumstances have changed over time and as we move into an ever more litigation minded community or environment, the police as a body have tried to pull themselves away from being seen as the persons responsible for events or, for want of a better expression, the potential fall guys for other peoples' oversight."*

– SD (Inspector, Mela 2002).

As with the PPG, the police therefore considered themselves to be *advisors* rather than organisers although there was the additional perception of having to educate the Mela organisers as to their responsibilities. Again, the police did not hold 'home advantage' – the meeting mentioned was held in a terraced house doubling as an outpost for the arts charity that organised Mela 2002. It is also interesting to note that this event poses potential 'in-the-job' trouble through the prospect of litigation that could be aimed at the police should anything go wrong.

However, the police involved in the MPG did not help themselves in this respect. During a meeting there was discussion over the number of stewards that would be required for the event. The inspector (SD) stated that he would have to consult a document that neither the organisers nor myself could access to determine how many stewards would be required at the event. The point to make is that such information exists in the public domain through the 'purple guide'. Failure to make such information clear to the organisers is either a) deliberate or b) demonstrates a lack of knowledge on the part of the police in the MPG. The latter explanation is most likely as there was no possible reason why such a relatively mundane issue as the number of stewards required at the event would need to be kept secret from the organisers and observer alike.

This lack of experience and expertise in relation to event planning was also highlighted as problematic from the organiser perspective. Advice did come from the police and local council but the main organiser only had a limited amount of relevant event planning experience to inform her decision-making. This experience originated from past Mela events and involvement in staging another art based event. This allowed for a vague awareness of the 'purple guide' but:

*"I have never seen a copy of it... it is some kind of guidance book that talks about health and safety relating to public performances or public events and it has guidelines on the things like how much space you have to keep between chairs and it is a very secret document and I am not sure who has got it but I think the police and the council have referred to it previously."* – FM (Organiser, Mela 2002)

The organiser was therefore reliant on whatever information she could glean from the police, council or other contacts rather than any official (and available) references for guidance. However, it is important to note this lack of guidance did not impact greatly on health and safety issues – the event passed without controversy in this respect.

In contrast to Mela 2002, the Multicultural Festival in 2003 had greater experience and expertise in relation to event planning. This came in the form of new and

additional representative assistance to FM from other organisations and this led to a number of planning tasks being devolved. Two of these new organisers had a great deal of experience and expertise in the planning of other large public events (including a large outdoor music festival attracting 70,000 – 80,000 people over four days) and were knowledgeable about logistical event planning and safety issues. There were also more meetings compared to the MPG and increased discussion on both event logistics (e.g. whether there should be a large screen) and event safety matters (e.g. first aid provision).

Dissolving the old Mela committee instigated this new planning format and led to the recruitment of new community organisers. The previous chapter highlighted that there was a perception that community organisers, and in particular one member, were using the event for party political purposes and not contributing to the planning side. There were some concerns that these individuals may have impacted negatively on the planning for the MFPG but this never transpired and the new group were more organised than the previous year:

*“We didn't seem to have any negative reaction, well not that I heard from old committee members, because we made it clear saying this will be your commitment, do you want to be in this year or not in this year? I think there were only one or two committee members that felt they could give time this year but they did turn up for the event and commented on it that they were really pleased with the scale of the event. The other thing in redoing those constitutions and rules is we made sure that when people made a commitment, that was the committee, and obviously people just couldn't turn up at meetings and try to reverse decisions but we made that clear at the start - if you want to stand the people who are elected will be the committee and they are the people that have to make the decisions rather than it being a more fluid committee as it has been in the past.” – RP (Organiser, Multicultural Festival 2003)*

From a policing perspective, the same inspector but a different sergeant attended some of the meetings and, again, the police's self-defined role was one of offering

advice. An interesting point to note is that this sergeant had been involved in the planning and policing of a previous Mela (in 1995) in both an *organiser and police capacity* through his work in a local multi-faith based group. This experience therefore enabled additional relevant knowledge to be made available during the planning process compared to the previous year.

In conclusion, the MPG held neither the collective experience nor expertise compared to the PPG. However, the planning process for the MFPG – although nowhere near the level of the PPG – was, a) larger in terms of numbers, b) more organised and frequent in relation to the actual meetings and, c) had additional planning experience and expertise. Once again, the outcome of this planning process was a successful event with no reported health and safety issues impacting on it.

### 3.3. Solstice

The final planning groups to consider briefly are the SPG and SCG. In terms of the spectrum of experience and expertise in event planning, these planning groups fall between the MPG / MFPG and the PPG. In terms of expertise, the SPG and SCG contained no members that could match the specific safety planning abilities and experience of the PPG. From the police perspective, Solstice is the biggest public order operation in the county and the officers involved in the planning process were drawn from the local division rather than a specialist-planning unit. Likewise, the organisers and community organisers are not involved in event planning other than for the Solstice. The SPG was a fully-fledged multi-agency planning group and its purpose was analogous to a safety advisory group (i.e. a focus on public event safety) without actually being termed one. The SCG was also predominantly concerned with these aims but there was more emphasis on consultation and debate rather than determining policy.

However, a critical factor was *experience* and *consistency*. The majority of the personnel in both sets of meetings had known and worked with each other for a number of (consecutive) years in relation to Solstice, especially since the first managed access to the Solstice location in 2000. Comparatively, these personnel

(i.e. police, organisers and community organisers) had been involved in the planning process relating to this specific event for a greater period of time compared to their counterparts at Pride and the Mela / Multicultural Festival. As with the planning groups in the other events, the process appeared to be successful from a safety perspective as there was no report of such issues impacting during the staging of the event. As will be argued in a later section, this experience and consistency was probably influential in successfully negating protest at the observed Solstice event.

To conclude this section on experience and expertise in relation to safety, it has been demonstrated that each of the planning groups employed different methods in order to reduce general health and safety risks. The PPG is an example of a tried and tested formula that is based on the ACPO (1999) guidance for public event safety. It also had as a resource a great deal of expertise in event planning from the police, organisers and community organisers involved in the group. This was in comparison to the MPG where such expertise and experience was lacking, although it had increased by the time the MFPG convened. The SPG and SCG did not meet the levels of expertise in event planning compared to the PPG but they had more experience (and continuity) in terms of being involved in the planning of the Solstice event for a number of years.

Despite these differences in planning levels and formats, safety issues did not impact on the staging of the events and the vast majority of safety related 'risks' were easily identified and dealt with in an uncontroversial manner. However, in order to understand how the 'significant' threats were reduced during the planning stages it is important to examine the factors concerned with the *planning process* rather than the structural composition of the planning groups. This will therefore be the focus of the following sections.

#### **4. The Planning Processes: A Police Success Story?**

P.A.J Waddington (1994a) argues that the police form 'spurious' friendships in order to 'win over' event / protest organisers and therefore maintain as much control over the planning process as possible. An example of a 'spurious'

friendship offered by P.A.J Waddington (1994a) concerns the interaction between the police and the organisers of a Gay Pride event. In this instance the police involved in the planning meetings were friendly and accommodating towards the organisers but behind closed doors were openly homophobic (P.A.J Waddington 1994a).

This example is cited because it is relevant to the planning for Pride 2003. It is worth re-iterating that the police were viewed by the local LGBT community to have ‘over policed’ the previous years event by deploying aggressive tactics during the staging of the event (i.e. the use of EGTs, aggressive licensing enforcement over the weekend). In relation to Pride 2003, this was the most ‘significant’ threat to order / the event future because it a) created potential ‘in-the-job’ trouble and b) was perceived to impact negatively on more general police / local LGBT community relations. This was a situation that the police were keen to rectify:

*“A lot of that may have been caused through a breakdown of relationships between the police and obviously the organisers because if you don't get that right you can make life very difficult for yourself. As you saw last year we attracted a lot of adverse publicity, some of it understandably so, so it was [in 2003] a) the skill of being able to do the job and b) patching up partnership working relationships, understanding if you like the sensitivities.” – CS (Superintendent, Pride 2003)*

Away from the PPG, there were additional meetings with the local LGBT community and the community organisers prior to the start of the official planning for Pride 2003. From the police planning perspective, this led to a meeting between the designated ‘silver’ (Superintendent CS), ‘bronze’ (Chief Inspector AC) and ‘gold’ (a locally based Chief Superintendent). The result of this meeting was to present and execute a policing style reflecting three key aims: public safety, public reassurance and preventing hate crime.

The issue of ‘public safety’ was explored in the previous section and the PPG had the relevant experience and expertise to address these needs. Consideration to the prevention of hate crime at the event will be presented in the next chapter on the staging of the events. However, the issue of communicating the ‘public reassurance’ message is pertinent as the PPG offered the opportunity for the police, through Chief Inspector AC, to rectify the errors of the previous year through the planning and policing of Pride 2003.

In relation to rectifying the previous year’s mistakes and thus avoid ‘in-the-job’ trouble, the PPG offered the opportunity for the police to demonstrate that they could ‘get it right’ in relation to Pride 2003 by:

- Agreeing, signing and helping to promote a joint statement of common intent with the community organisers, organisers and licensees;
- Chief Inspector AC pledging in the first PPG meeting that he would stay with the event for its duration;
- Communicating a set of (low key) police tactics for the event. For example, no evidence gathering teams would be deployed and a police car driven by members of the local Gay Police Association and displaying a Pride flag would lead the parade, rather than a generic police van that had been used at previous events.

Therefore, in addition to the public safety remit, the PPG also allowed the opportunity, through the input of Chief Inspector AC, to build *trust* that had been lacking the year before. When combined with the other meetings held between the police and the community organisers / LGBT community, it is important to note that this effort to build trust was not perceived as ‘spurious’ and Chief Inspector AC received credit from the perspective of the organisers and the community organisers for his input in this process. For example:

*“There were problems with communication last year and other people are in a better position to talk about that because I only... I witnessed some of it myself but I felt that their response to what had happened,*



*certainly [Chief Inspector AC's] response, to sit down with representatives and let them have their say directly to them was very sincere and it was not just a tactic.*" – BW (Organiser, Pride 2003)

And:

*"He [Chief Inspector AC] just seems to understand everything around him, he seemed to, appeared to, understand the different needs of all the different communities. If there was something shocking going on around him he never let on that he thought it was shocking. He is an excellent chap and I should imagine he is too good to be promoted very far."* – JM (Community Organiser, Pride 2003).

In addition, the 'table top exercise' – unique to the PPG process in comparison to the other planning groups – acted as a method of increasing trust by introducing the community organisers to the police officers who would be policing the event (i.e. the gold and silver commanders in addition to Chief Inspector AC) who in turn could reinforce the changes in relation to the way the event would be policed.<sup>2</sup> This function was arguably more important than the resolution of the hypothetical dilemmas that were presented during the exercise.

By communicating through the planning process their intentions and strategy, the police were effectively minimizing the most 'significant' potential threat to Pride 2003 before the event took place. How these strategies and intentions unfolded during the staging of the event will be considered in the next chapter. Returning to P.A.J Waddington (1994a) and 'spurious' friendships, one would argue that the police involvement in the planning process demonstrated not just professionalism (and the avoidance of potential 'in-the-job' trouble) but was also genuine.

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<sup>2</sup> One of the officers – the designated 'bronze' commander for the parade – was not in attendance and this did cause a problem for the parade director during the staging of the event. The implications of this are explored in chapter seven.

## 5. The Planning Process: Tension at Mela 2002

In contrast to the gradual reduction of police / community organiser tensions through the PPG, the main threat to Mela 2002 was external to the police and organisers. The nature of this threat produced tensions in terms of the relatively undeveloped working relationship during the planning process for this event. As was highlighted in the previous chapter, there were tensions arising from ‘gang related violence’ that was associated with two local Asian groups and there was concern whether it would impact on the Mela. In comparison to the Pride 2003 planning process, the organisers of Mela found it difficult to obtain support and advice from the council and police in relation to this threat and consequently the event was nearly cancelled:

*“We went for some discussions with the police and the police's line to me originally was we are on high alert as far as this situation is concerned because there is great tension. I know that they were extremely worried and there were a few false alarms about people gathering here, people gathering there and, you know, we are not sure if Mela is a good idea... It was a really difficult situation because we started to say to the police well are you advising us that the event shouldn't go ahead? You know, what's your information because if you have information that the guys are going to use Mela then obviously we'll cancel it. And of course, the police's line then became we can't tell you to do anything and we got the same reaction from the council and we had this ridiculous 24 hours of sitting here, [other organiser] and I, saying to each other well are we meant to be cancelling this or not? And it became clear that either we got a phone call from the council that said if you decide to cancel it, we've just had a meeting with the police and we would be very happy if, you know, you could maybe find a reason for cancelling it like [Organising Arts Based Charity] didn't secure the funding or some of the artists have cancelled and I said well no way, if I cancel it I won't say that we've cancelled it on the advice of the police but I will say that this has been a multi-agency decision... because the police's point and the council's*

*point was that they didn't want... their relationship with the Asian community particularly in [Mela town] is very delicate anyway and obviously they didn't want it to come out that they had cancelled Mela. That's not good for the community, and I understand that but equally so it's not good for us because that is what I do, I work with those communities week in, week out... I didn't want that responsibility either of having to say to people well you know it might kick off. It was a very, very confusing 24 hours.” – FM (Organiser, Mela 2002)*

There are a number of interesting factors highlighted by this quote that demonstrate the problems of the MPG process compared to the PPG. Firstly, the decision-making in relation to this risk was occurring outside of the MPG via extraneous meetings and phone calls. Although this type of external threat did not occur during the run up to Pride 2003, if it had there would have been a structure via the PPG process to discuss the issues with all agencies present in an environment that was conducive to shared decision-making. In contrast, the MPG was abandoned as an option to work through these issues and, in the absence of the community organisers, there was certainly pressure exerted on the organisers to cancel the event. This would suggest that the police (and council) were facing a dilemma in relation to potential ‘in-the-job’ and ‘on-the-job’ trouble arising from the event being staged. On one hand, advising that the event could go ahead represented the possibility of ‘on-the-job’ trouble with the police having to potentially deal with the consequences of an outbreak of gang related violence by making arrests / dealing with injuries. The potential for ‘in-the-job’ trouble could be even worse: as was highlighted earlier, the police were concerned about perceptions that they ‘owned’ responsibility for the event. Had there been disorder they would have potentially been the ‘fall-guys’ in the eyes of the community and any subsequent media attention would potentially focus on their (and the council’s) actions. Given that there had been serious outbreaks of disorder the year before occurring near to the town, official judgment post any outbreak of disorder at Mela could have represented ‘bad news’ for these two organisations and the associated personnel involved in the planning process.

The chair of the PPG suggested during an interview that, prior to the SAG format being established, the police attitude to public event safety was “A safe event is the one that doesn’t happen” (GF, Organiser, Pride 2003). This attitude would appear to have been aired via the recommendation that Mela 2002 should be cancelled. However, taking such action highlights another dilemma and more prospects for ‘in-the-job’ and ‘on-the-job’ trouble. By asking the organisers to lie, the prospect of the word getting out that they (i.e. the police and council) had in fact been instrumental in the decision-making process would have potentially caused terrible damage to the already fragile police / council – community relations. This would obviously have potential repercussions beyond the issue of whether the Mela should go ahead.

The compromise that occurred involved the organisers hiring in extra stewarding through their event funding. How these additional stewards would have fared had there been an outbreak of disorder is a moot point but this ‘answer’ satisfied the police and council to the extent that they retracted from urging the cancellation of the event. On the day itself, there was no disorder and no ‘gang related’ trouble – other factors played a role in this and they will be discussed in the next chapter – but it is interesting to note that from a police perspective *post event* this incident was not related and the impact of potential ‘gang related’ trouble was downplayed:

*“I don't want to suggest there is a gang mentality or anything of that nature because quite genuinely I don't believe we have white gangs hell bent on having confrontation with Asian gangs or vice versa for that matter.”* – SD (Inspector, Mela 2002)

However, this incident does highlight working relations that make the PPG appear a beacon of cohesion in comparison. The MPG, and thus community organisers, was not consulted and decision-making was occurring via ‘backstage’ channels with a number of pressures being placed on the organisers. Although an outbreak of disorder at the event did not materialise, the planning process for Mela 2002

would suggest that the MPG was a relatively ineffective forum for dealing with issues beyond straightforward event logistics.

## **6. The Planning Process: Dealing With Dissent**

The case of Solstice 2003 presents an interesting exception to the other planning processes as there were effectively two planning groups: the SPG and the SCG. The SPG followed the norms of the other planning groups with the majority of decisions proving uncontroversial. However, two potential ‘threats’ to the event did expose tensions, especially in the SCG and to a lesser extent the SPG. This section will focus on how these tensions and by implication, the potential threats were resolved.

To briefly re-cap, there was a dilemma associated with the date that the Solstice should be celebrated. It is normally the 21<sup>st</sup> June, the calendar date for midsummer, but technically, in 2003, it should be the 22<sup>nd</sup> as this is the dawn closest to when the sun is at its most northern point (8pm on the 21<sup>st</sup>). The dilemma, therefore, was whether the event should be staged on the 21<sup>st</sup> (the date it is normally associated with and most potential event attendees would regard as the ‘proper’ date) or the 22<sup>nd</sup> (the correct date from a solar calendar perspective).

At the first observed meeting there was a great deal of debate concerning this issue in both the SCG and the SPG. In relation to the SCG, the police, organisers and community organisers all agreed that the event could not be held over two days. From the police / organiser perspective it would be impossible logistically to plan for two days whilst the community organisers were keen that the Solstice should not recess back to a festival format which had been the case in previous years (pre managed open access). There were elements of dissent from a couple of community organisers – one argued that he could not continue in the planning stage if the 21<sup>st</sup> was chosen whilst the other accused the government agency that maintains the location of exploiting the solstice location’s historical and spiritual importance if it went ahead on the 21<sup>st</sup>. The group collectively (i.e. police, organisers and community organisers) persuaded the former to stay on as part of the planning process and, with regards to the historical and spiritual importance,

there was a collective argument that if the process went wrong in 2003 future Solstice events would be potentially threatened and thus also undermine the historical and spiritual importance of the location. A vote was held at the end of the meeting by the community organisers and the result revealed that the 22<sup>nd</sup> was the preferred option *but a second vote stated that the community organisers would support whichever date was finally selected*. This demonstrates a level of pragmatism and consistency on the part of the community organisers that was to prove important as the planning progressed.

The SPG were also split on the issue. The main concern for the organisers was with another location external to the Solstice location. The police and main organiser (who chaired SPG and SCG and was a representative from the government agency that maintained the site) were keen to hold the event on the 21<sup>st</sup>, as this would avoid having to manage the site for two days. Other organisers made a case for the 22<sup>nd</sup> as it was perceived that the 21<sup>st</sup> could lead to a decampment from the Solstice location to this external site, which they had responsibility for.

However, a decision was made to stage the event on the 21<sup>st</sup> and this created two sets of planning tensions that could have been the basis for both 'on-the-job' and 'in-the-job' trouble relating to the organisers and the police. The first and ultimately less serious planning problem revealed tensions between the different organisers. The community organiser from the SCG who had threatened to leave the group at the previous meeting decided that he would hold a separate celebration on the 22<sup>nd</sup> at an alternative, but still local, site rather than attend the Solstice celebration. This created a dilemma for the organisers who valued the contributions from previous Solstice events that this community member had made to the SCG but were not keen on a potentially large gathering occurring on the 22<sup>nd</sup>. This particular community member also made it clear that he had no intention of disrupting the main planning and wished both the SCG and SPG well in relation to the planning and staging of Solstice 2003. He also stated that he would return to the SCG to aid in the planning of future Solstice events.

Nobody questioned the sincerity of this community member but there were worries over how many people would arrive at this alternative celebration. These concerns were exacerbated by the fact that organisers from the national charity who had requested the 22<sup>nd</sup> as a date were attending separate truth and reconciliation meetings<sup>3</sup> and, as land owners of the site where the celebration would take place, were viewed to be implicitly endorsing it:

*“As time went on some of the people we thought who would be total allies turned out to be difficult. I am talking about the [national charity] and that sort of thing and some of the issues that emerged latterly in the process with opening the [alternative celebration site] and that sort of thing for [Solstice Community Organiser]. Some of those discussions that went on do make me wonder sometime as to which side they were on, not that there should be sides, but never the less we ought to say that there are the organisers and there are the revellers who want to come along and actually celebrate solstice and really the organisers have got to be corporate in the way they deal with things.” – RB (Chief Superintendent, Solstice 2003)*

The other organisers (especially the police) developed a contingency plan for this alternative celebration but they turned to the SCG at later meetings to ask for their assistance in trying to discourage people from attending. This tactic appeared to work as only twelve people participated at this alternative celebration.

The second and, potentially more serious, threat concerned a potential gathering that planned to protest at the chosen date of the official Solstice celebration. This protest was orchestrated over the Internet and it was planned to take place on the morning of the 22<sup>nd</sup>. It is important to note that the main organiser of this protest was not part of the SCG.

The community organisers in the SCG downplayed this threat during meetings by stating the individual concerned was a ‘cyber-anarchist’ and that the protest would

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<sup>3</sup> As mentioned in the previous chapter, this forum pre-dates the SPG and SCG although it was still running during the planning process. Its membership consists of people who were involved in both the SPG and SCG although it had no formal planning responsibility.

never materialise. Whilst presenting this message at the SCG group, a number of the community organisers were also involved in dialogue on internet message boards with members of the druid and pagan community who were unhappy with the chosen date. These community organisers argued a consistent 'party line' by stating that the future of open managed access would potentially be under threat if the protest occurred and this could herald the return of exclusion zones around the site and closed access. There were online counter accusations that these community members were no more than 'mouth pieces' for the police and the main organisers.

It ultimately transpired that there was no protest at the Solstice. It is impossible to say what impact the online dialogue had on reducing this threat – the 'organisers' of the potential protest could have been simply espousing threats and never actually held the intention of carrying it out. However, from the community organiser perspective, engagement was a better tactic than either ignorance or a heavy-handed intervention from the authorities:

*"I was incredibly encouraged by the fact that it seemed that we are getting to people, we are communicating and also we are representing people, people who are willing to work with a formula because so many people came on the right day and so few people came on the day that it wasn't open. It was a major vindication of all the work we did in the lead up I think. I think it surprised all of us, I think we were all biting our fingernails like mad that it was going to be a problem but it wasn't and it was because we were so aware and anticipated...I think we have to realise that we did do an incredible amount of work... if you are looking at it from a control and public order point of view it is an example of what happens when you allow people to talk to each other and encourage people to cooperate with each other and listen to each other. It shows that you can have good order, even in the most trying and difficult circumstances whereas the idea that a few behind closed doors should make rules and then you have a strong rod of iron to enforce those rules, this is what leads to the problems." – WP (Community Organiser, Solstice 2003)*



From the police and organiser perspective, the outcome of this response to potential protest could hold important implications for the future of the event as it suggests that, beyond the safety and planning remit, increasing trust was an inevitable outcome of the continuity and consistency displayed by the community organisers in the run-up to Solstice 2003:

*“There were a number of individuals I think [Community Organiser] was one, [Community Organiser] was the other one, who were basically saying that they were armchair anarchists they wouldn't cause any problems, they didn't have a following and that sort of thing and what was interesting is that they were absolutely proven right but what we were doing is saying oh are they right in terms of the risk to the whole event, we had to have contingencies in case they did turn up. Now I think that what we will have to do is in future years if the likes of [Community Organiser] come through and say we wouldn't worry about those I think we can put a little more credence to what they are saying whereas in the past, suspicious police officer saying I don't know if I like that sort of thing, I think what we have got to do is say yeah they probably are right and perhaps not worry quite so much about it... If you had listened to the e-mails earlier on in the process we would have had thousands grouping at the fence line, that they would have got in there and celebrated what they considered to be the true Solstice but that didn't materialise. So I think that is part of the point we were discussing earlier of trust – that is building.” – RB (Chief Superintendent, Solstice 2003)*

The two main threats of alternative celebrations and protest did not impact on the event. However, in dealing with these risks during the planning stages there was an assortment of possible ‘in-the-job’ and ‘on-the-job’ trouble tensions for all the parties involved. All the parties were interested in maintaining some sort of ‘control’ of proceedings. For example, the consequences of protest and alternative celebrations could lead to having to a) deal with it as it happens and b) face the potential consequences should anything serious occur (as the chair of the SCG

pointed out, she would be the one appearing in court should the worst happen). From the community organiser perspective, by not engaging with other community members over the internet there was the possibility that the event would be marred by trouble and the previous three years worth of work related to managed open access would be undone. By engaging, they could at least attempt to keep control of the future of the event and increase their credence with the other organisers.

It is interesting that, of all the four events, the threats faced by Solstice were potentially the most serious. It is also important to note that the two planning groups (SPG and SCG) had an internal consistency in terms of personnel stretching over a number of years. This provided a basis for a collective, and successful, approach to minimising these threats. Beyond the visible function of safety and logistical planning, this process also presented the opportunity to build trust – a factor that will no doubt stand the police, organisers and community organisers in good stead for the future.

## **7. Conclusion**

This chapter has highlighted that the process associated with the planning of the observed events. At a functional level, the purpose of the various planning groups is to ensure that the prospects of event safety are maximised prior to the staging of the events. This demonstrates that the concern for all the parties involved in planning is analogous to the maintenance of *general* order (Marenin, 1982). Whilst much of the decision-making was not contentious, a number of threats existed that could have potentially impacted on order / event safety. However, these were to an extent negated by the planning process, especially with regards to Pride and Solstice. The key factor behind this relates to the dynamic associated with the planning groups. This dynamic is characterised by good working relationships between the police, organisers and community organisers at these events. Further, these relationships had been built up over time (in the case of Solstice) and were interacting in environments that could facilitate effective decision-making (in the case of Pride and the Multicultural Festival). The exception to this concerned the planning process for Mela where the working

relationship between the organisers and police was not as developed compared to the other observed events. The reasons for why the threat associated with this event (i.e. gang-related violence) was negated are explored in the next chapter.

To an extent these planning meetings demonstrated characteristics that are analogous to partnership working that occurs in other contexts. For example, Crawford (1998) argues that the development of trust is an important factor in partnerships that focus on crime reduction and community safety and this was certainly evident during the planning process for the observed events (e.g. the police rectifying previous mistakes at Pride, community organisers dissuading protest at Solstice). Crawford (1998) also argues that conflict avoidance strategies in the context of crime reduction and community safety represent a 'quest for unity' which potentially undermines the effectiveness of their work. This is not as evident in the context of the observed planning process. For example, the Solstice planning process required difficult decisions to be made that culminated in heated debate and ultimately people leaving the planning process. The need to demonstrate superficial unity came second to avoiding an unworkable situation in this case (i.e. an event that lasted two days and took a festival format).

There are two possible reasons for this. The first relates to the nature of organising and then staging an event. As the following chapter will demonstrate, the personnel involved in the planning process were also involved in staging the event. The failure to address an issue during the planning could have serious implications on the staging process which in turn would reflect on these personnel. As one respondent put it "failing to plan is planning to fail" (GF, Organiser, Pride 2003) and this is an adage that all the planning groups wished to avoid. The second reason relates to consequences and it is necessary to draw on P.A.J Waddington's (1994a) concept of 'trouble'. Whilst P.A.J Waddington (1994a) argues that avoiding 'in-the-job' and 'on-the-job' trouble motivates the police to work closely with organisers, this chapter has demonstrated that these concepts are equally applicable to organisers and community organisers. To jeopardise event safety is to invite these forms of trouble for *all* the parties involved in the planning process (e.g. the main organiser of Solstice would potentially be taken to court should anything go wrong at the event). Therefore, to

facilitate safety and order and by default avoid these forms of trouble requires the police, organisers and community organisers to work together effectively.

One final point is worth highlighting from the literature on partnerships occurring in the crime reduction and community safety context. Heddermen and Williams (2001) argue that an important factor in effective partnership working concerns the skills of key individuals:

“In many cases, (project) implementation seemed to have been achieved largely because of his or her imagination, stamina, networking and management skills, and dogged determination.”  
(Heddermen and Williams, 2001, p2)

It is evident that these types of skills contributed to the planning process outlined in this chapter (e.g. the role of Chief Inspector AC at Pride). The recognition that individuals have an important role in facilitating successful planning and staging was also alluded to in the previous chapter (i.e. the recognition of Chief Inspector AC’s role from the local LGBT community). The combination of these factors (planning function, group dynamics, and individuals) are important for understanding the role of the planning process in relation to answering *why* order and safety was ultimately maintained at the events. These issues will be returned to in chapter eight when considering a holistic perspective on the public order policing of community-based events. However, the next chapter will shift the focus from this planning process and outline in greater detail how it impacted on the staging of the observed events.

# **Chapter Six: The Staging Process**

## **1. Introduction**

The purpose of this chapter is to outline and explore the inputs of police and other agencies during the staging process. Although each event was different in terms of format, levels of police resources and approaches to general event management, it is possible to draw out some interesting common characteristics as well as highlight aspects that were unique. This is best achieved by considering a number of factors associated with the staging process. Firstly, it is important to outline the police strategy at each of the events and the factors that influenced how these manifested themselves 'on the ground'. Secondly, the previous two chapters identified potential threats to order and public safety that emerged during the planning stages. Even though these threats did not manifest themselves it is worth outlining what capacity the police had available if the worst happened. This exercise is followed by revisiting some of the themes arising from the previous chapter in relation to general approaches (i.e. the integration, or otherwise, and collaboration between police, organisers and community organisers) to the management of each of the events. This will demonstrate a consistency with some of the practices that were evident during the planning stages at each event. Finally, there is consideration of the private security and stewarding that were a feature at all four events and in particular the types of tasks that these personnel conducted. As a reminder, and an opportunity to provide some background context, the chapter will start by briefly outlining some basic characteristics associated with the police input at each event.

## **2. The Police Input into the Staging Process**

The previous chapter highlighted that, to varying degrees, representatives from the police had an input into the planning groups associated with each of the four events. This part of the chapter is an exploration of how this input can be translated into a set of policing strategies that were implemented at each of the four events. As a benchmark for the discussion that follows, it is useful to briefly

summarise the police resources and command structure in addition to the format and numbers present at the observed events:

**Figure 2.** Summary of the Police Resources at each of the Observed Events

Event:	Number of Event Attendees:	Focus of Event:	Police Resources / Command Structure at Event:
Pride	60,000 – 90,000	Parade followed by public gathering (events / stalls / dance tents / live music) on local park	95 Officers 1 x Gold Commander 1 x Silver Commander 2 x Bronze Commanders
Solstice	30,000	Public gathering / celebration at Solstice location	100+ Officers 1 x Gold Commander 2 x Silver Commanders 3 x Bronze Commanders
Mela	5,000	Public gathering (stalls / live music) on local park	7 Officers 1 x Bronze Commander No Gold or Silver Commanders present for event
Multicultural Festival	5,000	Public gathering (stalls / live music) on local park	8 Officers No command structure present for event

The previous chapter highlighted different approaches to the planning of each event and the table above demonstrates that, from a logistical perspective (i.e. event numbers and police resources), there is also diversity relating to the format /

resource allocation at the staging of the four events. However, it is possible to draw out common characteristics relating to the police input at each of the events and determine the impact these had on the eventual safe, orderly and successful outcomes reported in chapter four.

### **3. The 'Policing Style'**

The policing strategies implemented at the four events can be conceptualised as a set of policing styles. In essence, these policing styles encapsulated the methods and tactics that were employed at each event and they were devised by those officers who had liaised with the organisers and community organisers during the planning process and / or held command positions during the police input into the staging process. The common thread across all four events was that each policing style was characterised by a 'low key' but not necessarily 'low profile' police involvement. The term 'low key' was either explicitly mentioned or implied when the officers involved in the planning process and / or command outlined their overall strategy to the events. The largest police presence was associated with Solstice and the silver commander on site (who was also the main police representative at the SPG and SCG) surmised that this 'low key' strategy a) was appreciated by the public and b) resulted in a low number of arrests:

*"That's been a deliberate stance right from 2000 in that what we employ is basically two sets of officers, those who are what I would say are straightforward police officers without training and that sort of thing, so they would go along and police that event wearing conventional uniform, you know a high visibility vest, helmets that sort of thing, and then in addition to that we have got trained officers who are in full protective equipment or lets say they have got the capability of getting into that protective equipment... the general way that we police would be community policing if we could and I know what I've said in the past at several briefings I've done is treat this as a big village and go in and try and police that accordingly and certainly I didn't mingle with the crowd very much in 2003 because my responsibilities were different but what I have seen in the past is a lot*

*of the crowd have been quite appreciative of the style of policing that we have adopted which has been low-key, you know, if we look at this year, 30 odd thousand people there, 16 arrests.” – RB (Chief Superintendent, Solstice 2003)*

There are a number of points worth noting from the above statement. This low key policing style attracts both the backing of those who attend the event and it results in a low number of arrests. To contextualise these figures, it is worth comparing the number of arrests made at the observed Solstice with numbers from a ‘big village’ over a similar period (i.e. over a weekend). The Surrey town of Camberley has a population of 30,105 (2001 Census) and averages 2.35 arrests over a weekend evening / early morning (Surrey Police, personal communication). It is also important to note that the chosen policing style has been consistent since 2000. As chapter four highlighted, prior to the Solstice in 2000 the event had been characterised by over a decade of exclusion zones that were heavily policed (along with the Solstice location) and the occasional outbreak of (heavily publicised) disorder. The next section will examine how these strategies manifested themselves ‘on the ground’ but the points that are important include the notion of ‘community policing’ (communicated in this instance through the metaphor of policing a ‘big village’) and the fact the strategy at the observed Solstice had been utilised on previous occasions.

The previous two chapters have highlighted that in relation to the police input into Pride, the topic of the policing style had not only dominated the planning process but it potentially presented the greatest threat to the event given the tensions that had arisen between the local LGBT community and the police during the previous year’s event. The consensual opinion from all parties, including the police involved in the PPG, was that the previous Pride had been insensitively policed with an emphasis on traditional public order methods (e.g. the use of Evidence Gathering Teams) rather than liaison with the organisers and community organisers who could have potentially informed a more appropriate operation. In contrast, the policing style for the observed Pride placed an emphasis on a strategy incorporating reassurance, public safety and the prevention of hate crime that had been planned and communicated well in advance of the actual event:



*"It was never perceived that there was going to be any great problem. All events are risk assessed and this was well planned and I'm talking about it from the partners, from Pride, it is something that we had known before, it was well planned, there was high levels of organization. So basically the event itself was always going to be low risk because this wasn't something that was going to be an illegal march where the motives were one of civil disorder or protest, this was lawful, well-organised, rehearsed. The biggest issues were crowd safety because we have got large numbers of people on a hot day coming into [Pride City] in a congested city and possibly throwing into it the usual sort of alcohol factor... people can get hurt. The other side of it of course was the crime because there were a lot of obviously homosexual people coming into the city, it could attract hate crime which of course is something that we have to police very sensitively. There have been incidents leading up to it, indeed there had been incidents in previous years, and we need to make sure that we maintain the confidence of the gay community in being able to respond and deal quickly and prevent it and hence the operation started on the Friday night were of course around the gay venues most of the people were gathering and of course it was this having high visibility reassurance but not being oppressive or intrusive as far as the gay community is concerned. It reassured them, it wasn't sort of hang on you are looking and checking up on what we are doing, which would be issues that came out the year before where it was all enforcing licensing rather than actually saying hang on are you okay with support and reassurance and visibility." – CS (Superintendent, Pride 2003)*

In addition to a policing style that was designed to regain lost confidence from the community organisers and the wider LGBT community, there was an expectation of an orderly event based on the inputs of the planning process and knowledge about what the event constituted. The policing style was low key in that the intrusive tactics of the year before were replaced with high visibility reassurance

but also an emphasis and awareness that the large numbers and weather conditions posed a threat to public safety. Another feature of the policing style at Pride was the integration of the organisers and community organisers from the PPG into the management of public safety at the event. This also occurred at Solstice but to a lesser extent. These factors will be considered in more depth as the chapter progresses.

The smallest of the observed events in terms of the police presence and the numbers of event attendees was the Mela and the Multicultural Festival that followed it. From the policing perspective, the Mela was not perceived as particularly difficult to police and the main objective was public safety:

*“Given the size of event that the Mela was, it was something that eight times out of ten we deal with in our stride... the success criteria for me would be first and foremost did anybody come to any harm, were there any difficulties from a traffic flow situation and any knock-on effects from road traffic accidents or anything of that nature and did the majority of people go away from the event feeling that they enjoyed themselves and hadn't seen an overt police presence. When all things are considered reflecting on the Mela that occurred, I would suggest that it was a success within those criteria.”* – SD (Inspector, Mela 2002)

As with Solstice and Pride, the Mela was not occurring for the first time. During the MPG, the Inspector – who was new to the area and had not policed the event previously – outlined that he had been informed that the policing at the preceding Mela had relied on a small police presence and there had been no significant problems. The organiser and community organisers in the MPG had endorsed this policing strategy and were particularly pleased that the event had passed peacefully given that it had been staged shortly after a nearby outbreak of disorder related to clashes between the police, members of far right political parties and a small number of the local Asian community.

Therefore, the policing at the observed Mela was based on a previous template and, because of the relatively small numbers involved, an expectation that a small police presence would be sufficient to ensure public safety without creating an impression of an overt or intrusive police presence. However, there was still a potential threat to order at the event arising from possible gang related conflict. The reasons why this did not materialise will be examined shortly, along with the procedures and resources available to the police to potentially counter this threat.

Before outlining the policing style at the subsequent Multicultural Festival, it is important to note that no threat to order and / or public safety had been identified prior to the staging of the event. It was in this sense the most straightforward event in terms of policing compared to Pride, Solstice and Mela. Given that the policing style had been based on previous events, it is no surprise that this in turn informed the policing style at the Multicultural Festival:

*“What we decided to do was put together a sergeant and seven PCs, which is a minimum PSU, and they would be allocated the task of policing the event on the day on the understanding that it is very low-key in the sense of we didn't want all seven there in a riot van. We wanted a maximum of two at a time, hats and coats, walking through the area, community involvement, and then alternate staff obviously because it is a long day. That was the plan up to the day itself, we never got any intelligence, or reports, or comments from anywhere to say that they expected trouble so we didn't increase the policing and on the day itself that is how we policed it. So you had one sergeant making contact with the organisers and at any one time generally there were a maximum of two officers walking through. We then policed the extremities, because with any event you get people travelling to and from which makes it a good area for anyone who wants to steal anything or mug anyone, so we policed the extremities with the extra. So if there were two in the event, there would be five walking around outside and that is how we policed it.” – MY (Sergeant, Multicultural Festival 2003)*

In terms of consistency, the numbers were consistent with the Mela and again there was an emphasis on low key policing through a small police presence patrolling the Multicultural Festival location and engagement, or community involvement, with participants at the event. Compared to Solstice and Pride, the policing of the Mela and the Multicultural Festival was characterised by a relatively loose command structure. The metallic hierarchy existed in principle but it was not as rigid or as comprehensive in contrast to Solstice or Pride. The concerns were related to finding cover and the logistics of allocating a small number of officers to the event. The task of preparing and running an operation involving approximately 100 officers under a more rigid command structure, which was the case at Pride and Solstice, naturally creates more complexity and potential difficulties. The various command structures are explored in greater detail in section five whilst a number of problems that were identified by the police and organisers in relation to these receive consideration in the following chapter.

Returning to consideration of the policing style, there are elements of consistency across the four events despite the differences in format, size and levels of police resources. Overt and intrusive public order tactics were eschewed in favour of the 'low key', reassurance and community involvement, combined with a concern for public safety rather than explicit order maintenance and crowd control. These formed the basis of policing styles that, rather than being reactive, were devised by police representatives and / or police commanders involved in the planning process. They were also informed by previous experience of policing the events in the past. The next section will reflect on how these policing styles operated during the staging of the events. This exercise will also offer the opportunity to consider why the potential for gang related conflict at Mela did not materialise.

#### **4. The Policing Styles in Action**

One common characteristic of police involvement during the staging of each event is that police officers generally had very little to do. This is not surprising given that each event ran in an orderly and safe fashion. However, it is interesting to reflect on how the policing styles mentioned translated into the actions that were

taken by police officers by drawing out common characteristics across the four events.

It was noted in the previous section that there were only 16 arrests out of a crowd of 30,000 at the observed Solstice. There was undoubtedly much more opportunity for the police to be proactive in making arrests if they had so desired. At the height of the event, it was impossible to circulate around the crowd without witnessing the smoking of cannabis. Quite often there were police officers close to this open drug taking but they did not intervene. This was a deliberate tactic embodied within the policing style at Solstice:

*“We could have probably been far more rigorous in our arrests if we had decided to nick everybody who was smoking a bit of dope and everyone who swore and everyone who was drunk and disorderly and that sort of thing but I think you've got to be realistic in terms of if you are not careful and you start going and you start arresting people in large numbers, for a start you run out of resources, because immediately if you take an arrest that is officers moved away from there and also you end up inflaming the crowd and is that really what we want? I think that there was a quote from Scarman from the Brixton riots in 81 where by he basically said that, and what he was referring to at that time was the whole issue of intervening in terms of drugs and it was the particular cafe that they hit and that sort of thing on that occasion and he did put forward a view to say that if taking a certain course of action by the police that then adversely affects the Queen's peace, the question is should you be taking that course of action even though there is a degree of criminality and that is something I have always kept in mind as far as Solstice is concerned. Whilst there may be misdemeanors, some would argue that it is awful that there are people smoking dope and that sort of thing, but if that is going on is it right as a consequence of dealing with that few that you could really cause an incident of major proportions as we have seen in the past and that is why we have said try to keep it low-key, if there are people dealing there they should be taken out because I'm sure*

*everyone would applaud if that happens, and those people that are really drunk and disorderly and committing antisocial behaviour yes as far as possible get those out but in general terms low-key.” – RB*  
(Chief Superintendent, Solstice 2003)

The policing strategy for Solstice therefore had a ‘bigger picture’ approach at its heart. This was based on weighing up outcomes – the police could choose between non-intervention and therefore underenforcement in relation to drugs / minor public order offences or they could take a proactive arrest strategy that could potentially have antagonized the crowd and created disorder. The choice of the former strategy was taken in the light of previous experience (Chief Superintendent RB had been instrumental in the planning and policing of Solstice since 2000) and an awareness that, if order (and therefore public safety) was the priority, overt criminality was not a pressing concern relative to achieving this overall aim that had been a precedent at the event since the inception of managed open access. At a logistical level, a proactive arrest strategy could also have exacerbated the potential for disorder and there would not have been the resources to cope.

The low arrest figures reflect that this approach was adopted by the police officers at the event even though the strategy of underenforcement in relation to drugs was possibly not the policing norm – despite changing attitudes – away from Solstice:

*“Attitudes change, I don't know if on the night you were aware but the consensus was we would not be actively policing people using prohibited drugs. We had been proactive in policing the distribution and sale and dealing of such things but if somebody walked past you smoking a spliff, it wasn't that you turned a blind eye but you didn't actively police it. If that happens on a Saturday night on a high street I think nine times out of ten that person would be arrested for the possession of a controlled drug but I think attitudes are changing to the recreational use of certain drugs and I think you don't get conflict and without conflict you don't get hot spots, you don't get a problem for policing. It is very much if I'm going to stand on the road and*

*stand in front of you and prevent you from going somewhere you are going to be upset. If I wave at you when you go past you are going to think what a lovely policeman and that is the situation I think.” – DC (PC, Solstice 2003)*

Once again, the implication is that underenforcement and the application of the general low key policing style minimises the potential to create crowd antagonism towards the police and this was desirable in relation to avoiding ‘a problem for policing’.

There were no reported arrests arising from the staging of Pride but in comparison to Solstice where the policing style was similar to that utilised at previous events, the policing of the observed Pride event rejected an overt and enforcement oriented policing style (that had been used the previous year) and opted for a discretionary approach that placed an emphasis on proportionality:

*“I don't have police officers walking like guards along the side of this procession with evidence gathering teams filming and that is one of the issues that was picked up... you know in riot gear, that is the proportionality side of it and is it necessary? If I saw someone on the float or officers saw someone on the float who was carrying out a sexual act on another male, quite clearly an offence, a public decency offence, quite clearly there could be members of the public who think it's horrendous, there are lots of complaints, is it necessary at that stage to stop the procession and form cordons, go up to that float in front of the community and actually arrest or take details to summons these people? I don't think so, that is the discretionary power of saying no.” – CS (Superintendent, Pride 2003)*

As with Solstice, there was drug taking at Pride but this was not actively policed. Overt drug taking was not as prevalent compared to Solstice. However, it was occurring and an impact of the policing style was that the police opted for non-intervention and therefore underenforcement:

*“If anyone was seen drug dealing at Pride, as they were, nothing was done about it. They were just observed because if the police had gone in and arrested anyone the crowd would not have known what they were being arrested for. They would have seen it as a hostile attack on a gay person so they very wisely - I suppose in a way it is wise - just let it carry on which I’m not for. I’m not just saying it because you are doing something for the police, I know that you are not a copper, but I don’t approve of people taking drugs. I like poppers for sex, amyl nitrate but that’s all. That is very much a gay thing.” – JM*  
(Community Organiser, Pride 2003)

This quote raises an interesting contradiction: JM states that he is *against* people taking drugs and that by implication something should have been done even though he admits to his own drug-taking. However, it is worth reiterating that, in direct contrast to the previous year, potentially intrusive methods such as the use of evidence gathering teams and even the use of the police helicopter (who in previous years had photographed the crowd) were not present during the policing of Pride 2003. From the first PPG meeting, there was a commitment to a ‘low key’ and sensitive policing style and this included new tactics such as officers from the local Gay Police Association leading the parade rather than the traditional tactic of using a police van. In addition, the officers who policed the event were drawn from the city that hosts Pride, the logic being that they would be more sensitive in their approach to the event as they were used to policing a large resident gay population compared to officers drawn from other locations. These were tactics specific to the police input at the event that were implemented in light of the tensions arising from the previous year. However, to fully appreciate the implementation of the policing style one needs to consider the levels of integration between the police, organisers and community organisers during the staging of the event and this will be considered in due course.

Returning to the specific police input at the observed events, it is interesting to relate that whilst there was underenforcement in relation to drugs and (minor) public order offences, arrests that were made mirrored the intention of the chosen policing styles. This represents a subtle but important distinction between general



underenforcement and limited, yet punitive, selective enforcement. For example, prior to the parade and subsequent gathering at Pride, the bronze commander on the park (who was also main police representative at the PPG) was informed that a man had been arrested for robbery that was known to be homophobic. After liaison with the silver command room and the custody suite, it was decided that this individual would be detained for the entire weekend to ensure that he could not potentially commit any hate crime. This reflected the stated intention of the police to prevent hate crime at the event. At the Solstice event, the silver commander on site (Chief Superintendent RB) was informed during the staging of the event that two people who had been arrested for trying to gain access to the Solstice location with wire cutters had been cautioned and released. This prompted the silver commander to contact the custody location, which was based off site, and insist that anyone arrested must be detained overnight to prevent possible reoccurrences and / or further problems.

It is evident that discretion was therefore a key element imposed by the police commanders during the staging of Solstice and Pride. This discretion was directed towards maintaining the overall aims of the policing styles at each event (i.e. reassurance / low key and public safety). In order to achieve the successful outcomes and maintain order, discretion led to selective law enforcement. Some criminal acts were tolerated (e.g. drug taking) because it was perceived that intervention might increase the potential for disorder. Those persons arrested were subject to full enforcement – there was a desire to keep them away from the events by detainment rather than caution and again this was because it was perceived that they could undermine the aims of the policing styles and disrupt order.

The implementation of the policing style at Mela and the Multicultural Festival highlights different priorities compared to Solstice and Pride. Firstly, the police did not have to make the same choices in relation to whether they would under or over enforce certain acts and behaviours. Both events were characterised as being pitched at a family audience and overt criminality / minor disorder (e.g. drug taking, alcohol related public order offences) was largely absent. As was hinted

earlier, this made these events relatively easy to police, hence the small police presence and the emphasis on public safety / community involvement.

Returning to main threat associated with the observed Mela, the planning process revealed that there was a fear that the two gangs might have confronted each other at the event. Incorporated within the policing style was an expectation that this would not occur because of the family nature of the event. During the briefing the designated bronze commander (who was a sergeant who had been involved in the MPG) told the two officers who would police the majority of the event that there was a) no intelligence to suggest that disorder would occur – it had been absent from a fair the previous week which was viewed as potentially much more conducive to disorder – and b) the families of the gangs would be present at the event thus decreasing the possibility of disorder. The main organiser at Mela, who was content with the policing style incorporated at the event, echoed this view:

*"They [the police] were very helpful on the day, always available, always had officers available so there has been a police presence because you know it is not an easy situation and I don't know why nothing kicked off last year really. It could easily just have done. Apart from the fact that their mums and dads might have been there, which is quite often the reason really." – FM (Organiser, Mela 2002)*

The policing style was therefore implemented with two officers initially being deployed to patrol the event during the morning and afternoon. Two additional officers replaced them in the early evening and they were joined by three more to aid with traffic dispersal at the close of the event. None of these officers were involved in the planning process and the bronze commander only made one visit during the staging of the event. These officers were deployed with an expectation that disorder was unlikely and throughout the duration of the event, they had very little to do. Their role encompassed patrolling the park and interacting with members of the public and those involved in the event (e.g. vendors). The two initial officers managed to score an unplanned public relations coup when they could not find a parking space for their police vehicle. Following from the example set by a nearby fire engine, these two police officers allowed children

(and even the local mayor!) the opportunity to clamber around their vehicle and answer any questions they might have. Once these officers were relieved, the next set of officers continued with patrolling and general traffic related duties (e.g. stopping traffic to let cars out of the car park). Overall, from the perspective of the officers policing the event, it was perceived as an opportunity to earn relatively easy overtime at double the normal rate.

I observed the staging of the Multicultural Festival from the perspective of the organisers but the implementation of the policing strategy appeared similar. There was only minimal contact between the organisers and the police officers present and with only two officers at any one time, policing an event with over 5000 people there certainly was not a sense that the police were imposing themselves on the event. As with the previous year, the implementation of the policing style was well received:

*“I was only aware of the police patrolling now and again. Obviously they said that they didn’t want to be a heavy presence there, they didn’t see it is a high risk and they just wanted to keep an eye on things and not feel like they were imposing on the event. They didn’t want to be seen as spoiling people’s fun, which I think that they were aware of.”* – RP (Organiser, Multicultural Festival 2003)

There were no arrests arising from either the Mela or Multicultural Festival so, in addition to the policing at Pride and Solstice, it must be concluded that the policing styles were implemented successfully and a) avoided antagonizing the crowd which therefore reduced the potential for disorder and b) contributed in varying degrees to public safety.

## **5. What If... Police Preparations for the Unexpected**

Each of the four events was deemed to be ultimately successful and they were characterised by being both orderly and safe. However, it is important to note that, despite policing styles that emphasised low key approaches to each of the events,

there were systems in place to deal with any potential threats to order and or / event safety.

In relation to the Mela, resources would have been drawn to the event from the surrounding area if they had been required:

*“Although it is assessed as being a fairly low risk event, we never close our minds to the possibility that the unforeseen might occur but on that weekend we didn't have a particular group of officers identified and ready to act in a public order type role but there would have been a number of officers scattered about the division who if the on-call inspector had felt a need to send into that area, he or she could have called on that fairly shortly and we could have had something there fairly quickly.”* – SD (Inspector, Mela 2002)

Although not implemented, this provision was built into the command structure at the event. The bronze commander was the only part of this structure involved, albeit in a limited role, during the staging of the event. However, a DCI and two inspectors were nominated in the operational order and subsequent briefing as on-call gold and silver commanders respectively.

Circumstances were slightly different in relation to the subsequent Multicultural Festival. In addition to this event, local police resources were allocated to a large balloon festival, a football match and a BNP rally. This led to an alternative command structure relative to the previous years Mela that could have potentially been called upon:

*“There were four events surrounding the area, some very high profile with the possibility of large-scale disorder so gold / silver / bronze was in the area but had nothing whatsoever to do with this one event. Had something gone wrong at the event, because they were there, they would have been utilised. Had it been a one-off on that day there would not have been a gold / silver / bronze set up, just the operational order outlining what the event was, where it was, the time*

*it is running, what is expected and then what we expected from the officers on the day i.e. two at anyone time at the event walking through. It was very short - it only took two sides of A4.” – MY (Sergeant, Multicultural Festival 2003)*

The command structures at Pride and Solstice did incorporate specific gold, silver and bronze commanders into the policing strategy. Public order trained officers were also present within the police resources allocated to each of these events. In relation to Solstice, approximately 20% of the officers present had some level of public order training although they were not required in this capacity. The on site silver commander also had an officer acting as a public order tactical advisor, although this was in anticipation of the unexpected rather than as a core function of the policing operation:

*“We have a public order tactical adviser there should there be an incident in the crowd for example we've either got to go in and arrest somebody quickly or rescue an officer, God forbid, or rescue a security guard or deal with a medical emergency and the crowd are not being compliant then there are tactics that we could use with the appropriately trained officers going to do it. As it was we didn't need to use those.” – RB (Chief Superintendent, Solstice 2003)*

The silver and two bronze commanders at Pride also had public order tactical advisors but their expertise was not called upon. Indeed, the tactical advisor assigned to the bronze commander in charge of policing the parade stayed on in this capacity at the park to earn extra overtime. There was also a public order trained PSU available for deployment in the event of disorder or an emergency but this was not deployed and it spent the entire event located at the local police station. Keeping the PSU away from the event was a deliberate tactic after the problems associated with the overt public order strategy taken during the previous year. To conclude this section, the capacity to deal with the ‘unexpected’ in relation to disorder or public safety was present at each of the four events – it would probably have been utilised had there been a protest at Solstice – but they were not required to perform these public order functions.

## **6. Integrated Approaches to Management at the Observed Events**

The chapter thus far has focussed on the police inputs into the four observed events. This section revisits what was explored in the previous chapter on planning and will examine the levels of integration between the police, organisers and community organisers in relation to the management of each of the events. By considering this, it is possible to outline three distinctive approaches to managing Pride, Solstice, Mela and the Multicultural Festival that demonstrate different levels of integration. As with the planning stages, there is a spectrum relating to the capacity for combined and cohesive decision-making that occurred at these integrated levels. It is interesting to note that this spectrum mirrors the levels of integration and cohesion present during the planning stages.

### *6.1. Fragmented Approaches to Event Management*

The Mela and Multicultural Festival were characterised by a fragmented approach to event management. The role of the organisers and community organisers involved in the MPG and MFPG during the staging of the event was essentially logistically based (e.g. setting the park up, meeting and greeting the bands) and these tasks were conducted in isolation from the police. Likewise, the police did not set out to consult with others on the day of the event in relation to their chosen tactics and decisions (e.g. the use of the police vehicle as an opportunity for good PR was purely the decision of the two officers initially deployed). The only contact that the main organiser had with the police at Mela was to be present at a briefing of stewards and security that occurred on the park where the event took place. During the Multicultural Festival, there was not even this contact between police and organisers – they simply introduced themselves to each other and then continued with their respective roles.

There was no obvious requirement for the police, organisers and community organisers to engage in joint management and this had been the norm in terms of approaching the event. As was highlighted in the section on policing styles, the police and organisers were happy with the low key and non-intrusive way in which the event had been policed. An emergency, whether relating to disorder and

/ or public safety, might have necessitated liaison between these parties but this never arose so it is impossible to speculate how they would have worked together.

## *6.2. Joint Control Approaches to Event Management*

At the opposite end of the spectrum to fragmented control is the joint control approach to management that was present during the staging of Pride. This joint control approach was essentially a continuation of the collaborative planning that had occurred at the PPG. All the representatives involved in the PPG had some role to play in relation to event safety during the event so this approach demonstrated a high level of integration between the police, organisers and community organisers.

This joint control strategy manifested itself in a number of ways. During the gathering on the park, most of the personnel involved in the PPG held regular meetings (approximately every ninety minutes) to discuss any health and safety concerns. The bronze commander allocated the responsibility for policing the parade worked in tandem with the parade director, a key member of both St John Ambulance and the PPG as a community organiser. Another community organiser, who had been involved in the tabletop exercise, worked as an observer / advisor with the silver commanders (from the police and ambulance service) at the silver command post located at a local police station. However, the most visible demonstration of this strategy occurred when stewards from Pride were briefed and paired with police officers to visit gay venues and report any concerns that licensees held. This information was fed back into the joint control strategy that was, in the words of Chief Inspector AC, 'tweaked' to accommodate these views in order to maintain a sensitively driven policing operation.

This integrated approach was in direct contrast to the previous year where there was inconsistency in the police personnel present during the planning stages and a lack of liaison / consultation with the community organisers during the staging of the event and insensitivity in relation to licensing issues and the use of an overt public order policing strategy. In contrast to the previous year the joint control

approach, that was essentially a continuation from the PPG, gained praise from the participants at Pride and the community organisers:

*They got the safety function there in terms of road closure and everything, that all went according to plan so there weren't any issues there. We had no arrests which for an event where you get upwards of 90,000 plus people attending... I mean Reading [an annual music festival] had 50,000 and 90 arrests or something. We had double and no arrests so I think that says a lot for the planning work that went on in the first place and it also goes a long way to the police exercising sensitivity and listening to what was asked of them and they had their views obviously but I think the policing of it went very, very well." – KT (Community Organiser, Pride 2003)*

KT, who was a senior member of the Pride committee and a member of the PPG, was new to the event in 2003 but other community organisers that had been involved in both 2002 and 2003 echoed similar sentiments that demonstrate an extremity in opinion between the two years:

*"There was certainly praise all around for the police. The public, and I listen to the public on show day [i.e. the gathering on the park], were very pleased, they were very happy, unlike last year when they were very unhappy. The after parties, also I have not heard any complaints about the policing of it and the council again were very supportive over licensing on their premises and all sorts of issues where councils can be difficult, police can be difficult, fire authorities, ambulances, all those people if they want to can dig their heels and cause a problem and this year none of them did. - WP (Community Organiser, Pride 2003)*

Given the positive feedback, the final point to make concerning the joint control approach to management was that it served a wider purpose for the police than simply fusing decision making. It was highlighted in the previous chapter that the police input into the PPG had reduced the main threat to the event (i.e. that the



police would damage local police / LGBT community relations through any insensitive policing of Pride) by promoting trust, cohesion and communication between all the agencies in the months leading up to the event. The subsequent implementation of these efforts into a successful and well-received event therefore provided the opportunity to demonstrate the increase in trust and send a positive message to the wider LGBT community:

*“There is an LGBT community of 40,000 in the city which is 1/6 of the population and over that weekend there are more, there must be 80 to 100,000 in the city and quite rightly those people deserve a service from us but a lot of police service is about perception and we are never always going to get it right be it with the LGBT community or the general public. We will from time to time drop the ball but if you're successful managing Pride through they will tolerate, the opinion formers in the LGBT community will tolerate, you dropping the ball occasionally in relation to general policing arrangements if you build that degree of trust. If we haven't got it there that will be viewed as just yet another discriminatory act done by the police and I can totally understand where they are coming from with that. So I wouldn't say it's the biggest thing as far as trust and confidence but it is not far off as far as that community is concerned.” – AC (Chief Inspector, Pride 2003)*

### *6.3. Partial Joint Control Approaches to Event Management*

The management of Solstice shared many similarities with the joint control approach that was evident at Pride. The centre of operations for the staging of the event was a car park slightly off site from the main Solstice location. This car park was host to the police silver command post, the organiser command post and other services (e.g. the RSPCA, the fire service, a St John Ambulance post). The key police and organiser representatives involved in the planning of Solstice were present at these command posts (thus there was consistency between the planning and staging processes) and there was interaction and consultation but it was not as systematic compared to Pride (i.e. consultation was on an ad-hoc basis rather than

the regular pre-planned meetings that occurred at the gathering on the park during Pride). Consultation between the police and organisers focussed on logistical decisions such as when to open the Solstice location to the public and when to turn off the lights preceding the focal point of the Solstice celebrations that occur when the sun rises. Away from these decisions, the police and organisers predominately worked in isolation from each other and there was no integration between the agencies in the form of a police representative incorporated within the organiser command post or vice-versa. In addition, the community organisers were rarely present or in contact with either the police or organiser command posts which was in stark contrast to the community organiser input into the joint control strategy evident at Pride. Given these differences, I would suggest that the management of Solstice was therefore characterised by a partial joint control strategy. The police and organisers were located closely to one another and, even if not physically present, were only a mobile phone call away should an issue have arisen. The majority of police and organisers had also worked with each other during the planning of Solstice. However, they did not fuse or integrate their decision making in relation to the staging of the event to the same extent as the joint control approach evident at Pride.

The main intention behind this partial joint control approach was a focus on event safety:

*“Basically you have responsibilities and you have responsibility for people’s safety and you have to think about everything you do irrespective of what you may have planned and what you think is right, you have to have that flexibility to say, okay we are not opening at 10 we are opening at 9 because the crowd dynamics are changing and if we don’t do it now we could have a crush and we could have this that and the other and it is that whole process – safety is number one.” – IL (Organiser, Solstice 2003)*

In relation to the major decisions where there was consultation between the police and organisers (i.e. when to open the Solstice site to the public, the timings for

switching off lights), the actions taken were relatively cohesive because of the general consensus that safety was of prime concern. Therefore, the Solstice location was opened earlier than planned in an attempt to ease external traffic congestion and to reduce the chances of potentially antagonising a crowd that was patiently waiting and to avoid crushing outside the Solstice location. The lights were only switched off when it was considered light enough (the timings change because of factors such as the cloud base) and this reduced the potential for injuries resulting from event attendees not being able to see what they were doing.

The flexibility inherent in this approach reflects both the consistency and trust that has built up since the inception of open managed access and the good working relationships evident during the planning process. When this is combined with the low key policing style, it is not surprising that the event has been typified by order that is in complete contrast to the tensions prevalent during the 1980s and 1990s.

This section has outlined three approaches to event management that incorporate varying levels of integration between the police, organisers and community organisers. These approaches were informed by what had happened at previous events and mirrored the levels of collaboration occurring during the various planning processes. In addition to the policing styles, it would appear that each approach was suitable to manage the requirements presented by each event. However, and although not impacting adversely on order or event safety, the feedback process from each event highlighted that improvements could be made in relation to certain aspects of the staging process and these will be addressed in the next chapter. Returning to the staging process, the final common characteristic that needs to be addressed concerns the use of stewards and private security that played some part at all four events.

## **7. The Role of Private Security and Stewards**

The terms steward and security were often used interchangeably during the planning and staging of the four events. It is therefore important to outline the input of stewards / security (as defined by the organisers) involved in each event through and this is shown in Figure 3.

**Figure 3.** Summary of the Security / Steward Input into the Observed Events

Event:	Security / Steward Input During Planning?	Numbers and type of security / stewards at event:
Mela	No	6 – 8 Professional Security 10 Voluntary Stewards
Multicultural Festival	No	5 Professional Security 15 – 20 Professional Stewards
Solstice	Yes	160+ Professional Security 40+ Professional Stewards Small Fire Marshall Presence Small ‘Peace Steward’ Presence
Pride	Yes	150 Professional Security / Professional Stewards Some voluntary stewards recruited from local LGBT community worked with police in relation to licensing at gay venues

The role for the vast majority of stewards / security at each of the events is best encapsulated by a Freudian slip during an interview relating to the Multicultural Festival:

*“They [the organisers] paid for a private security firm to do the policing... I mean the stewarding...”* – MY (Sergeant, Multicultural Festival 2003)

In relation to the role of professional stewards / security at Solstice, these personnel were explicitly tasked with dealing with minor criminal offences or disorder that potentially falls within the domain of the public police:

*“It is the security guards who are there to police the event. We are there to back the security people up. It is **[the main organiser’s]** event and they supply their own security and we are there purely to back them up and that is why you are going to get quite a low key policing style.”* – RR (Chief Inspector, Solstice 2003)

It is possibly naïve of this officer to make the assertion that the police / security relationship automatically culminates in a low key policing style. Historically, this relationship of the police ‘backing up’ security existed at previous Solstice events when there was a high profile police presence, disorder and disruption (i.e. the antithesis of ‘low key policing’). Returning to the observed Solstice, the remit for the professional stewards / security at Solstice was agreed upon with other organisers and the police prior to the staging of the event and culminated in a ‘statement of intent’. The professional stewards / security were therefore performing order maintenance and minor crime management roles in the knowledge that the police would only intervene if their assistance was required. The person in charge of security for the event remarked that police assistance was only called upon on one occasion to deal with disorderly individuals. It is a reflection of the event as a whole that this situation did not result in any arrests. Whilst dealing with minor disorder / criminality, the main objective of the professional stewards / security was consistent with the overall aim of the police and other organisers:

*“I think there is one thing that ultimately we focus on and that is the safety of the crowd. Obviously in that sentence the crowd encompasses the contractors working there, the security and the police, but it is the safety all the way down the line. It is always safety and everything else is secondary to it, even the stones **[the focal point of the Solstice location]**. Ultimately they are a bunch of stones, a bunch of rocks and if they fall over or are damaged but it stops someone getting hurt or*

*killed, you can't defend that and I think all the way from the very start of the planning to when we finish safety is all we are thinking about.”*  
– HJ (Organiser, Solstice 2003)

Solstice was unique amongst the four events in that a small number of ‘peace stewards’ were present during the staging of the event. These peace stewards (interchangeably referred to as magic or green stewards) were drawn from the druid / pagan community via the community organiser input at the SCG and they had been a feature of the event for a number of years. They did not have the same overt order maintenance / crime management remit associated with the professional stewards / security – their self defined remit was to act as sources of information – but they were a potentially useful resource for their professional colleagues:

*“For minor incidents they are great and they will... say someone has put a tent up and you have got some security guards saying can you take it down and someone like good old [Community Organiser] will come over and he is prepared to sit and talk for 10 minutes whereas the security staff won't... They are good at defusing situations and it is probably better coming from someone from their own community than some officious security guard.”* – HJ (Organiser, Solstice 2003)

The approach taken to professional stewards / security at Pride shared many similarities with Solstice. However, one important difference was that one specific security firm at Pride provided the key personnel in addition to all stewards and security. In contrast, the key security personnel at Solstice had to sub-contract in workers from a host of companies that created a discrepancy in experience and ability that although not ultimately impinging on event order or safety was not as straightforward to manage. Returning to Pride, the staging of the event was essentially incident free for the stewards / security with these personnel mainly involved in monitoring and feeding back information concerning crowd management systems (i.e. keeping people flowing at ‘pinch points’). However, they did occasionally participate in actions relating to minor order maintenance and crime management:

*“There was one incident on the day this year whereby there were reports of dealing in one of the dance tents. A discussion was held, and [security firm at Pride] were asked to ask their response team to assist in removing an individual from the dance tent if they were seen dealing. That person in the dance tent was spoken to by the response team, searched by the response team because it was deemed to be an action which could be taken reasonably because ultimately the security and stewarding firm will if necessary act under the direction of the senior police officer on the site.” – BW (Organiser, 2003)*

This insight is interesting as it reflects that, in contrast to the assertion made at Solstice, the security were willing to ‘back up’ the police rather than vice versa. This demonstrates that the relationship between police and security is potentially complex and will be dictated by events rather than a pre-determined strategy. With regards to working relationships, the discussion that culminated in the actions mentioned above demonstrates the joint control approach that was associated with Pride (i.e. meetings, discussion and action based on collaborative decision making between the police, organisers and community organisers). In comparison, at Solstice the main security personnel were in direct communication with the main organiser rather than an integrated system with the police and other organisers. It must also be noted that at both events the key security personnel were involved in the planning process. Indeed, they had been involved for 17 years and 4 years at Solstice and Pride respectively. They therefore were consistent members of the planning groups and the security operations at the observed events were essentially based on templates from previous events. Given the commercial competition associated with the private security industry and the fact business rivals would take their position if the operations were unsatisfactory it is not surprising to report that the other organisers / community organisers were content with their input over this time:

*“I wouldn't think of changing them [security firm at Pride] based on the results, you know. They confiscate beer and they are pretty good on the drugs front, they keep an eye on what is going on and they are*

*responsive so for what we paid and what we get is a good deal with them.*” – WP (Community Organiser, Pride 2003)

The final point that needs making in relation to the use of stewards and security at Solstice and Pride was a perception that event attendees might initially prefer to approach these personnel with any issues compared to the police. This could be the result of wider police / community relations or related to the more turbulent times in these events histories (i.e. the previous year’s policing at Pride and pre-managed open access at Solstice):

*“Some people definitely have predisposed ideas that they can talk to security and stewards, and definitely stewards more than security. That is what they are there for; they are there for public information and crowd management at the end of the day. I think there are a lot of people who would rather... because they are nervous of police reaction or they have had a bad experience or their friends have had a bad experience, that does leave people with an imprint so I think you work to your strengths. I think that the positive aspects of how people can approach stewards and we can have those links in with the police and we have that line of communication in, that works really well.”* – TS (Organiser, Pride 2003)

Once again, the joint control approach to management is emphasised as working well in the context of the Pride event. In the context of Solstice, the preference for dealing with stewards / security provides another factor that reduces the potential for antagonism and potential disorder arising from previous tensions:

*“I think in a way, it takes away... some of the public are much happier to be dealt with by security than they are by police so automatically you are taking out that element of potential antagonism between certain sections of the community that don’t believe in or are against the police. We all know who these people are and it is the sort of event that will attract them so by taking the police out of that equation and*



*just dealing with security I think works a lot better” – RR (Chief Inspector, Solstice 2003)*

The involvement of stewards and security in the Mela was slightly different. Firstly, they did not have to engage in the same levels of crime management and order maintenance simply because of the nature of the event. However, they were still occasionally involved in minor order maintenance (e.g. dealing with drunks). The intention again was that the police would only become involved if they were called upon and this situation rarely occurred. When it did, the steward / security personnel had to locate the police officers in person as they were not linked in via communications, thus once again demonstrating the fragmented approach to event management at the Mela.

It was highlighted in the previous chapter that the main organiser of Mela had to arrange a certain number of stewards / security personnel at the last minute as a response to the potential for gang related disorder. Therefore, there was also no representation or input from these personnel during the planning stages at Mela. This provided some tension because, whilst the organisers were relatively happy with their performance, the police at Mela were not impressed by some of the personnel that had been employed to perform the stewarding / security role:

*“They [the police presence] found that some of the stewards that they acquired via a variety of means were not the type of people that I would have been too keen on taking a position of public safety and responsibility and in fact some of the police officers who did attend in passing checks found themselves more intent on looking at the stewards because they knew their backgrounds so they were possibly more of a threat in some cases than the actual event itself.” – SD (Inspector, Mela 2002)*

Although there was no identified threat, the organisers at the Multicultural Festival were persuaded by the police during the planning process to employ purely professional staff. The organisers took this action and although it cost more money, there was not a repeat of these concerns from the police. Consistent with

the previous year was the fact that the firm employed were not part of the planning process and they performed their duties within the fragmented event management approach. However, as there was a bigger stage and more musicians at the Multicultural Festival a lot more of their time appeared to be concerned with guarding property and checking stage passes rather than patrolling the park.

This section has attempted to outline the role of security and stewarding at the four observed events. As with the planning and event management strategies, there was diversity across all the events in the type, numbers, experience and prior involvement in the planning associated with security and stewarding. However, and to varying degrees, these personnel were tasked with minor order maintenance and / or minor crime management in addition to more general public safety roles (e.g. the avoidance of crowd congestion). This resulted in the police being able to implement the low key policing styles successfully because they were removed from these tasks and would therefore not appear overt or intrusive. However, at each event, the police were prepared to 'back up' the stewards / security if necessary but reflecting the general orderly nature of all four events, this assistance was rarely called upon.

## **8. Conclusion**

This chapter has focussed on the staging process and has demonstrated that the inputs (and implementation) of certain policing styles that were low key and non-intrusive were complimented by security and stewarding that conducted minor order maintenance and crime management tasks. This approach was informed by both expectations of order and historical precedent relating to each of the events and it allowed for a primary focus on public safety at Solstice and the Mela / Multicultural Festival and the re-gaining of lost trust at Pride. In addition, the various integrated approaches to event management reflected both these historical precedents to each of the observed events and the nature and form of the collaborative planning efforts outlined in the previous chapter. Despite the differences in approaches and the logistical diversity across the events, it would appear that the chosen strategies (both police and integrated) worked.

With reference to the academic literature, this chapter demonstrates the work of police / security in a non-confrontational public order context (cf. Button, 2002; Button and John, 2002). More generally, the multi-agency approaches taken to maintaining safety and order during the staging of the observed events reflect the trend of 'pluralisation' in relation to policing (Loader, 2000). These are themes which will be returned to in chapter eight. With regards to the empirical analysis, the next chapter will examine the implications of the findings raised in this and the previous two chapters. The events were deemed successful but by reflecting on post-event feedback from the police, organisers and community organisers and their expectations for future events it will be possible to evaluate whether the approaches taken at each event can be improved even further. The next chapter will also examine the elements from the planning and staging process that could be applied to other policing contexts from the perspective of those involved in each of the events.

## **Chapter Seven: Post-Event Analysis**

### **1. Introduction**

The previous analysis chapters have focussed on the history / context, planning and staging of each of the observed events. The aim of this analysis chapter is to reflect on *post* event issues. This is pertinent to the empirical analysis for a number of reasons. Firstly, a key characteristic of the observed events is that all three are repeated on an annual basis. At the time of conducting and completing the interviews following the observational fieldwork, the indications were that each event would run in the following year. The previous analysis chapters have examined how this process of repetition and past experience has impacted on the planning and staging phases. Just as these planning and staging experiences impacted on the events themselves, it is logical to suggest that the planning and staging will impact on any *future* Multicultural Festival, Pride or Solstice events from debriefing and the dissemination of experience. An example of this evolutionary process in action comes from the transition of the Mela to the Multicultural Festival that has been traced in previous chapters. Therefore, it is important to emphasise that the events are not occurring in an isolated vacuum and that there are factors that will inevitably impact upon and shape the future of each event. Focussing on issues post event allows the opportunity to a) identify the factors and their origins that may impact on the maintenance of order and safety at future events and b) highlight how ‘good practice’ might be applied in the policing of public order and in other policing contexts. Undertaking this exercise will also highlight the key variables in determining what makes the events ‘successful’. The results of these findings present further analytic and policy opportunities that will be explored in greater detail in the subsequent two chapters.

### **2. The ‘Debrief’ Process and the Event Future**

Before identifying the most salient features of each event that may impact on the futures of Pride, Solstice and the Multicultural Festival, it is important to state that

a common characteristic of each event was a process of 'debriefing'. The purpose of the debrief for each of the events was to allow the police, event and community organisers the opportunity to reflect and evaluate on how each event had progressed and what might need to be altered before embarking on planning for the following year. From a methodological perspective, the majority of interviews were conducted as this process was either being prepared for or had just occurred. This presented an opportunity to explore the issues in advance of a formal debrief or as they had been presented *after* the debrief. In terms of structure, at Solstice there were formal debriefs for the police and SPG whilst at Pride this was conducted by the PPG. The MPG / MFPG also conducted this exercise although it was more comprehensive for the Multicultural Festival as there were agencies involved. What follows in the remainder of this chapter is an analysis of these issues that might impact in some form on the future of each event, whether or not they relate specifically to the formal debrief process.

A key conclusion from the empirical analysis is that each event was characterised as being safe and orderly (i.e. threats to health and safety and / or public disorder did not materialise, despite a small number of arrests surrounding Solstice and Pride). When asking for general feedback on the outcomes from each event, participants from the police, event and community organisers would stress this point and often claim that the event had been a 'success'. In fact, given the 'success' associated with each event a pertinent question arising could be why hold a formal debrief at all? A community organiser from Pride offered an insightful rationale behind the debrief process that partially answers this question:

*"We need to look at what went well, what didn't go well, getting peoples' perspectives. We need to look at that and we need to basically learn from what went well so that if we can hand on heart say everything went perfectly at the weekend – and we have already said that it wasn't perfect – but on the day if we can do that then that would be the day really when you don't need a debrief. You just say right, we will do exactly the same next year and to a large extent it will be the same next year but there will be different personalities next year and then the human factor starts coming in so yes there is a plan*

*for a debrief, we have got various key players who are not available until next month or whatever. In the ideal world, the debrief would happen within a week or two weeks but such was the fatigue... I think the key issues are going to still be fresh in peoples' minds."* KT  
(Community Organiser, Pride 2003)

This quote neatly highlights that there is an anticipation of factors (e.g. 'different personalities') that in some form will impact on the planning and staging of any future Pride event despite the fact that the majority of the feedback from the organisers and community related to a successful event. There could be a temptation to just 'leave things as they are' (and in a number of cases things will be done in the same way) but the debrief allows an opportunity for any issues raised to be discussed. Any decisions taken and agreed during this process may potentially culminate in shaping the planning stage for the following year which could impact on the staging phase and so on. It is therefore worth briefly summarising the main issues that arose either in anticipation of, or following, a formal debrief that could impact on the planning and staging of future events.

### *2.1. Multicultural Festival*

The main logistical improvements identified for a future event included the provision of more food stalls, the production of a map that would contain information on the location of stalls / running order of events and finally the greater use of publicity to advertise the event prior to it being staged. Of relevance to the planning process, the event and community organisers were also thinking about the possibility of turning the event into a two day festival, which was a format that had occurred as a 'one-off' in the mid 1990s. All subsequent Mela / Multicultural Festival events have lasted for one day only. Importantly, this possibility had been communicated to the police who were willing to support it:

*"It will have our support again next year as long as they want to do it. Of course next year it might go back to two days and that will increase the police requirement and we have no problems because, touch wood, here in [Town where the Multicultural Festival is located] we haven't*

*had any issues with it... it is something that we can actually support and I think society wouldn't expect anything less of us."* MY (Sergeant, Multicultural Festival 2003)

Two important factors were identified that could make this a reality. Firstly, the problems associated with the planning of Mela during the previous year (i.e. the 'political' motivations of some committee members) had not materialised with the emergence of the larger MFPG. Secondly, this group would have more time to plan for a future event. The planning for the Multicultural Festival could only start after the MPG had been formally dissolved and new event and community organisers had been recruited. This was a time consuming process that will be avoided in the future as there was no perceived need to re-ratify the planning group. In addition to more time, the perceived success of the Multicultural Festival during the planning lay in the foundation of a new constitution that it was hoped would make the event sustainable. Clarifying the aims / roles involved in the planning of any future events – which had been built into the constitution for the MFPG - allows for 'sustainability' as it promotes a structure that accommodates the fact that key personnel might move on. For example, the main event organiser for the Mela and a participant in the MFPG (FM, Event Organiser) was due to move to a new position in London and thus would not be taking part in future planning. However, her role could be accommodated by somebody else due to the comparatively larger but more structured MFPG compared to its Mela counterpart the previous year. The luxury of more time also opened new opportunities for the MFPG in terms of a potential greater emphasis on community consultation and participation in any future events:

*"We will be six months ahead of where we normally are so from that point of view, that [the MFPG] has worked and community consultation is something that I would be keen to build in, whether it be public sessions or whatever, some sort of community consultation sessions so we get ideas from the community and they are engaged with it in the planning process in some way."* RP (Organiser, Multicultural Festival 2003)

The rationale behind such an approach is that the greater the participation of the local community, the more representative the event will be of that community. However, what is of relevance to this chapter are the opportunities that greater consultation with the local community through the MFPG might offer the police and other agencies. This will be explored in greater detail in section three.

## *2.2. Pride*

The feedback following Pride was generally positive from the police, event and community organisers. In contrast to what had occurred the year before, there was praise for the low key policing strategy adopted for the event and all organisers thought that the joint control strategy was the best way of planning and staging the event. In terms of the event's future, it was anticipated that the event would grow in popularity leading to an increase in numbers as had been the case over previous years. This might hold implications for where the parade is staged (namely if more people want to see it, the route might have to change) and for making additional arrangements with public transport providers to move event attendees into and out of the city where the celebration is held. The community organisers also anticipated that the theme for a future Pride event would probably change but essentially many of the aspects that made the event a success would stay consistent whatever the levels of attendance (e.g. holding a parade followed by a celebration on the park).

As has been explored in previous chapters, one of the main successes associated with the observed Pride event was the attitude of the police in addressing the concerns of the gay community in relation to the strategies they adopted during the previous year. One officer in particular was identified as representing this change in attitude but post the staging of the event had moved to another location and new duties and would thus not be directly involved in the future planning of Pride events. However, this officer identified continuity as an important factor in building on the success achieved during Pride 2004:

*“It would be nice in the perfect world to have the same person managing it year in year out but that will never happen but what can*



*happen, particularly where you have got the trust and confidence issues, is there must be an appropriate handover by the person who is going out to the person coming in and that is not just handover with them, it has got to be a handover with the people who you have got trust and confidence issues with so it is as seamless as possible because it would be, from pride's point of view, it would be a high degree of scepticism that the event has been so successful this year, it goes back to where it was in the previous year because of an individual not being present so there has to be a very heavy handover which we had this year because I have left it but I am having a meeting shortly with Pride organisers for the forthcoming event, the 2004 event, with the person who I'm handing over to despite the fact that I have been away now for eight to ten weeks so that they can see... they will express their concerns to that meeting and I will manage it with the new incumbent which should always happen but sometimes it doesn't, it depends on how much of a priority you see that being but if the colleague taking over from me can get off on a good footing with them then it will mean there will be added bonuses throughout the city for the LGBT community throughout the year. Of that there is no doubt." AC (Chief Inspector, Pride 2003)*

The importance of this handover cannot be underestimated. One community organiser stated after an interview that whether the new police personnel were 'dickheads' or not would impact on the planning of future events, especially in terms of forming effective working relationships. This demonstrates that, despite the success associated with the event, an underlining scepticism could be forced to the surface should the wrong police personnel take over the liaison role. In fact, the issue of changes in personnel is also pertinent to other representatives involved in the PPG. As one event organiser stated, an effective handover through the passing of relevant information to any new personnel is crucial to establishing a planning base from which any unforeseen variables can be tackled during the planning and staging of future Pride events:

*"I think it will be interesting to see what happens now that [Chief Inspector AC] has moved to another area of command... it comes back to the point that we touched on earlier about the personalities and the consistency. It is hoped that [...] who is one of the inspectors in the project section with regard to events who has knowledge on this and attended the debrief this year, will be present hopefully... where we can keep that knowledge going, [Chief Inspector AC] can brief the next officer or he can come with that officer. I think they have identified that as important, different senior officers have different views on the same subject and I think it is necessary to keep that consistency. For example, if I move on or go onto other duties elsewhere then someone would come in and also continue. It's not a 'we know it, we're familiar with it, don't worry about it' because every year is slightly different. It is either slightly different because of the nature of the event, the physical positioning of the attractions, the personalities... No two events are identical but it is important that no sits down and says 'right I don't know anything about this, tell me all about it.' It tears everything apart. I think year on year we can say 'okay we have established that and that needs fine tuning' or 'we've worked on that section really hard lets focus on this a little bit more' and issues that were identified for this year will be addressed for next year."* BW (Organiser, Pride 2003)

Whoever may be ultimately involved, the clear concern for all organisers is building on the success of Pride 2003 for future events. In order to achieve this, it is acknowledged that the methods employed (e.g. the joint approach to both planning and staging; consultation with the local gay community) need to be communicated to new members and that any issues that require 'fine tuning' are addressed. Again, section three will address an example that is pertinent to the staging of the event that would benefit from 'fine tuning'. If these communicative and reflective strategies are successfully incorporated in future planning then the future of Pride is likely to be secure, safe and orderly, at least in the types of threats encountered.

### 2.3. Solstice

As with Pride, an issue facing future planners of Solstice concerned changes in personnel. For the chair of the SCG and SPG (SM, Organiser), the observed Solstice was to be the last that she would be directly involved in due to a promotion to a new position. Similarly, the Chief Superintendent RB who acted as the main police liaison during the planning and as a silver commander during the staging of the event was making this Solstice his last due to commitments as a divisional commander. This meant that he would no longer be directly involved in the process. Both of these personnel had been involved with the event since the planning and inception of open-managed access to the Solstice location. In contrast to Pride, their ‘successors’ from the police and the main organisation that maintains the Solstice location shadowed them throughout the planning and staging process. This enabled these new personnel to familiarise themselves with the members of the SCG and SPG, understand how the planning process operated and gain experience of staging the event. Although planning for the following Solstice was at an embryonic stage at the time the interviews were conducted, this change in personnel was already starting to introduce new methods for planning the event:

*“With the change of management in [Organisation that maintains the Solstice location], [...] is doing things slightly differently... we now have specific subgroup meetings where the people who need to be talking to each other are talking to each other as opposed to having 20 people sat around the table, three of which needs to talk to each other and the other 17 are bored.” IL (Organiser, Solstice 2003)*

This example relates to the SPG but it is not unreasonable to suggest that a new influx of ideas / methods in this group could filter through to the SCG and eventually the staging of a future Solstice event. Again, this event – as with Pride and the Multicultural Festival – will inevitably evolve and culminate in different decisions / directions being taken relative to previous events.

With regards to the debrief process and feedback received after the observed Solstice, the police, event and community organisers were content with the outcome, especially considering some of the logistical problems that emerged during the planning stages (e.g. the debates over when to hold the event and the potential for protest). There were two examples of problems occurring during the staging of the event that will impact on future events. These shall be explored in greater detail in section three. With regards to general logistical issues, all organisers suggested that the following year would be easier to plan because there would be no debate over the date on which the event should be held. This would eliminate the potential for large numbers of people turning up on two different days. However, the main event organiser for the observed Solstice felt that the total of 30,000 people who attended the event represented a maximum number that the site could accommodate:

*"The limit has to be 30,000 people. The infrastructure and by that I mean everything, it would be overloaded beyond that because we already have a field hospital, we already have police support... Whilst it would be wonderful to allow access for more, if we do so the costs are enormous. Actually, it is not about finances it is about how many more medical staff do we need there, how many more welfare staff do we need there, how many more police officers or security? I do know that police leave is cancelled and it is unfair on everything else that goes on in this county to expect that sort of level because there is no money involved in this, no one is asked to pay for parking, nobody is asked to make a contribution but there is a huge financial implication. My view is that we have to be very mindful of the fact that ultimately if there was a major road accident, what we don't want is medical staff in a field hospital when they should be somewhere else because of the numbers increasing. At the moment it is manageable and that is what we have to keep it to."* SM (Organiser, Solstice 2003)

The issue of cost that is raised in this extract is relevant across all the observed events. The cost of running the events ranged from £10,000 for the Mela to £150,000 for Pride. In terms of policing, the operations at the Solstice and Pride

cost £175,000 and approximately £50,000 respectively. Despite being similar sized operations in terms of police numbers, this discrepancy reflects the additional cost of mutual aid that was required for the Solstice. The police did not charge for their services at the observed events although there was recognition that this may change in the future. Indeed, ACPO (2005) have published a 'charging methodology' which aims to provide guidance on when the police should charge at events and the percentage of costs that they should seek to recover. This issue will be further explored when considering policy recommendations in chapter nine.

Returning to the issue of numbers, it is difficult to predict whether they will increase at the Solstice. The observed Solstice was held over a weekend and this, combined with good weather, might have inflated the attendance compared to future events which will, for the coming years, be held on weekdays. However, attendance has increased since open managed access<sup>1</sup> and there is potential for disagreement in future years depending on how the event evolves. For example, the community organisers might want to change the format of the event:

*“From the [organisation that maintains the Solstice location] point of view, they were talking before the event of 30,000 being about the absolute maximum that could be held... It is difficult to know how it will develop because of the changing circumstances of (the Solstice location). One would have thought that the more the event includes the sort of things I am talking about [lectures, talks and acoustic music sessions were raised as possibilities earlier in the interview] the more people will be kind of curious and want to come and then the issue of car parking and that comes back again so if it is going to get any bigger, there will be quite a lot of discussion but on the other hand in India they manage to have amazing Kamala<sup>2</sup> type gatherings and although we are not specifically trying to organise anything like that, if the people want it then there should be a way of enabling it.” WP (Community Organiser, Solstice 2003)*

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<sup>1</sup> Solstice Year (Attendance) – 2000 (8000); 2001 (14,500); 2002 (25,000); 2003 (30,000)

<sup>2</sup> This refers to an annual festival that is held at Kamala

It is not within the remit of this thesis to speculate on the form of future events. However, it is important to note that there could be the potential for conflict between the community organisers and the event / police organisers if they disagree over the format that the event should take. Although speculative, it could be the case that the community organisers who compromised on certain issues (e.g. the dates, opening hours) during the planning stages of the observed Solstice might expect greater accommodation of their ideas in the future. There could be consequences for the maintenance of order and safety at any future events if any potential disagreements were unresolved during the planning process. However, it is also important to note that since the development of open-managed access a function of the SCG and SPG has been to allow such debate to occur with all the key players (i.e. the police, event and community organisers) present. This collaborative planning process has been successful in the past so there is no reason to expect that it will be unsuccessful in the future if these key players continue to plan together, even if disagreements arise:

*“This is an organic process, it is not what the authorities feel they can handle against what the people want... I don’t want people to think I’m coming from the perspective of the alternative community although I talk about it occasionally... My job is to let the information go through so that I can... I feel with my ability to make contact with as many sides as possible, that it will work, that we are not going to have people so angry or so dogmatic that there is going to be a problem. It is trying to smooth up all the rough edges so that the process can flow and can continue. I have just happened to find myself in a position being able to do this a bit and as long as it is useful I will keep doing it. That’s where I’m coming from.” WP (Community Organiser, Solstice 2003)*

Of course, an unforeseen scenario might occur that jeopardises the entire event but given the strides made and the comparison between the event in the 1980s / 1990s (occasional violence, protest and exclusion) and open managed access, the framework of collaborative planning and its recent history of success would

suggest that most eventualities would be resolved during the planning process and not adversely impact on order and safety at future Solstice events.

### **3. Post-Event Feedback: Enhancing the Potential for Future Success**

The previous section briefly reflected on general feedback arising from the three observed events. As each event was considered a 'success', it is likely that many aspects of the planning and staging will be undertaken in a similar fashion for future events. However, it was noted that certain factors (e.g. the success of the events attracting larger audiences, changes in personnel) could impact on future planning and staging and this will inevitably lead to a process of evolution although it would be pure speculation to predict with accuracy how these might impact.

The aim of this section is to identify feedback from the debrief process and / or interviews that relate to improvements that could potentially enhance the 'success' of future events. In the cases of Solstice and Pride, this relates to logistical issues arising from the staging of these events. The Multicultural Festival was not as logistically challenging to stage due to it being smaller than either Solstice or Pride but post event it was identified (by event and community organisers) that it presented potential opportunities for the police to enhance their reputation with the local community.

#### *3.1. Solstice*

There were two main logistical issues arising from the staging of Solstice 2003. The first of these concerned the unplanned consequences of a large volume of traffic on the roads around the Solstice location and the second related to communication between the different agencies involved in the partial joint control staging of the event. This approach was explored in the previous chapter but it is useful for the reader to be reminded that this incorporated the different agencies working together during the staging of the event and making some joint decisions (e.g. lighting times) but at the same time residing in different command posts and using different communication protocols.

Taking the first of the above issues, it is useful to briefly outline how the large volume of traffic descending on the Solstice location impacted on the staging of the event. During the SPG and SCG meetings, traffic issues were raised, albeit briefly, and approval had been sought and gained by the police representatives from the local council regarding a set of road closures around the Solstice location. In addition to these set road closures, Chief Superintendent RB also stated at a SCG meeting that the police would monitor road traffic levels and close roads accordingly in order to ease potential congestion. The responsibility for managing this aspect of Solstice fell with the police and was incorporated into the police command structure for the staging of the event via a specialist traffic bronze commander (a sergeant).

During the briefing of senior officers on the eve of Solstice, Chief Superintendent RB stated that he had been over the Solstice location in a helicopter and that the road closures mentioned during the planning process had been implemented. However, Chief Superintendent RB also mentioned that there was sufficient build up of traffic on the main road around the Solstice location to warrant early opening of the car park. As was mentioned in the previous chapter, the nature of the partial joint control approach to the staging of the event allowed for consultation between the police and main organiser to occur, culminating in a collective decision to open the car park earlier than was initially planned. Unfortunately, a combination of factors meant that the sheer volume of traffic that had already accumulated posed unexpected problems for those involved in managing the staging of the event, even after this decision had been made:

*"I think what you have got is anybody who doesn't know the **[Solstice location]** area is at a disadvantage, but certainly a Friday night in the summer on that section of the **[main road]** it is always very, very busy in any case because what you have got is people travelling down to the South West and the **[main road]** is quite a useful route. The problem that you find is that if you come from London, the first set of single carriageway you come to is **[Solstice location]** and it is extremely busy. Compound that with an operation at **[Solstice***



*location]* where you are encouraging people to come and go to a specified location to park, combine that with the fact that the car park is opening quite late and yet people, I would say wantonly, are ignoring the fact of the opening times, you get a stage where the sheer concentration of traffic is such that as it was the gates of the car park when they were opened were just flowing freely. The sheer number of cars coming in there added with the congestion which would be there in any case meant that people just decided that as dawn was approaching they didn't stand any chance, looking at a long line of traffic, of getting into the car park and then walking from the car park to the **[Solstice location]** in time for dawn, that they felt the most appropriate thing to do was park their car on the **[main road]** and it virtually, as you will know as you were going back at 7 o'clock **[the morning after Solstice]**, it became like a car park – they then felt it was the most appropriate thing to jump over the fence. Now that was an absolute and utter disaster from that point of view, we were left with a situation where we couldn't get our units through because of course the road is blocked, we ended up towing 195 cars away at the end, we had to close the **[main road]** and redirect it in different places and so the impact further a field from **[Solstice location]** was great because you were channelling quite a lot of traffic through roads which are not suitable for those quantities so it did cause a lot of aggravation hence why deliberations for 2004 have to be such that the car park opens at a realistic time but I will still come back and say that 2003 was unique because it was a weekend and we anticipated that we would get those sorts of problems but I don't think we thought the **[main road]** would end up being a car park.” RB (Chief Superintendent, Solstice 2003)

In relation to the staging of all the observed events, the traffic problems at Solstice presented the greatest logistical difficulty for the police and event organisers. In response to this unexpected volume of traffic, a number of decisions were made in ‘real time’ by the police’s silver command post. This included impromptu traffic management tactics such as closing the main road in one direction for a short

period of time to try and increase traffic flow. There were also problems with traffic post-event. In addition to vehicles leaving the Solstice location after the event, there was a fatal accident (this was not due to traffic management schemes) involving Solstice participants that compounded the problems of facilitating the flow of traffic away from the Solstice location.

Although the traffic problems did not impinge too greatly on the safe and orderly management of the Solstice location and celebrations, it did highlight the benefits of partial joint event management strategy. The main organisers had been unwilling during the planning stages to build in overt flexibility to opening times as it was perceived that this might signal to event participants that they were not fully in control of the event. However, these concerns were overruled by sheer logistical necessity as the event unfolded and it was a joint decision to open early which allowed the police to focus on managing the problem as effectively as they possibly could. In this respect, the cohesiveness of decision making demonstrated during this episode further highlights that underpinning the partial joint control strategy was the core issue, and prominence, of safety over other factors:

*“I think we made a mistake when we didn't open the car park early enough. Alright we opened it early and it is great to keep it shut because it makes it better from our point of view because obviously we don't have to start running our operations... but the havoc it caused and the potential for an accident on the road just for the sake of opening a car park early, in hindsight we should have opened it earlier.”* HJ (Organiser, Solstice 2003)

All parties involved in the planning and staging of Solstice agreed that, despite the possibility of Solstice 2003 being a ‘one-off’ in terms of circumstances, the issue of opening times and parking would be an issue that future planning would have to address in greater detail.

The second logistical ‘difficulty’ that manifested itself during the staging of Solstice concerned problems with communication between different agencies at a tactical, rather than strategic level:

*“The communications are not good is the short answer. I can usually get hold of [IL] and [RB] obviously, I can get his control, so I suppose for major incidents it works well, the decision-making for turning the lights out and stuff like that but for the day-to-day running it is not good.” HJ (Organiser, Solstice 2003)*

Essentially, the partial joint control approach enabled strategic decisions to be made whether they were planned (e.g. turning off the lights at dawn) or unexpected (e.g. attempting to manage traffic flow through opening the site early). This decision making involved the ‘key’ players from different agencies who had been involved in the planning process and can be characterised as consultative and cohesive. However, away from this strategic level much of the operational running of Solstice was conducted by personnel from different agencies who were not part of the immediate partial joint control approach and had not been directly involved in the planning. The greatest problem that this presented during the staging of the event was ambiguity. Although problems at this tactical level did not impact significantly on the successful outcome of the event, they are aspects of event planning / staging that were raised post event and potentially can be overcome in the future and thus shift an overall partial joint control approach to something analogous to the joint control approach that was present at Pride.

From the police perspective, communication at this tactical level was hampered by the fact that radios did not work on the site leading the majority of communication to occur via the use of mobile phones:

*“The radio system in this county is not very good and a lot of people were using mobile phones which is all very well and good but if you are monitoring a radio you are obviously monitoring other peoples’ conversations and it gives you an idea on what’s going on. If all the conversation is done by mobile phones, you’re cutting out a gap in the communications loop... for myself as a commander, I wasn’t aware of what was going on outside of the [focal point of Solstice celebrations], I wasn’t really aware of what was going on. I also feel*

*vulnerable, you know, I didn't feel as though... it was a necessity for me to keep on going back to silver control to keep on getting updates on what was happening.*" RR (Chief Inspector, Solstice 2003)

It is anticipated that a new radio system was due to be implemented by the police that would overcome this difficulty for future Solstice events<sup>3</sup>. In addition to not being able to communicate with each other, the police could not communicate directly with other agencies which led to ambiguity. An example of this ambiguity came from the bronze commander with geographical responsibility for the focal point of the celebrations (Chief Inspector RR) and concerned the deployment of ambulances onto the site. With no means of radioing in – either to the Silver command or ambulance check point – he did not know whether ambulances were being deployed to deal with minor issues (e.g. drink or drug related minor injuries) or something potentially much more serious (e.g. a stabbing resulting from confrontation). It was not just the police who experienced these problems. They were also noted by other agencies involved in the staging of the event. An example of this 'communication ambiguity' comes from the personnel providing the private security for the event:

*"There was an incident and I was in the control room and the ambulance people... I don't know what happened to their communications either, they could communicate with us quite easily but they obviously were not communicating with the police because they had a problem, I went over and I had to get one of the tactical guys, the sergeant, he was the only policemen around so we have to go and deal with it because we hadn't got communications. Somewhere along the line I couldn't talk to their [police] control room and the ambulance needed someone then and there because they had someone in the ambulance kicking off and he obviously couldn't get back to his comms so we ended up doing it off our own... So it is a definite problem that will have to be looked at, even if we have a tin can with a*

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<sup>3</sup> The new system referred to is called 'Airwave' and is a digital, as opposed to analogue, based radio communications system. It's 'roll out' is being overseen nationally by the Police Information Technology Organisation (PITO).

*piece of string! It is crazy we are literally this far apart (hand gesture) but we have no comms to each other... I think this year (i.e. Solstice 2004) we have got to make sure we have got better comms between all the emergency services because certainly half the time I'm not sure if the Fire Brigade have gone to sleep but we were not communicating terribly well with the ambulance because there were too many ambulances going in to people who had stubbed their toes and stuff like that."* IL (Organiser, Solstice 2003)

To further compound communication-related ambiguities, the police command structure also presented potential tactical problems for police decision making. The traditional approach to the 'metallic hierarchy' of command during a police operation incorporates a gold commander, a silver commander and any number of bronze commanders depending on the scope of a particular event or incident (e.g. Waddington 1991, 1994a; ACPO 2001). However at Solstice there were *two* silver based positions (silver control on site, silver command off-site). The problem, especially for supervising officers and bronze commanders, concerned which silver they should be communicating with during the staging of the event:

*"If you are referring to silver, who are you referring to? Silver command or silver control? Now that was raised at the debrief and that was a cause of confusion. As far as I am concerned the silver commander I don't think should really have been there [on site] and should really have been in control so combine the two. If there is a control and people call him silver I think really control is wondering if they are after control or the silver commander, so as the observer this might have given you the impression that there were a number of silvers... You should have the one control and silver. But whether or not they will change it for next year I don't know but what you've got to look at is if officers are used to doing certain things and if they have done that over a number of years they are very reluctant to change just to incorporate a system so they obviously think it works quite well. I wasn't at the debrief though but I raised... a lot of points I raised but I don't know whether they will take them on board...they certainly*

*weren't raised when the minutes came.*" RR (Chief Inspector, Solstice 2003)

This officer had moved from the Metropolitan Police during the previous year and had experience of policing similar types of events (e.g. the Notting Hill Festival). As a single silver is prescribed by ACPO (2001) and it is certainly interesting that Solstice deviated with this approach. It is therefore pertinent to highlight the 'silver control' response (i.e. Chief Superintendent RB) to the potential logistical issues presented by communication and command related ambiguity:

*"It is never perfect by any means and certainly what we found this year was better than we had in previous years, I think the fact that we had a silver commander on the site with what would be the equivalent [Main organisation that maintains the Solstice location] silver commander if you were to use that same sort of model, was more appropriate. I'm sure if you were to speak to some of our officers they would say that the communication was still difficult but it certainly was better. I suppose the only way that you are realistically going to have that senior decision-making etc is to have a joint control facility and a joint command facility. Really the roles are in many ways not compatible to be able to do that and so it maybe that what we have in 2003 with one or two refinements is perhaps the best we are going to get."* RB (Chief Superintendent, Solstice 2003)

This statement further distinguishes between the partial joint control approach taken at Solstice and the joint control strategy adopted by the organisers of Pride. It also demonstrates the evolving nature of the Solstice event as the management of the event has changed dramatically, especially when comparing pre and post managed open access, and the format will undoubtedly evolve in the future even it is only through 'one or two refinements'. The point to make here is that Solstice – as with the other observed events – is not occurring in an isolated vacuum but that factors arising during the planning and staging of future events will demand responsive management on the part of the organisers in order to preserve the successful outcomes associated with it since 2000. It is tempting to suggest that

the reason why a joint control strategy has not been adopted at Solstice is because factors have not arisen that have facilitated the need for it. Although Chief Superintendent RB suggests that roles between different organisers may not be compatible in terms of a joint control approach to staging the event, some unforeseen scenario or indeed the change in key personnel might challenge this idea. The experience of the PPG would suggest that roles between different agencies can be made compatible in terms of control and command issues during the staging of the event. This aspect of Solstice therefore raises important issues with regards to 'good practice' in relation to potential guidance and / or legislation in the planning and staging of events that might be drafted in response to the current void identified in the literature chapter (ACPO, 1999; Sexton, 2003). These issues will be considered in the final chapter of the thesis that will explore the policy implications of this research.

### *3.2. Pride*

As has been highlighted in the previous section and previous chapters, the staging of the Pride event was characterised by a joint control approach. Unlike Solstice this approach incorporated all the agencies involved in the planning process (i.e. the PPG) into one command and communication strategy. Further, the communication problems associated with Solstice were not evident at Pride. The police, council, event organisers and private security were not only located in the same vicinity throughout the staging process (in the park which provided the focal point for the celebrations) but were also consulting with each other regularly to review the staging of the event. It has been noted in previous chapters that the major issue for the organisers of the event – namely avoiding the problems associated with the policing in the previous year – were addressed during the planning stages (i.e. the police apologising, consulting and working with the local gay community / organisers throughout the planning process).

It is therefore interesting to note that the only logistical difficulty associated with the staging of Pride had its root in the planning stages. After the last PPG meeting, a table top exercise commenced involving both members of the PPG and representatives of agencies that would be involved in the staging of the event.

However, there was one bronze commander missing from the table top exercise who would hold responsibility for the policing of the parade. Although this was not identified to be a problem at the time, it meant that the community organiser in charge of this aspect of Pride did not have the opportunity to meet the bronze commander until the event itself.

During the staging of the Pride event, the only problem occurred during the parade. A public announcer (PA) van was due to be at the head of the parade so that the mayor could read a short speech, cut a ribbon and officially start the parade. Unfortunately the PA van was missing vital equipment which meant that this could not happen. The chair of Pride tried to amend this situation by arranging for another float (a bus) which had PA capabilities to make its way to the front of the parade. This created a certain amount of chaos as the parade had been lining up in a pre-determined order for two hours and there was not the space on the road to manoeuvre a large bus. In order for the bus to achieve its aim and get to the front of the parade it also had to pass two police vehicles. Unfortunately for the community organiser in charge of the parade, the bronze commander did not initially allow the vehicles to be moved. With a mayor waiting to make a speech, the community organiser relied on some last minute improvisation and the parade was officially started via a megaphone and the first floats, complete with surrounding dancers, progressed forward. As the parade started, the bus was still stuck and prevented the floats behind from moving on. It is at this stage that the police vehicles were moved and the rest of the parade progressed, albeit behind the frontrunners. From my fieldnotes, I noted that this part of the event was particularly chaotic as the police and community organisers rushed around to try and reinstate equilibrium in the parade. The heat was a factor (the dancers moved forward quickly but then slowed down) and with officers / organisers proactively slowing the front of the procession it was not long before the majority of the parade had caught up with the floats at the front. Although there was a lot of chaotic and improvised parade management, the crowd did not seem to either notice or care about this initial gap between floats during the early part of the parade.



From the perspective of the community organiser in charge of the parade, this hitch represented a problem with communication that could have potentially been avoided had the bronze commander been at the table top exercise or there had been another form of meeting prior to the staging of the event:

*“I have written a debrief report and in it I have put that the relationship on the parade with the police was not good at all. There wasn't a relationship. I think it was probably because I didn't meet the guy [the bronze commander for the parade] beforehand, we hadn't had a chance to meet we were just thrown together at the last minute. He was supposed to be with me all-day, I didn't see him at all, I don't know what he did, I don't really care what he did, but it is important that we do actually meet and have some sort of bonding before the event.”* JM (Community Organiser, Pride 2003)

This further emphasises the importance of communication to both the planning and staging phases of the observed events. As with Solstice, this incident did not impact on either the overall safety or the perceived success of the event but it highlights that even with a cohesive joint control strategy there are still opportunities for improvement in the working relationship between different agencies in future events (e.g. through ensuring that all key police personnel meet their community organiser counterparts prior to the event). If this example is successfully addressed through the debrief it is likely that the joint control strategy at the staging of a future Pride event could be even more cohesive and therefore limit even further the potential for disruption to order and safety at the event.

### *3.3. Multicultural Festival*

The staging of the Multicultural Festival (and the preceding Mela) did not prove as logistically or tactically demanding for the police or organisers compared to Solstice or Pride. This was due in part to the size of the event – it was much smaller in terms of attendance compared to Solstice and Pride – and, from the police perspective, there were less significant operational demands and a looser command structure. These factors contributed to a fragmented approach to staging

the event (i.e. the police and organisers isolated any decision making away from each other). Although there were no complaints about the policing of the Multicultural Festival, it is interesting to note that the event and community organisers suggested that there were positive opportunities offered by the event that the police could take advantage of. In short, the police could use the event to promote themselves to the local community.

The first of these potential opportunities concerns recruitment. For example, the main police representative involved in the MFPG did not realise that the force had sent a recruitment stall until I raised it in the interview:

*“You are the first person to tell me that. I know the Fire Brigade was sending someone. Now, headquarters at no stage told me that they were going to do that and until you mention it I didn't know they had been there on the day. I personally couldn't go because I had a personal commitment that day so I couldn't get down there, but no I wasn't aware they had one. So that is the left and right hand isn't it? We are trying to police an event and even the officers on the day didn't mention it.”* MY (Sergeant, Multicultural Festival 2003)

Although a successful recruitment exercise does not rely on informing those officers involved in planning the event, it could have been potentially more productive had some liaison occurred so that the recruitment team could have been aware of local dynamics. In contrast, and in addition to the fire service and the police, the army also used the event (and the previous year's Mela) as a recruitment / information dissemination opportunity. From my observations of the event over the day, the fire service (complete with fire engine) and army had a more productive time compared to the police – they appeared to be drawing larger interest and had more to offer in terms of things for young people to do compared with the police who seemed happy to talk but were simply handing out recruitment brochures. Given that the MFPG occurred soon after the second Gulf War had ‘ended’, the attitude of the army was perceived positively given the demographic composition attending the event:

*“The army were quite good in sending a couple of Asian squaddies to talk so Asian young people could ask if there were any clashes with religious and ethnic issues in being a member of the army and talking to a real soldier, a Sikh or a Muslim soldier or whatever, about their experience was I think quite valuable. I don't know how many people they spoke to but I would think if young people have an opportunity to speak to someone who is actually doing it from a similar background to them would be quite valuable so it would have been quite nice if the police had had something similar really. They [local community] might not be able to get that information anywhere else, talking to someone in an informal way about their own experiences... it would have been quite nice.”* RP (Organiser, Multicultural Festival 2003)

The point to make here is that the army had recognised the nature of the event and sent people with whom younger people, especially from the local Muslim community, might identify. This recruitment / information dissemination exercise was geared towards the event. The police could have followed this example and, in addition to recruitment, used the event to disseminate information. However, for such a strategy to succeed, the police might need to acknowledge and understand some of the underlying tensions between themselves generally and the local (especially youth) community:

*“In this area if you speak to half the Asian young guys, or even the girls for example, their perceptions about the police are negative so if the perception is negative are they going to work for them? Nope. If they do work for them they are not going to work in this area for them. They won't be able to work in this area for them so you can't go around and have two officers in recruitment to try and recruit other people and pay them a salary when you don't even understand some of the issues about why people won't join the police in this area.”* AM (Community Organiser, Multicultural Festival 2003)

In terms of context, the area where the Multicultural Festival takes place is close to, both geographically and temporally, the source of violent disorder between the

police, far right groups and sections from the local Asian community. As the aim of the Multicultural Festival was to promote community cohesion, it therefore provided an ideal environment for the police to promote themselves as an organisation and build better links with the local community. One community organiser gave an example of how this could occur:

*“I think one of the hardest things about ringing the police is, if you have never rung the police and you have never had any dealings with the police, you don’t know how the police work so you feel a bit thick and the police need to understand that is how people sometimes feel. So when you ring the police, who are you speaking to? What happens to that incident you reported? Who do you speak to if you want more information? I think the police could be taking steps to talk to the community about that, you know when you ring us this is what happens, this is your local community bobby, this is how you can get access to them, this is who you need to be ringing, these are local events going on - we can be helping you in your area set up a neighbourhood system for example, actively getting out there and empowering the community to take some sort of responsibility for themselves but with overall responsibility obviously lying with the police but that isn’t done in this area. It is not done in the area so people don’t take responsibility, people who try and take the responsibility, the police don’t come forward so you are always in a catching up situation.”* AM (Community Organiser, Multicultural Festival 2003)

Of course, such information is of potential relevance to *any* member of the local community regardless of their cultural reference points of how the police operate. What is important, and a possible failing of the fragmented planning and staging, is that the police need to know about this information if they are to think about disseminating it. Greater consultation could lead to such information being passed from community organisers to the police but then the police would have to further disseminate it to the relevant department that deals with recruitment and public relations. If, as hinted by those involved in the MFPG, there is a greater attempt at

consultation and collaboration between organisers and the local community for future events, there is the potential for the police to tap into this process and develop their relationship with the local community *beyond the event*.

As has been highlighted in previous chapters, the contrast to the approach taken by the police at the Multicultural Festival comes from Pride. Within the joint control approach to planning and staging, recruitment and information dissemination was incorporated into the event after consultation with the community organisers and the local gay community. These actions, coupled with the way the event had been policed, were perceived to have benefits beyond the event itself, especially with regards to more general police / gay community relations in attempting to build trust between the two. This is not to say that the policing of Pride had solved every police / gay community problem but there were perceptions, as explored in previous chapters, that this process had been aided.

In summary, this section has examined aspects of all three observed events that could be improved upon in the future and further contribute to the success associated with the outcomes of each event. In all three cases, greater collaboration between the different police, event and community organisers would suggest itself as the best method for addressing these. Whatever action is taken in future, when it is combined with the factors raised in section two and potential unforeseen scenarios it is inevitable that the approaches and mechanisms utilised in planning and staging future events will be different (whether subtly or significantly) from those taken during the observed events.

#### **4. Understanding and Applying Good Practice from the Events to Other Contexts**

The previous section hinted at the potential benefits that the Multicultural Festival might hold for the police *beyond the event*. The aim of this final section is to explore in what ways, if any, the police might usefully take their experiences of being involved in the three observed events and apply them to other policing contexts. This obviously has ‘good practice’ potential that will be explored in relation to possible policy implications in the final chapter of the thesis. With

regards to this section, it is worth briefly outlining these benefits from the perspective of participants as they demonstrate that the planning and staging of each event has potential implications in other contexts.

From a policing perspective, the experience built up by Chief Superintendent RB as a key member involved in open managed access at Solstice has potential spin offs in his role as a divisional commander with the local traveller community:

*“What we are absolutely abysmal at is liaising with what is another minority group which is that of the travellers and when I say travellers I am talking about the Romany gypsies etc. We have quite a large community here and at the moment there is a great deal of mistrust from that community over the intentions of the police and what we have got to do is try to get to a stage where there is a mutual understanding because there is still this view that, quote, they are just a bunch of thieving gypos and that is not the case and certainly some of the tactics we have employed in the past have been discriminatory and we have got to try and address the needs of that community because there is no doubt at all if we can make inroads and build the trust of that community they too will want to assist us in making sure the unruly elements of their community, like the unruly elements of every community, are brought to justice but at the moment because there is a total lack of trust they are reluctant to come forward and do that so certainly what we are in the process of doing is our race and community relations officer is involved in various groups to try and build the trust with elements of that community and that is working with outside agencies. It is not us ourselves going along and doing it because if we said hello, Mr [local] Constabulary, here come along for a meeting I don't think there would be many people sat on chairs whereas if we use... There is an actual group involved in the churches and there is a very active reverend in the city here who is sort of a link in with the gypsy and traveller community but it is through those avenues that we can replicate what we have done as far as Solstice is concerned. The only thing I would say which is probably the negative*

*of it is that we have been dealing with a history and culture from Solstice which is let us say 18 years where the trust really broke down – It has taken us until 2000 and arguably those relationships are still building. What we have got as far as the traveller community is mistrust which has been built over many, many years and so therefore to turn that round in perhaps two or three years may be unrealistic and may take a lot longer but there is no doubt at all that that is work that we have got to do.” RB (Chief Superintendent, Solstice 2003)*

What is evident from the above quote is recognition that there is a) a problem between the police and the local traveller community and that b) a multi-agency approach might be the best way of building up trust between the two. The experiences of Chief Superintendent RB in the SPG and SCG over a number of years would suggest that the lessons learned during this process offer the best way forward for making positive inroads between the police force involved in Solstice and this local community. In terms of understanding the factors that potentially increase trust, a prominent dynamic would appear to be building good working relationships. This is viewed as a key factor in the success of Solstice:

*“Isn’t it a fundamental basis of everything which is you know what your outcome is and then you build the team to manage the outcome. The process in the middle is just how it happens but so often people look at the process and try to manage the process as opposed to... if you manage process, you’re so process driven you don’t build your team. This is about people, this is about the interpersonal relationships between all these different people and the agencies but at the end of the day you are not dealing with the agencies you are dealing with the people so if you build a good relationship with the people you represent those agencies, you end up getting support.” SM (Organiser, Solstice 2003)*

As has been explored in previous chapters, the ‘personalities’ involved in the planning groups are important to success. Even amongst apparently diverse groups such as the police, local councils, druids and pagans the focussed

‘outcome’ of facilitating a successful event has, coupled with time and *reflective personnel from the community and authorities*, allowed these working relationships to flourish. This approach could be beneficial for a number of policing contexts, such as crime and disorder partnership working. It is not surprising to report that similar sentiments were also expressed about the planning and staging processes associated with Pride:

*“A successful event will only come around through effective and constructive communication between all parties involved... You can sum the whole thing up by communication and certainly, with regards to the police involvement, a reflection on personalities, but also culture I think as well is generally changing, reflecting the way things are done and breaking down those stereotypes, you work for local government you are a loser... Members of the group, whatever the group is called should be hand-picked with the following things in mind: they should not be just who is in the office, right you can go because a whole manner of things can go wrong and I have read post event reports, post incident reports from elsewhere from all around the world as part of my research which have heavily criticised the representatives from the agencies for being unable to carry out the functions which they were required to do because they were chosen by senior ranks and didn't understand what was being asked of their organisation, as simple as that, a lack of understanding, a lack of communication and too many people think of rules and regulations and tick boxes. What I try and do is say well they are all over there, they are there if you want them but this is the principle, this is the spirit, I can use those if I'm forced to but I don't want to, I'll explain, I will refer, I will enforce but developing and communicating is the key.*

BW (Organiser, Pride 2003)

Once again there is an emphasis on personality and open communication – the agencies will ensure that the event goes ahead but the success or otherwise will rely on these factors combining to form good working relationships. In one sense, the planning arrangements and the partial joint control / joint control approaches to staging Solstice and Pride provide the forum for these positive factors to



flourish. With regards to good practice, it would appear that this type of approach would be beneficial at other types of events as one community organiser from Pride – who has experience of being involved in the planning of other events – points out:

*“All events in general, they should all follow something similar. It would be very useful and just safer for the public... There should be SAGS and joint event controls. You can't always do that with private promoters, once a promoter has hired a field, Mean Fiddler or whoever, they don't want all these services, they want to take responsibility themselves therefore they take responsibility but they also take the rap if things go wrong. If something goes wrong at Reading [Music Festival] next week it will all fall to the Mean Fiddler and how they have operated or reacted accordingly. I wouldn't want to take that risk and wherever possible any event that I am involved in I would certainly want consultation and joint event control provided it doesn't interfere with the event and the SAG does not because it is on safety issues only so any promoter that doesn't want an expertise of people in the room for free, trouble is they are not normally going to be for free are they, it's got to be a good thing. It is got to be a good thing for the safety of outdoor events.”* CB (Community Organiser, Pride 2003)

The idea of safety advisory groups (SAGs) and joint control would appear to hold benefits across a number of event contexts although the potential cost, as mentioned by the above community organiser, could be a factor at *commercially* based events as opposed to community-based events. This issue was raised earlier in the chapter and will be further discussed in chapter nine.

It would appear that the methods adopted by the police, event organisers and community organisers at Solstice and Pride promote trust through open communication and this in turn leads to successful outcomes (i.e. the maintenance of safety and order). Turning away from community-based events, one community

organiser involved with Solstice suggests that this ‘spirit’ may hold implications for the policing of political protest:

*“The police should be seen not as an agent of enforcing the authority of the government or another authority but as servants of the people including the government and the authorities. I am not suggesting the police should start acting against the government... I think the police are beginning to realise, certainly the way I’ve been dealing with the police over the Solstice issues, I get the feeling they realise that there is much there to make protest possible, if it is a protest we are talking about and I’m not talking about Solstice now, if we were talking about a more difficult protest situation there is much to make the protest possible and the protesters able to express their view as they are to ensure that the agencies of government and control are enforced... Local people [near to Solstice] go about their business if they don’t want to be there so similarly in any policing situation is up to the police to protect the interests of people who are not involved in the protest but also that the protesters are not the problem. It is just like the people who come to Solstice are not the problem and as soon as they are treated as the problem we get problems and therefore if any strategy, any kind of protest is planned, really it would be good if the people who are organising the process could develop a spirit of trust with the police so that the police could be organised so that people who do organise protests realise that the police are not there to undermine or prevent their protest or stop what they want to be, or be heard, they are there to help the facilitation as far as is reasonable in the context of everybody else who is concerned with what is going on. It’s all words this but I think there is something very important in what we are saying here, that the whole idea of protest is not... we want change, we want understanding, there is a reason why people do things, we want what people do to be effective and police involvement in a co-operative way will help the two sides to understand each other better, it will prevent bad feeling and prevent horrible things happening and therefore lead to more peaceful resolutions of*

*problems which is what it is all about.*" WP (Community Organiser, Solstice 2003)

To some commentators and practitioners, the views presented above may appear naïve and it could be the case that some protest participants may be unwilling to co-operate with the police during any potential planning stage. However, the point being made is that the police should not dismiss protestors as 'the problem' and there must be an effort on the part of the authorities to try and engage with protestors who in turn must also be willing to engage in order to achieve the difficult mix of facilitating 'effective' protest but avoiding disorder. To an extent this is exactly what happened, albeit over a number of years, as the Solstice transformed from a difficult, occasionally violent annual public order incident to a safe and orderly community celebration.

To conclude this section, the successful outcomes associated with each of the observed events offer potential good practice that could be applied to other contexts. It would appear that key factors are trust through open communication and the formation over time of good working relationships. The SCG / SPG and PPG coupled with the respective partial joint control / joint control offer the mechanisms for these to flourish. With regards to the Multicultural Festival, the personnel involved may be at the embryonic phase of developing both these approaches and the suitable mechanisms. They may manifest themselves in the future as there are signs that the planning process may be more consultative and cohesive compared to previous events (e.g. the Mela). The links between organisers and the police may also develop – for example one of the event organisers fully intended to use the main police representative involved in the MFPG to assist in the planning of another event – and this can, in association with closer planning, only be beneficial to all the organisers and their respective agencies / communities in staging future community-based events.

## **5. Conclusion**

This chapter has explored *post event* findings from the three observed events. By reflecting on the outcome of each event and information concerning the debrief

and / or reflections on the event future, it has been possible to identify that key variables associated with the successful outcomes would appear to be the building of trust through open communication leading to effective working relationships. As has been explored in previous chapters, consistency and personality would also appear to be important in addition to trust. In order for these ‘factors’ to manifest themselves, the utilisation of a partial joint / joint control approach to planning and staging would appear to offer the best mechanisms for them to flourish. This has potential implications for policy, especially when considering other policing contexts in addition to the observed events. These will be explored in the final chapter of the thesis.

To conclude the empirical analysis section, it is important to note that each event has a history, a present (i.e. the observed events) and a future. These have now all been explored through the last four chapters and combine to shape the planning and staging of the events. These factors also demonstrate that the events are not occurring in an isolated vacuum. Accordingly, the task of the next chapter will be to take the empirical findings of the last four chapters and develop an analytic framework to account for this shaping process. This also offers the opportunity to compare and critically evaluate existing theory concerning public order policing.

## **Chapter Eight: Theorising the Public Order Policing of Community-Based Events**

### **1. Introduction**

The purpose of this chapter is to present the empirical findings of this thesis within a theoretical context. To achieve this, there will be a focus on three areas of investigation. Firstly, a five stage model is developed which represents the empirical and grounded research findings. This allows for a holistic overview of the processes associated with the public order policing of community-based events that have been explored in the previous four chapters. Following this is an evaluation of these findings in respect of existing analytic accounts on public order policing. This section will draw on the accounts highlighted and discussed in chapter two. A product of this evaluation is the identification of opportunities and limitations associated with these existing accounts. These in turn suggest that there is the scope for a new analytic framework to account for the practice of public order in the context of this thesis. Drawing on the work of Pierre Bourdieu, this new analytic framework is presented in light of the empirical research findings.

This chapter will therefore aid significantly in meeting the research aims outlined at the end of chapter two. It offers answers to exploratory (i.e. *what* is happening) and explanatory questions (*why* is it happening). Further to this, both Garland and Sparks (2000) and Fielding (2002) argue that criminology can benefit from engagement with existing social theory. In addition to the evaluation and potential revision of existing theory, the findings from the exercises outlined above allow for the identification of possible policy implications which will form the focus of the next, and final, chapter.


### **2. Towards a Model for the Public Order Policing of Community-Based Events**

The aim of this section is to present a model that outlines the processes associated with the public order policing of community-based events. This model, outlined

by figure 4, is a culmination of the grounded approach as discussed in chapter three. However, it must be reiterated that this represents a *perspective* on the public order policing of community-based events, rather than an attempt to put forward a definitive account of the phenomenon under investigation. Before exploring existing analytical accounts and positing a potential new framework for understanding public order policing, it is worth outlining each component of the model and the impact it has on contributing to the maintenance of order and safety at the observed events. This will in effect summarise the findings and themes originating from the previous four empirical analysis chapters but present them within a holistic context. By outlining them at this stage of the chapter, it will be possible to account for these findings from existing and new perspectives.

The first component of the model to be considered is stage one, *event history / context*. A running theme throughout the previous four analysis chapters is that the police, organisers and community organisers have been able to draw on previous experiences of planning and staging for the observed events. This served two purposes. Firstly, there was a precedent whereby all the observed events had been staged previously without disorder. The nature and length of this precedent varied across the events. For example, the Solstice event had been characterised by disorder / disruption until 2000 although since this date the event has been staged successfully through a process of 'managed open access'. In comparison, Pride, Mela and the Multicultural Festival have staged a number of events without disorder. The event history therefore provides a baseline to work from: experience and knowledge (in some cases from the organisation of *other* types of events) have been accumulated and working practices were developed with the goal of minimising disorder / disruption prior to the planning of the observed events. The second function that the event history provides is an element of consistency. This was most marked in relation to Solstice where the majority of personnel (police, organisers and community organisers) had been involved in the event since the introduction of managed open access and in some cases before. With regards to Pride, Mela and the Multicultural Festival, this consistency was more evident in relation to organisers and community organisers with *new* police personnel becoming involved in the observed planning phases.

**Figure 4.** Model for the Public Order Policing of Community-based Events



The *event context* relates to the awareness of potential ‘threats’ to order, safety and / or the event future at Solstice, Pride, Mela and the Multicultural Festival. As with the event history, the nature of these potential ‘threats’ varied across the events. For Solstice and the Mela, these threats were ‘external’ to the planning groups, representing potential protest and gang-related violence respectively. The biggest threat at the observed Pride event related to concerns, predominantly raised by the local LGBT community and community organisers, that the policing would be insensitive. Finally, there were concerns at the Multicultural Festival that internal politics amongst community organisers would create tensions as the event evolved from the Mela that was staged the year before. The important point to make about the event history / context is that it impacted on the planning *and* staging phases of all the observed events. The culmination of knowledge / working practices gained from previous events and awareness of potential threats therefore both permeated and informed the entire process.

Stage two in the model refers to *Event Planning through Partnership*. During this stage, the police, organisers and community organisers came together and worked to plan for the staging of the observed events. The processes involved during this stage were documented in chapter five. In summary, it was noted that the overt function of such planning was to prepare safe and successful events. In this respect, the majority of decisions taken were not complicated or contentious and they were related to routine logistical issues (e.g. running order for the events etc). However, the planning phase also allowed for the identification and subsequent reduction of the various threats associated with each event. This process reflected a number of factors. Firstly, decision-making was informed and guided by the event history / context. For example, at Pride the new police personnel involved in the planning were aware of what had occurred at the previous event in relation to accusations of insensitive policing. The planning stage therefore presented an opportunity for the police to rectify previous errors. The officers who liaised with the organisers and community organisers acknowledged what had gone wrong previously and promoted a policing style to address their (and the LGBT community) concerns.



Secondly, and in relation specifically to Pride and Solstice, experience and consistency were important factors. These manifested themselves in two ways. At Pride, organisers and community organisers had experience of planning previous events. The police personnel involved in the observed planning, whilst new to Pride, were affiliated to a specialist events planning department so they also had relevant experience. This was reflected through the establishment of a Pride specific Safety Advisory Group (SAG) which is encouraged as 'good practice' for event planning by ACPO (1999). At Solstice, all the organisers, including the police and community organisers, had experience of planning and staging previous events. This experience was therefore supplemented by consistency: people knew each other and had worked together to previously stage successful events. The impact of both these factors is best appreciated in the context of Pride. The main police liaison made a pledge to all the other organisers that he would be involved in policing the event to ensure that a consistent approach was maintained. This was in contrast to the previous year where different police personnel had been involved in the planning and staging phases and this factor had been identified (by police and other organisers) as contributing to the problems associated with this event.

The culmination of this experience and consistency was a cohesive planning process at the observed Pride and Solstice. This allowed for the development of trust between all the parties involved in planning these events. The issue of trust is best exemplified by the response of Solstice organisers to dilemmas over when to stage the event and the potential for protest. In relation to the former, there was an open debate and vote concerning which date should be chosen to stage the event. The decision taken did not please all organisers and community organisers. Indeed, some of the prominent community organisers left the group for the observed Solstice but promised to return for the following year. However, the majority of organisers and community organisers who voted against the date finally chosen did state that a) they would back the decision and b) would remain involved in the planning and staging process. With regards to the potential for protest, the community organisers stated that they would engage with those advocating it, with the aim of preventing it from occurring. The police and organisers developed contingency plans but were willing to let this engagement

take place rather than overtly exclude the potential protestors from the planning process via the community organisers. Given that no protest materialised, the main police liaison for the event suggested that the actions of the community organisers would hold greater credence for the planning of future events. This therefore represents the continual building of trust that was associated with the planning and staging of the observed Solstice.

In contrast, there was not the same level of experience and consistency at the observed Mela. Although this represented a smaller event logistically, the police or organisers had not worked together before. Relative to Solstice and Pride, none of the parties involved in the planning process held much planning experience. This created tensions during the planning with the event nearly being cancelled due to the external threat of gang-related violence. Although this step was not taken as a decision was made concerning the numbers of security personnel, the planning process at this event could not be described as cohesive. The situation improved with reference to the planning for the Multicultural Festival. Not only had experience been gained from the previous year but more organisers and community organisers were drafted in who held event planning experience. In addition, the main police liaison for this event had been directly involved as an organiser in a previous Mela event. This led to an increased frequency in meetings and a broader knowledge base to consult from. The main threat to this event – potential disruption due to internal politics amongst community organisers – was also avoided during the planning process by successfully changing the constitution and focus for the event away from the Mela and towards the wider remit of a Multicultural Festival.

A final point to be made concerning the planning process relates to the roles of specific individuals. Again, this is best reflected in relation to the observed Pride and Solstice. Through exposure to the event history / context, key individuals were sensitive to the nature of the events. At the observed Pride the main police liaison introduced a number of initiatives (e.g. having the parade led by officers from the local Gay Police Association rather than a generic police van) to facilitate an effective and appropriate policing response to the event. Both the main organiser and police liaison at Solstice accommodated the debate over dates

and consented to community organisers engaging with potential protestors. The sensitivity demonstrated by these individuals was therefore an important factor that was acknowledged by other organisers and community organisers as being influential in the staging of successful events.

Returning to the model, the nature of the planning process associated with each of the observed events was closely mirrored at stage three: *staging the event*. This part of the process has been detailed in chapter six. From the police perspective, a common theme across all the observed events was the adoption of ‘low key’ (but not necessarily ‘low profile’) policing styles. This culminated in a low number of arrests being made at Solstice with no event-related arrests being made at Pride, Mela or the Multicultural Festival. Despite this ‘low key’ policing style, there were contingency plans at all the events for a sizeable and specifically tasked police response to any disorder / disruption to public safety. None of these police contingencies were called upon. At all the observed events, private security personnel and stewards supplemented the police presence and performed order maintenance / crime control tasks (e.g. facilitating access to the events; avoiding crowd congestion; confiscating drugs).

The actual staging of the observed events incorporated both the policing and management of logistics (e.g. opening times; ensuring that entertainment was running smoothly). The police, organisers and community organisers were all involved in this process, albeit to varying degrees. Chapter six outlined that this process manifested itself through three forms:

- A *Joint Control* Strategy (i.e. Pride)
- A *Partial Joint Control* Strategy (i.e. Solstice)
- A *Fragmented* Strategy (i.e. Mela, Multicultural Festival)

The above relate to the integration (or otherwise) of the police, organisers and community organisers during the staging of the observed events and they fall along a spectrum. At one end, the joint control strategy associated with Pride incorporated all the parties involved during the planning process working closely on managing *all* aspects of the event, including the policing. This was characterised by regular meetings, shared communication and a joint event control

location. The partial joint control strategy at Solstice allowed for major decisions to be made through consultation between the police, organisers and community organisers. However, the police and organisers were located in different control centres and had separate communication systems hence the partial nature of this strategy. Finally, Mela and the Multicultural Festival were characterised by a fragmented strategy: the police and organisers / community organisers did not work together in managing the event. Instead, the police simply carried out their duties (e.g. regular patrol) whilst the organisers / community organisers focussed on managing event logistics. There were separate communication systems and no joint control location: the only time these parties came together was for a briefing prior to the official opening of the event.

The combined result of the planning and staging process leads to stage four, *order and safety maintained at the event*. All the observed events, whatever the form of planning and event management, were perceived as a success by the police, organisers and community organisers. The threats that arose and were associated with the event history / context never materialised. At this stage it is important to acknowledge that the planning / staging distinction is in some ways artificial. The agencies involved were working towards orderly and safe events during both the planning and staging phases. In terms of minimising threats, it is difficult to attribute with certainty whether the processes associated with the planning or staging phases were most important. It was probably a combination of the two at Pride (i.e. planning and then implementing an appropriate policing strategy) whilst the planning phase contributed heavily to reducing the threat of protest at Solstice. With regards to Mela, there was a perception that the threat of gang related violence was reduced due to the nature of the event (i.e. family oriented and therefore not conducive to violence) rather than processes explicitly linked to the planning or staging phases.

Though order and safety was maintained at the observed events, the different strategies utilised highlight important differences. These became evident post event when the agencies embarked on a process of debriefing (see chapter seven). The joint control strategy was characterised by cohesive and consultative decision-making by virtue of the police, organisers and community organisers

working together. This was also evident at Solstice to an extent but there were identified problems concerning communication between the police and different agencies. The fragmented approach to the staging of the Mela and the Multicultural Festival did not impact on order and / or safety. However, had there been disorder / disruption it is a moot point whether these arrangements would have been as effective or efficient at responding to it compared to the joint / partial joint structures evident at Pride and the Solstice.

Further to reflecting on the planning and staging processes, the debriefing / feedback process highlighted ways in which the events could evolve. For example, at the observed events there was awareness that key personnel would no longer be involved in the planning / staging of future events. It was therefore acknowledged that there would need to be an effective 'handover' process to inform newcomers of the dynamics associated with each event and therefore maintain some form of consistency. Problems were highlighted with elements of the planning / staging process and it was also acknowledged that these would require addressing to enhance success at future events. Although most of these related to event logistics (e.g. changing the 'theme' at Pride; having a two day Multicultural Festival; event costs), there was reflection on improving the event management strategies to increase cohesive decision-making. The predominant factor in respect of this related to improving communication between various agencies during the staging of the events. Finally, benefits were identified from the planning and staging processes that went beyond the events. For example, the successful staging of Pride highlighted potential benefits in increasing wider trust between the police and resident LGBT community. The police at Solstice suggested that the methods associated with planning the event could be successfully employed to build links with the local traveller community, where relations were tense. At Mela / the Multicultural Festival, it was acknowledged that the event could enhance the processes associated with the broader goals of community cohesion (e.g. Community Cohesion Unit, 2002).

All the mentioned stages therefore culminate in stage five, *an updated event history / context*. This stage recognises that the observed events are not occurring in an isolated vacuum. The practices and processes associated with the planning

and (successful) staging are incorporated into the event history and context, to be drawn upon in the future. Of importance is the fact that additional experience and knowledge is available: the police, organisers and community organisers have successfully minimised a host of potential threats that did not exist prior to the observed events and identified relevant shortcomings. This is all information that is likely to inform and guide the planning and staging of future events, regardless of what 'new' threats may emerge.

The purpose of this 'holistic' model has been to demonstrate the processes associated with the public order policing of community-based events. This model is rooted in the data collected from observational fieldwork and interviews and reflects the findings that have been presented in the previous four empirical analysis chapters. Chapter two argued that this public order context (i.e. festivals) is under-researched compared to political / industrial protest and community disorder. The model therefore sheds light on the processes associated with this context and answers 'exploratory' (i.e. what is happening) questions. However, to effectively answer 'explanatory' questions (i.e. *why* are these processes happening) requires evaluation of existing analytic accounts relating to public order policing and wider social theory. The first of these tasks, namely the evaluation of existing public order related analytic accounts, will be the focus of the next section.

### **3. Evaluating Existing Public Order Related Analytic Accounts**

Chapter two highlighted a number of analytic accounts relating to public order policing. The aim of this section is to consider the empirical findings outlined in this thesis in light of these accounts. This exercise will aid in understanding the public order policing of community-based events and it will highlight potential limitations / opportunities that are inherent within these existing analytic accounts. The section starts by considering the 'paramilitarism' and 'flashpoint' accounts presented by Jefferson (1987, 1990, 1993) and D Waddington *et al* (1987, 1989) respectively. This will be followed by exploring the influential work of P.A.J Waddington (1994a). Finally, there is reflection on more recent accounts, for

example, social movements (P.A.J Waddington, 2003), social psychological perspectives (e.g. Reicher *et al*, 2004) and the work of Barton and James (2003).

The first account to evaluate is Jefferson's (1987, 1990, 1993) work on the 'rise of paramilitarism'. Chapter two noted that this analytic account incorporated a four stage model (preparation, controlling space, controlling the crowd, and clearance) arguing that 'paramilitary' police strategy and tactics (e.g. the use of riot shields) leads to a 'self-fulfilling prophecy' and 'amplification' of disorder (Jefferson, 1987, 1990). This perspective also argues that public order policing is conducted at the expense of those being 'policed'. The first important point to make is that this account focuses on public order policing and overt contention. Jefferson (1987, 1990) bases his model on disorder on three examples of political protest (a Manchester University Student Union protest, 1985); industrial dispute (Orgreave, 1984) and community disorder (Broadwater Farm, 1985). This account was criticised by P.A.J Waddington (1987, 1993) for, amongst other things, not representing the wide and often orderly context in which public order policing is practiced.

The findings from this thesis dispute the relevance of elements from this analytic account to the public order policing of events where contention is minimal. Further, it could be argued that the model presented in the previous section represents the 'amplification' of order rather than *disorder*: the closer police, organisers and community organisers worked together during the planning and staging of the events, the more likely potential threats to order / safety were minimised. However, one element of Jefferson's 'paramilitarism' argument is worth commenting upon. The threat to the observed Pride related to a perception of insensitive policing. Specifically, this involved 'intrusive' techniques such as the overt filming of the crowd by Evidence Gathering Teams (EGTs) which, as a relatively recent technique, could be construed as an example of 'paramilitarism'. This issue will be commented upon further when evaluating social psychological accounts (e.g. Reicher *et al*, 2004) and as the chapter develops.

Rather than focus on Jefferson's (1987, 1990, 1993) paramilitarism arguments, it is more illuminating to reflect on his recommendations concerning the

‘deamplifying’ of this process in public order policing. These recommendations were noted briefly in chapter two but to re-iterate there were eight in total and many facets of the observed planning and staging process meet them. These are summarised below in light of the general findings from this thesis:

Recommendation One: The police should analyse incidents with a view to a) being aware of their working practices and their potential in the ‘amplifying process’ and b) monitoring the number of unnecessary arrests made.

*Findings: The employment of ‘low key’ policing styles at all the observed events demonstrates a level of self-awareness which appreciates that an inappropriate policing strategy could potentially increase the possibility of disorder / disruption. This is particularly relevant to the policing at Solstice.*

Recommendation Two: The police should monitor arrests and complaints, and identify any patterns of bias / discrimination if necessary.

*Findings: Although large numbers of arrests have not been associated with the observed events in recent years, the police at Pride did respond to complaints made during the previous year. This culminated in a new policing strategy for the observed Pride event.*

Recommendation Three: Developing a ‘success criteria’ (i.e. ‘trouble free’ public order policing with low arrests, complaints and injuries) and rewarding it.

*Findings: Each of the observed events consisted of ‘trouble free’ policing strategies that were appreciated by organisers and community organisers. In the case of Pride, the main police liaison involved in the planning and staging of this event received an award for his efforts from the local LGBT community.*

Recommendation Four / Five: Changing the recruitment policy for specialist public order units: ‘this means choosing women, rather than men, the ‘steady’ rather than the ‘active’, the older rather than the younger, and so on’ (Jefferson.



1990, p144). Officers should be encouraged to undertake foot patrol rather than be stationed in police 'carriers'.

*Findings: Although specialist public order units were part of contingency plans for all the observed events, they were not actually deployed in this capacity. The majority of officers involved in policing the events were not specifically public order trained and their duties encompassed normal patrolling and minor traffic / crowd management. Interestingly, members of the local Gay Police Association had a proactive role during the policing of Pride (e.g. leading the parade).*

Recommendation Six: Officers should use 'standby time' to focus on achieving 'trouble free' policing of public order.

*Findings: During the briefings conducted at the observed events, officers were encouraged to interact with crowd members to help ensure safe and orderly events (e.g. the analogy used at Solstice of 'policing a big village' using community policing techniques).*

Recommendation Seven: A genuine dialogue should be established with groups and communities being 'policed', with the police 'being prepared to listen and learn' (Jefferson, 1990, p144) from these groups.

*Findings: Despite the varying levels of planning associated with each of the observed events, the police engaged with organisers and community organisers at all of them. With regards to Solstice and Pride, the police have been proactive in listening and learning from these other organisers and the community, culminating in 'successful' policing operations. Even though there was not the same level of contact between the police and organisers at the Mela, there was still communication between these agencies during the planning of the event. The subsequent Multicultural Festival demonstrated a greater police commitment to the planning process (i.e. through attending more meetings; having a liaison officer who had experience of planning previous Mela events) which suggests that they were learning from the experiences of the previous year.*

Recommendation Eight: The police should encourage ‘an open, participatory, reflexive and above all *experimental* approach to all practices’. culminating in ‘non-discriminatory, trouble-free and acceptable (to the policed) policing of public order’ (Jefferson, 1990, p144).

*Findings: The aspirations that Jefferson holds reflect the aim of the police involvement to the observed events. There is consultation during the planning, and reflection occurs post-event on what could be improved (e.g. better communication strategies at Solstice; the police focus at Pride post the problems associated with the previous year). The staging process is also ‘open and participatory’, albeit to different degrees, by the implementation of partial-joint and joint control strategies at Solstice and Pride that incorporate other agencies / community organisers into the policing process.*

An evaluation of Jefferson’s account on public order policing would suggest that ‘paramilitarism’ and the ‘amplification of disorder’ is not a dynamic in relation to the types of events that formed the fieldwork for this thesis. Instead, the empirical findings suggest that Jefferson’s recommendations are a reality for this public order context. The key issue is whether these practices can be applied to other public order contexts (e.g. protest / industrial disputes, community disorder). This will be discussed in the next, and final, chapter.

The next analytic account to be evaluated is the ‘flashpoints’ model (D. Waddington *et al* 1987, 1989; D Waddington, 1992). As with Jefferson’s account, this model is most closely associated with accounting for different types of *disorder*. Chapter two outlined that the flashpoints model consisted of six stages: structural, political / ideological, cultural, contextual, situational, and interactional (D Waddington *et al*, 1989; D Waddington, 1992). Through these different levels, the ‘flashpoints’ model acknowledges that public order policing occurs in a wide and often complex social / political context. The importance of taking into account such variables informed the analysis in this thesis where there has been a focus on understanding how the event history / context both informs and guides the planning and staging phases of the observed events. This is analytically useful and

demonstrates unequivocally that the observed events do not occur in a social / political vacuum.

However, as there was no disorder / disruption at any of the observed events, the potential of this particular analytic account is reduced: it is simply redundant to attempt specifying a single incident that signifies that *orderly* events would occur. D Waddington *et al* (1989) does analyse events where disorder did not occur from the 'flashpoints' perspective but he is left to speculate on general processes, rather than specific incidents, that caused this to happen. For example, in relation to a 'Thatcher Unwelcoming' rally in Sheffield that passed off peacefully, D Waddington *et al* (1989) are left to conclude that the organisers successfully conveyed a message to demonstrators that disorder was not in the wider interest of their cause whilst the crowd was managed through the adoption of a 'festive' atmosphere (e.g. provision of entertainments). In addition, the policing was low-key and the political composition of the crowd meant that neither the organiser nor police decision-making was challenged (D Waddington *et al*, 1989). At a more general and macro level, D Waddington (1992) argues that the potential for 'flashpoints' can be reduced by implementing a host of changes to policy (i.e. improving the policing of public order along the lines suggested by Jefferson above, establishing a less inflammatory and reactionary press, government investment in areas of deprivation / social inequality).

It is not the intention to rehearse the criticisms made of this analytic account by P.A.J Waddington (1991, 2000b). However, it is rather lacking in respect of the findings from this thesis: the model presented in the previous section would appear to represent a series of processes that undermined the potential for a 'flashpoint' occurring from this perspective. Beyond this, it is difficult to gauge with precision *which* processes were more important and why. A combined evaluation of 'paramilitarism' and 'flashpoint' analytic accounts suggests that they are limited in accounting for public order policing where overt and clear 'contention' is missing from the equation. This is not to make a value judgement on their collective worth to understanding other public order contexts, although the methodological and conceptual criticisms of P.A.J Waddington (1987, 1991, 1993, 2000b) must be acknowledged. Rather, they are limited in offering

extensive insight into *why* the observed processes, as outlined in the previous section, contributed to the maintenance of order and safety at Pride. Solstice. Mela and the Multicultural Festival.

Of all the analytic accounts presented in chapter two, the work of P.A.J Waddington (1994a) is acknowledged as being the most applicable to the general policing of public order (e.g. della Porta and Reiter 1998). Although the predominant focus of this account is on the policing of contention, P.A.J Waddington argues that the under-enforcement of the law and facilitation / negotiation are key factors in contributing to the maintenance of order during the majority of public order operations. The factors that P.A.J Waddington (1994a) outlines are relevant to the findings from this thesis. For example, the police engaged with the organisers / community organisers through negotiation during the planning stages of the observed events and compromise was present (e.g. negotiating conditions of entry to Solstice and stewarding / security numbers at Mela). In addition, the law was rarely, if ever, evoked to dictate decision-making in the police's favour.

These factors would therefore suggest a consistency between P.A.J Waddington's (1994a) account and the findings of this thesis, despite a different focus (i.e. the policing of 'festival' community events as opposed to protest / industrial dispute). However, there are noteworthy limitations within P.A.J Waddington's (1994a) account that need to be addressed. D Waddington (1998) rightly notes that P.A.J Waddington's analytic account tends to relegate the perceptions of organisers in the context of public order policing. Chapter three argued that by taking into account the views of organisers, this thesis would negate similar charges. The inclusion of the organiser and community organiser perspectives could lead to a beneficial revision of P.A.J Waddington's (1994a) analytic account and will now be discussed.

Firstly, the concept of avoiding 'trouble' from a police perspective is central to P.A.J Waddington's (1994a) argument. The empirical findings from this thesis would appear to support this assertion: a key motivation of the police involvement in the observed events could be construed as avoiding both 'on-the-job' (e.g.

having to make large numbers of arrests at the events) and ‘in-the-job’ trouble (e.g. alienating local communities through inappropriate and misjudged policing operations). P.A.J Waddington’s argument is that ‘trouble’ is minimised the more control police have over proceedings and that this is achieved by negotiation and compromise. What the findings of this thesis suggest is that similar processes might apply to the organisers and community organisers. For example, the main organiser at Solstice held legal responsibility for organising a safe event. This represented the ultimate goal and to achieve this required careful negotiation and compromise with the police and community organisers. Likewise, the community organisers at Solstice had to negotiate between the police, organisers and potential protestors during the planning phase. This exercise could potentially have led to consequences that are analogous to ‘on-the-job’ (i.e. day to day engagement with individuals hostile to the intentions of the police and organisers) and ‘in-the-job’ trouble (i.e. dealing with the potential consequences of alienating these individuals in the long term). Rather than being an issue solely for the police, the avoidance of trouble in this context is a collective enterprise. The planning and staging processes at the observed events encapsulated negotiation and compromise from *all* the parties involved as they endeavoured to stage safe, orderly and successful events.

The importance of this collective enterprise raises a second issue in relation to P.A.J Waddington’s work. In response to Jefferson’s (1987, 1990, 1993) ‘paramilitarism’ account, P.A.J Waddington (1993) argues that a disciplined and coordinated police response to public order policing a) decreases the potential for disorder and b) minimises injuries etc should disorder occur. Part of this response involves a structured command process (i.e. the ‘metallic hierarchy’). It has been noted that the partial-joint and joint command strategies at Solstice and Pride respectively involved the organisers / community organisers in addition to the police, albeit to varying degrees. In the context of these events it was not just the police who were involved in a coordinated approach to minimising disorder: again, it was a *collective* process. The model presented in the previous section and the findings reported in chapter six suggest that greater integration of the police, organisers and community organisers (i.e. a joint control strategy) during the staging process led to more efficient and effective event management. Further

consideration of both 'trouble' and methods associated with staging events would suggest that P.A.J Waddington's analytic account could be revised in respect of the organiser / community organiser perspective. These points are raised in the context of 'festival' events although it would no doubt be interesting to explore these perspectives in relation to other contexts (i.e. political protest / industrial protest). P.A.J Waddington's (1994a) analytic account is certainly relevant to the findings of this thesis but there is definitely the scope for additional development.

An evaluation of more recent analytic accounts concerning public order policing is also worth consideration. For example, social movement theory has been applied to the policing of contention (P.A.J Waddington, 2003). As discussed in chapter two, this analytic account argues that a combination of political opportunities, mobilising structures and framing processes represent a complex dynamic that can lead movements from protest, possibly incorporating violence, to wider public legitimacy (e.g. the American civil rights movement). This account can be applied to understanding the broader context of Solstice and Pride. Starting with Solstice, an important component of the event history / context has been a shift from disorder / disruption during the 1980s and 1990s to a process of 'open managed access' in 2000. This particular Solstice, and all subsequent events, have been characterised by a lack of disorder / disruption. This shift can be understood from a social movement perspective. The prolonged lack of public access to Solstice gradually led members from the druid and pagan communities to work with the organisation that manages the location and the police in finding a workable solution to resolve this issue. This resulted in compromise between these communities and the authorities (i.e. druids and pagans forsaking the wish for a lengthy festival in return for shorter, but open, access to the Solstice location). These efforts resulted in 'open managed access' although the observed Solstice revealed that there were tensions amongst those who celebrate the event (i.e. the potential for protest). Although these tensions never materialised, they demonstrate the ever-evolving dynamic that is associated with this event.

Social movement theory also provides appropriate context in relation to Pride. The observed Pride represented a large celebration and is one of many held across various towns and cities in the UK. Tatchell (2003) argues that there is greater

general acceptance of the LGBT community compared to as recently as the late 1980s when this community was subject to overt discrimination. Tatchell (2003) also suggests that direct action through groups such as OutRage! have been influential in raising the profile and grievances of the LGBT community culminating in this more general acceptance. This shift is perhaps best exemplified by the decision to allow openly gay police officers the right to march at London Pride in 2003 (Tatchell, 2003). The observed Pride has grown as an event over this period of time, and this growth could be interpreted as social movement theory in action. To reflect the dynamism associated with this theory, Tatchell (2003) notes a number of contemporary issues (e.g. opposing a ban on same-sex marriage) where direct action could be employed. Although protest was not a central component of the observed Pride, these issues could create the potential for protest at future events. In respect of this, it is interesting to note that Peter Tatchell<sup>1</sup> believes that Pride as a general concept has become 'conformist' to a new Labour agenda and has forsaken its radicalism so this potentially could lead to splinter organisations / events where the emphasis is on the political rather than the celebratory which would again be consistent with the tenets of evolving social movements.

Applying social movement theory to the Mela / Multicultural Festival is more difficult. Mela events are celebratory and staged all over the country and the evolution to a Multicultural Festival is specific to one location. It is important that the event history / context of the observed Mela and Multicultural Festival is appreciated but the origins of these events are not as explicitly connected to contention relative to Solstice and Pride. Therefore, social movement theory is applicable to understanding *some* of the context to the observed events, albeit at a broad level. In particular, it demonstrates the evolutionary nature of the driving forces behind Solstice and Pride. In summary, this perspective might inform the history / context associated with the observed events but it is not conducive to analysing the micro elements (e.g. the event management strategies) highlighted through the model in the previous section.

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<sup>1</sup> *The Independent*, 6<sup>th</sup> July, 2002.

The social psychological perspective of Reicher *et al* (2004) also focuses predominantly on the policing of contention. Chapter two highlighted that this perspective centres on police strategy during public order operations and argues that interaction with the crowd coupled with the minimising of controlling and disciplinarian tactics will reduce the potential for disorder. This perspective is informed by the arguments of P.A.J Waddington (1994a) and Jefferson (1987, 1990, 1993). The empirical findings from this thesis suggest that these processes are equally applicable to the planning stages. The model presented in the previous section argues that interaction during the planning stage allows trust to build, which is an important component of Reicher *et al*'s analytic account. The policing operations evident during the staging of the observed events encompassed the strategies that Reicher *et al* (2004) advocate: crowd interaction was encouraged and controlling / disciplinarian tactics were not employed. To emphasise the importance of this approach, it is worth reflecting on the police tactics at Pride one year prior to the observed event. The policing operation at this event encompassed the deployment of Evidence Gathering Teams (EGTs) which was construed as insensitive and inappropriate. Rather than 'enabling' order, this tactic created tensions that went beyond the policing of the event (i.e. the deterioration of wider police / LGBT community trust relations). The efforts of the police at the observed Pride event were channelled on resolving the difficulties that this operation had created with the aim of restoring lost trust. Although the social psychological perspective of Reicher *et al* (2004) relates to the policing of contention, it does present policy implications for 'good practice' which will be explored in the next chapter.

The final analytic account to be evaluated concerns Barton and James' (2003) exploration of the policing at a 'Run to the Sun' event. Consideration of this account is important as this event represents a festival that is characterised as lacking in overt contention / disorder. The most interesting finding from Barton and James' account concerns the mechanisms for accountability: the police found themselves having to negotiate between the local resident and business communities in devising an appropriate policing strategy. From this case study, Barton and James (2003) argue that these two groups represented divergent interests (i.e. community vs. entrepreneurial) and that in turn this presents a



challenge to contemporary public order policing in the context of festival events where overt contention is minimised. The key questions posed concern what forms of interest will dominate in this context and why.

This is a relevant contemporary perspective but it also requires some revision. The police at the observed events negotiated between different groups but the *commercial* interest was not a dictating factor. There was sponsorship at Pride and Mela / Multicultural Festival but this was supplemented by other forms of income (e.g. local government funding). The Solstice event was not subject to any form of commercial sponsorship. In contrast to Barton and James (2003), the major factor at the observed events was the *community* interest. To develop an analytic perspective for festival events requires recognition of the accountability issues that Barton and James (2003) note but it must also acknowledge a range of interests in addition to local resident and business communities.

This section has provided an evaluation of existing analytic accounts that are pertinent to public order policing. All of these accounts provide some potential explanation to understanding the processes outlined in the previous section. However, the focus of these accounts is mainly concerned with understanding public order policing in the context of protest / industrial dispute or community disorder. It is therefore appropriate to suggest that a new approach is developed which can incorporate the analytic opportunities presented above but also address a number of limitations. This will be presented in the following section.

#### **4. Developing an Analytic Account for the Public Order Policing of Community-Based Events**

With reference to the empirically based model presented in section two, developing an analytic account for the public order policing of community-based events requires consideration of macro (e.g. event history / context) and micro (e.g. the role of individuals) factors. It also needs to consider how these processes interact with each other, culminating in the observed phenomenon of safe, orderly and successful events. An opportunity to achieve this arises from the work of the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu and more specifically his reflections on the

concepts of the 'field' and 'habitus'. Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992) argue that the 'field' represents a social space which encompasses conflict and competition as participants compete over various forms of capital (e.g. cultural authority, scientific authority). In addition, the 'field' is never a static entity: the very act of conflict and competition leads to evolution and therefore a changing structure. To understand why this occurs, it is important to outline the concept of 'habitus'. This refers to individual processes which are internalised and informed by external structures (e.g. past experience, cultural knowledge, an appreciation of 'the rules of the game'). The *key* process concerns the interplay between these two concepts:

'Both concepts of habitus and field are relational... they function fully *only in relation to one another*. A field is not simply a dead structure... but a *space of play* which exists as such only to the extent that players enter into it who believe in and actively pursue the prizes it offers. An adequate theory of field, therefore, requires a theory of social agents... Conversely, the theory of habitus is incomplete without a notion of structure that makes room for the organized improvisation of agents.' (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p19)

The implication is that both field and habitus impact, and hold consequences, for each other which in turn creates an evolving dynamic. This evolving dynamic represents a heuristic that can be applied to the four observed events. For example, the debate surrounding when to stage Solstice was informed by the individuals involved in the SPG and SCG, and culminated in a form of structure (i.e. the chosen date) which in turn dictated subsequent events beyond these meetings (e.g. planning preparations, the threat of protest). Likewise, the pledges of the main police representative at the first PPG meeting created a structure that dictated the planning and staging of the observed Pride (e.g. the utilisation of a sensitive policing style). The dissolution of the Mela committee created the opportunity for the expansion of the planning group and marked the evolution towards a Multicultural event format. These examples reveal the minor histories associated with the events that emerged during the field research process. However, these in turn were influenced by prior factors (e.g. event history / context) *and* hold

implications for the future. To understand in greater detail how these processes operate requires a greater exploration of Bourdieu's concepts.

The concepts of habitus and field have been applied to understanding various aspects of policing (Chan 1997; Bigo, 2000; Bowling, Phillips, Campbell and Docking, 2004). As an example of this approach in action, Chan (1997) argues that field and habitus can aid in understanding police culture and racism. With regards to the field, Chan (1997) suggests that the social and political status of minorities, discretionary police powers, and legal protection against police abuse represent significant components. When outlining the habitus, Chan (1997) makes reference to four different dimensions of 'cultural knowledge':

- *Dictionary Knowledge* – i.e. how the police categorise different groups;
- *Directory Knowledge* – i.e. how police work is 'normally' done;
- *Recipe Knowledge* – i.e. how things should, or should not be done, in certain situations;
- *Axiomatic Knowledge* – i.e. relating the above to the general rationale of policing (e.g. the police mandate).

Chan (1997) argues that understanding the field and habitus in this context can illuminate why racism occurs. It is also argued that successful reform can only occur if both the field and habitus change: this therefore requires addressing the macro (i.e. social, political, economic and legal) and the micro (e.g. internal reform) context in which policing is conducted. To apply this approach to the findings of this thesis requires developing a framework which outlines the composition of the relevant field and habitus. This procedure also provides greater explanation of the processes identified in the model in section two.

#### *4.1. The Field*

At the macro level of the field, it is important to identify common factors across all the events as these represent the social space under investigation. This reveals three broad factors that could be construed as representing the field in relation to the public order policing of community-based events. The first of these factors is

conceptualised by the event history / context. The observed events shared different event histories but the common theme, as related in section two, is that these informed the practices of participants involved in the planning and staging processes. In relation to Solstice and Pride, social movement theory offers a potential explanation as to the form and nature that contemporary events take (i.e. the process of political opportunities, mobilising structures and framing processes). However, what is of critical importance is an acknowledgement that, whatever the origins, it is inevitable that the event history / context will register some form of impact on contemporary processes. If this factor were to be extrapolated across other events / public order contexts, the key task facing the analyst would be a) identifying whether there is a specific history, b) locating its origins (e.g. past contention or simply following the zeitgeist) and c) evaluating the nature of its impact on the processes that they observe. This process would also reveal important contextual information relating to the nature of the relationships between the different parties involved and possible individual motivations. Further, it allows for the identification of previous working practices in relation to planning and staging events and it can also reveal insights into the wider police / community relationship (e.g. the police and local Asian community at Mela / Multicultural Festival). Finally, general event characteristics can be ascertained such as previous crowd numbers or the length and format of an event.

The second factor relates to policy and legislative procedures that are openly available to the participants. For example, the policing at the observed events encompassed a form of command structure that followed the 'metallic hierarchy' which is based in national policy (e.g. ACPO, 2001). It is also recommended that public event safety is prioritised through Safety Advisory Groups (ACPO, 1999). Although this was only utilised at the observed Pride, this information existed in the public domain during the planning of the other events. Equally, the organisers could access relevant health and safety advice from the public domain (e.g. HSE, 1999) prior to and during the planning process. These sources also contain legislative information, ranging from the acquisition of public entertainment licences (HSE, 1999) to the application of Human Rights legislation when developing a policing strategy (ACPO, 2001).

The third factor relates to the ‘changing architecture of policing’ (D Waddington, 1996). Occurring extraneously yet simultaneously with the planning and staging of the observed events are relevant processes which impact on all aspects of policing. For example, multi-agency partnership working is practised in respect of crime reduction and community safety through the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (e.g. Phillips, 2002) which in turn represents increased pluralisation in policing (Loader, 2000). This process of pluralisation is also demonstrated through the increasing use of private security personnel in a public order context (e.g. Button and John, 2002). Once again, an analyst who wishes to extrapolate the second and third factors to other events / public order contexts would need to be attentive to the possibility that these will be modified or changed as time passes. To summarise, these three factors represent an external structure that is associated with the observed events. They inform what is possible but also impose a set of limitations in that they dictate what is *lawful* and *realistic* when planning and staging events. The next task is to understand the various forms of habitus within this macro context.

#### 4.2. *The Habitus*

Chan’s (1997) exploration of four dimensions of ‘cultural knowledge’ is relevant to understanding the habitus associated with the observed events. The factors listed above that comprise the field will impact on dictionary, directory, recipe and axiomatic forms of knowledge. To fully appreciate these concepts it is important to examine them at two levels. The first level refers to the different roles of participants in the planning and staging of the events. Chan (1997) applies these forms of cultural knowledge to the police but in the context of this thesis it is equally valid to apply them to the organisers and community organisers. Given the diversity of participants involved in the planning and staging process, it would be impossible to list specific individual habitus but Figure 5 demonstrates some *general* properties.

**Figure 5.** Applying Different Forms of Cultural Knowledge to the Police, Organisers and Community Organisers in the Context of Community-based Events

Knowledge Type	Police	Organiser	Community Organiser
Dictionary	Based on knowledge / experience of group and / or policing the relevant community / working with organisers in another context.	Based on knowledge / experience of group and / or other policing / community contexts.	Based on knowledge / experience of group and / or other contexts in which exposed to police / organisers.
Directory	Negotiation and recourse to law and police policies.	Negotiation and recourse to law and organisational policies	Negotiation and recourse to wider community resources.
Recipe	Based on previous experience with group and / or general police experience.	Based on previous experience with group and / or general working experience.	Based on previous experience with group and / or general community experience.
Axiomatic	To maintain order and safety.	To maintain safety.	To stage a successful event for their community.

Figure 5 represents a general overview of habitus and the categories should not be viewed as concrete. For example, the community organisers at all the events were interested in issues of safety and order even though the rationale for their involvement centred on staging a successful event. However, in addition to demonstrating the general range of possibilities that represent the habitus, figure 5 reveals a *second* level from which to appreciate this concept. The coming together of the police, organisers and community organisers creates a *collective habitus*. In this context, the dictionary, directory, recipe and axiomatic forms of cultural knowledge are predominantly informed by past experience of the collective and the process of negotiation. This collective habitus is analogous to a meso stage and as such represents a conduit for the interplay between the micro habitus and

macro field. It is at this level where both habitus and field are informed and shaped by each other.

The phrase *collective habitus* is deliberate as it presents an opportunity to move beyond the ‘everything is relevant’ phase that potentially hinders theory development (Fielding, 2002). The planning and staging processes at the observed events mirrored each other. For example, the PPG was characterised by regular meetings and close cooperation between the police, organisers and community organisers. This process culminated in a joint control strategy where there were similar levels of cooperation. In contrast, the MPG was characterised by few meetings and tensions between the organisers and the police. There was little collaboration between the parties during the staging phase leading to fragmented event management. This allows the possibility to distinguish between different levels of collective habitus. At one extreme the police, organisers and community organisers are working closely together or, as one participant from Pride (Chief Inspector AC) succinctly stated, ‘everybody was singing from the same hymn sheet’. It has been systematically documented that the level of collaboration and cooperation achieved at Pride were not established to the same extent at Solstice or the Mela / Multicultural Festival. It has also been documented that greater collaboration and cooperation leads to the development of consistency, trust, cohesion and flexibility. Within this context, the personalities of key individuals are allowed to flourish. The boundaries between the police, organisers and community organisers become less discrete: the planning group and joint command symbolise the sharing of collective aims and objectives. This collaboration and cooperation also leads to an extensive pool of cultural knowledge, in all its forms, that can be accessed and acted upon.

As the cooperation and collaboration increase, the dynamic of the social space (i.e. the events) evolves. There is also greater awareness of the opportunities and limitations presented by the field. The event history / context is enhanced, alerting all participants to its content and meaning, whilst policies and regulations that are potentially unique to one group are shared and understood. In the absence of a ‘flashpoint’ for order, it is reasonable to suggest that the greater the collective habitus, the more likely potential threats to order, safety or the event future can be

averted. In terms of *changing* the field, these collective processes form an updated event history / context to be drawn upon in the future. This process is facilitated through procedures such as handovers, debriefings and feedback from the community. There is also the possibility that good practice can be extrapolated and used to inform new policy and / or regulation.<sup>2</sup> At this most developed level, the collective habitus therefore represents the widest culmination of cultural knowledge and awareness of the field which in turn increases the possibility of safe, orderly and successful events. The least *developed* collective habitus was evident at the Mela. Despite this, the event still passed off without incident. This indicates that some form of collaboration and cooperation during planning / staging is better than none and this is best demonstrated with reference to the Pride that occurred previous to the observed event.

The current and previous chapters have outlined that this particular event was problematic in relation to the policing strategy and tactics that were utilised. The police representative during the planning was due to take an active role in the staging of this event but was removed due to extraneous factors. New personnel who were not involved in the planning process took charge of policing the event and failed to consult or inform the organisers or community organisers of their plans. They then implemented a policing operation based along ‘traditional’ public order lines with officers proactively and overtly filming the crowd. This resulted in complaints from event attendees and the wider LGBT community. The reason for this can be tracked to a considerable fissure in the collective habitus – essentially a key element (i.e. the police involvement in planning) was removed which resulted in a break in consistency. The operation could therefore not ascertain important nuances in policing Pride that would have been accessible through the collective habitus. The consequences of these actions ingrained themselves in the event history / context to the extent that they threatened police / LGBT relations at future Pride events and amongst the resident community. This episode acts as a warning to the potential consequences of not opting for collaboration and cooperation. It is only possible to speculate as to how the various forms of planning and staging strategies would have responded to more

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<sup>2</sup> This is stressed as a possibility as none of the planning / staging practices from the observed events was submitted as good practice to agencies such as ACPO or the Health and Safety Executive.




substantial threats than were present. However, this analytic framework would hypothesise that the greater the collaboration and cooperation (and by implication, the breadth of the collective habitus and what this represents), the more minimal any potential threat would be to safety, order or the event future. Therefore, the strategies utilised at the observed Pride not only present the *best* methods for maintaining safety, order and the event future but they also represent a position from which the police, organisers and community organisers can respond most effectively to any potential threats.

This analytic account offers an appreciation of macro, meso and micro factors in relation to the public order policing of community-based events. It remains at a framework stage as more fieldwork would have to be conducted to test the central hypothesis that greater collaboration and cooperation – as identified at the observed Pride – present the best opportunity for safe, orderly and successful events. In its favour, this analytic account has developed Bourdieu's concepts of the field and habitus to supplement the empirical and grounded research findings. It also recognises that *all* agencies involved in the planning and staging process have an important role to play. Figure 6 outlines how these processes manifest themselves and lead to the observed phenomenon.

However, care would be required in extrapolating these ideas to another context and this would almost certainly result in revision. For example, the policing of political protest would need to factor in the level of overt contention as a feature of the field. This in turn would alter the dynamic of the dimensions of 'cultural knowledge' if organisers / community organisers were to be replaced by 'protestors'. Equally, the policing opportunities and limitations would change (e.g. the potential requirement for a 'high profile' policing strategy). However, the processes might remain consistent: greater collaboration and cooperation during the planning and staging between the police and other groups would result in a larger pool of collective habitus and therefore enhance the potential for order. To conclude, further development and testing across other community events / contexts would inevitably lead to developments / revision but this analytic account presents the potential for greater understanding of contemporary public order policing.

**Figure 6.** Applying Bourdieu’s Concepts to the Public Order Policing of Community-Based Events



**5. Conclusion**

This chapter concludes the analytic process associated with this thesis. Together with the preceding four chapters, this chapter has presented empirical research findings in relation to understanding the form and nature of the public order

policing of community-based events. There has also been the opportunity to evaluate these findings in light of existing public order related analytic accounts. This exercise demonstrated the need for a new analytic approach that offers explanatory potential in relation to the empirical findings. To achieve this, the work of Pierre Bourdieu was drawn upon to account for a host of micro, meso and macro processes occurring in an evolving dynamic that encapsulates the four observed events. It was also suggested that the processes associated with this account could potentially be applied to other contexts although some revision would be required.

Indeed, the central hypothesis that increased collaboration and cooperation will lead to a reduction of the impact of threats to safety, order and event futures requires more development and testing through additional research. In addition, it must be noted that what has been presented over the last five chapters represents a *perspective*. As P.A.J Waddington (2000b) correctly argues, this is all that is logistically and realistically possible given the complexities associated with planning and staging *any* form of public event. Despite this, the empirical findings and subsequent analytic account do offer prospects for a greater understanding of contemporary public order policing. They also present the opportunity to identify relevant policy implications and this will be the focus of the final chapter.

# **Chapter Nine: Policy Implications and Thesis Conclusions**

## **1. Introduction**

The previous five chapters have addressed the majority of research aims as stated at the end of chapter two. This has culminated in exploring and understanding the public order policing of community-based events. The final research aim, to be addressed in this chapter, concerns the identification of good practice for both the police and organisers in respect of the type of events that formed the basis of the fieldwork. It also states that, where applicable, good practice should be identified for other public order contexts. As was highlighted in chapter three, an important component of the CASE PhD structure relates to generating relevant policy findings. The first part of the chapter will therefore focus on achieving this aim. To accomplish this, consideration is given specifically to the observed events. This is followed by the identification of ‘post-event’ policy that holds potential ramifications which originate from, but impact beyond, the observed events. Finally, consideration is given to how these policy implications might be relevant for other public order contexts. Interwoven with these policy implications are reflections on how and where future research might be conducted to develop the ideas presented throughout the thesis. The second part of the chapter represents the conclusion of the thesis. It will draw on the research aims and consider the subsequent findings and theorising from empirical analysis and policy implications. From this position it is possible to speculate on the prospects for contemporary and future public order policing.

## **2. Policy Implications: Planning and Staging Community-Based Events**

The most important policy implication to emerge from the findings of this thesis relates to the planning and staging phases associated with community-based events. One would echo Sexton (2003) in recommending that some form of legislation, possibly entitled ‘Public Event Management and Safety Act 200?’, is implemented that makes it a statutory requirement for event organisers to work with the police / council in addressing health and safety issues. The working format for conducting this important exercise already exists through the Safety

Advisory Group (SAG) (ACPO, 1999). Therefore, the format and principles associated with the SAG format should be a cornerstone of any such legislation. Before outlining the benefits of such legislation, it is relevant to draw on Walker (2000) in relation to police governance. As highlighted in chapter two, Walker (2000) argues that good governance should be both constraining and enabling. This principle should apply to any future event safety legislation. The ethos of partnership working and the aim of staging a safe and successful event are the key components that need distilling into potential legislation. Care would then need to be taken to ensure that this approach could be applied to a *diversity* of event contexts. For example, such legislation could impact on the small village fete which might possibly attract 500 people through to a pop concert / festival attracting over 100,000 people. Within this range there would also be different forms of religious / cultural festivals or events that bring their own dynamics and requirements. The balancing act lies in making sure that police, organisers and community organisers are aware of their responsibilities and the importance of health and safety whilst being encouraged to pursue creative approaches to tackling a multitude of potential circumstances (e.g. the role of the SCG in conjunction with the SPG at the observed Solstice).

The SAG format was utilised to good effect during the planning of the observed Pride. Taking this as a template, the local council should take the lead through a department which holds the remit for event planning. This is entirely logical as these personnel will have access to, and knowledge of, relevant policy and legislation that are requirements for staging a safe event. The nature of the event will dictate the police involvement. As a baseline, there must be police representation if they are to be involved in any aspect of staging the event. Beyond this, the police should respond creatively to the dynamics of the event. For example, it would be logical to include public order specialists if it is anticipated that there will be a large crowd and / or requirement for a considerable police presence as these personnel will again bring knowledge of relevant policy and legislation. In contrast, it might be more appropriate to involve a local community officer in the planning process for a relatively small event such as a village fete. Finally, if it is an event that is aimed at minority communities, it might be applicable for officers who are members of that community to become

involved at some juncture of the planning or staging (e.g. as the local Gay Police Association did at the observed Pride). With regards to the last option, it should be clearly ascertained that such officers would a) want to be involved and b) have a useful contribution to make (e.g. tactical advice on the policing). This should be stressed to discourage tokenism.

The emphasis is currently on the event organisers to be proactive in alerting the council to their planned event. This would remain the case in light of any future legislation. What is important from this perspective is that the right organisers are involved in the planning (and subsequent staging) process. The number and roles of organisers will be determined by the nature of the event but it is important that representatives who attend SAGs hold the capacity to make logistical and financial decisions that are relevant to event safety. The nature of the event will also reveal other organisers who should become involved in the process. For example, at a community event representatives from that community should be encouraged to participate. If it is a large event, representation from the other 'blue light' services (i.e. fire and ambulance) and private security should be involved. The list of possibilities is potentially endless: what is critical is that the *right* people are involved and that the SAG is *event specific*.

This collective and collaborative approach offers a number of potential benefits. Within the context of planning events, regular meetings can potentially increase cohesive decision-making: discrete occupational barriers will be broken down between the police and organisers if the shared aim is to stage a safe and orderly event. Each party is exposed to the 'cultural knowledge' of the other organisers and this can be pooled to create a 'collective habitus' of dictionary, directory, recipe and axiomatic knowledge. This facet of the planning process could be subject to future 'teacher-learner' oriented research (Pawson and Tilley, 1997). This approach would allow participants involved in the planning of events to reflect and expand on the meaning and nature of how the 'collective habitus' impacts on the effectiveness of their work. The empirical findings suggest that the 'collective habitus' is in turn related to the development of trust and consistency as personnel start to know each other's roles, expertise and rationale for being present during the planning stages. The culmination of these factors is flexibility:

the greater the 'collective habitus', the more enhanced the number of potential options to respond to any significant issue that threatens safety, order and / or the event future.

The observed Pride and Solstice highlighted that the processes present during the planning stage were incorporated into staging the event. The observed Pride offers additional good practice in relation to this. The collaborative and cooperative ethos of the SAG format transferred to a 'joint control strategy' that was utilised to stage the event. This strategy involved the same personnel who had participated in the planning. In the staging context, the group were again acting as a collective by holding regular meetings, and sharing a command location and communication. Although no threat emerged to safety or order at the observed Pride, this working arrangement promoted further trust, cohesion, and flexibility. By default, this also encouraged consistency because the same personnel were involved. Rather than being enshrined in legislation, the 'joint control strategy' should be recommended as relevant to the staging of large or complex events. It should be characterised as encompassing the same personnel that are involved in the planning, and event specific protocols should be developed (i.e. a shared communication strategy / a joint command post). The mechanisms for achieving this are available through the 'metallic hierarchy' (ACPO, 2001) and this might be employed by the organisers in addition to the police. The police and organisers of smaller / less complex events should be aware of this joint control strategy but circumstances might deem it unnecessary (e.g. if the event requires minimal police / organiser input).

The key to achieving this level of good practice lies in effective dissemination. Jefferson (1990, p144) argues that 'trouble-free' public order policing requires 'an open, participatory, reflexive and above all *experimental* approach to all practices'. This advice can be applied to organising and staging safe and orderly public events. Whilst relevant advice is available in the public domain (e.g. HSE, 1999; ACPO, 2001), it would be of benefit to *all* police and organisers to establish a centralised and easily accessible resource which can guide the planning and staging of safe events. Individual councils offer varying levels of advice but it would make more sense to adopt a centralised approach through the development

of an internet site. Such a site could list the contents of the 'purple guide' (HSE, 1999) and the rationale behind the SAG process. A message board could also be created which would allow event organisers to share and consult with regards to advice and experience from around the country. Another possibility concerns rewarding good practice. This could be achieved by following the template associated with the 'Tilley Award'<sup>1</sup> with SAG / planning groups submitting how they overcame problems and successfully managed an event. These submissions could then be evaluated by the Health and Safety Executive and / or ACPO and the winning entry would be rewarded: a suitable prize might be a small funding contribution towards the planning and staging of any future event. This process would also allow for the development and further dissemination of good practice.

In retrospect, the formalisation of the SAG process and wider access to event planning guidance could have minimised some of the difficulties associated with the Mela and Solstice. For example, an accessible resource such as that mentioned above would have avoided the problems concerning steward numbers at the Mela. At the observed Solstice, closer collaboration and cooperation between the police and organisers – which is advocated through a joint control strategy – would have facilitated better communication between the police and organisers (i.e. through a shared communication strategy). Outlining these benefits demonstrates that the SAG / Joint Control Strategy should be encouraged for large events and considered by smaller events. The next task is to focus specifically on how the empirical findings might enhance the *policing* at these types of events.

A common theme across all the observed events was the utilisation of 'low-key' policing styles that operated under the 'metallic hierarchy' principle. A consistent finding was that the chosen policing styles, which incorporate strategy and tactics, were appreciated by the organisers and community organisers. In this respect, each policing operation matched the nature and requirements of the four observed events. The function of the police at the observed events included a mixture of patrolling and minor traffic / crowd management duties. At the larger events (i.e. Solstice and Pride), these roles were supplemented by specialist officers (e.g.

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<sup>1</sup> This was established to reward good practice in relation to problem oriented policing. See <http://www.crimereduction.gov.uk/awards.htm#tilley> for further details.



traffic) but the consistent trend was one of low, if any at all, arrest rates. There were opportunities for the police to make arrests (e.g. drug taking at Solstice and Pride) but this was avoided. This echoes P.A.J Waddington's (1996) observation that, in a public order context, the police will be inclined against making arrests to avoid the possibility of antagonising the crowd. This is relevant to Pride and Solstice where the event history embodies previous tensions between the police and the event attendees. The findings would support the principles advocated by Reicher *et al* (2004) that the right policing style (i.e. incorporating negotiation / interaction) will develop trust between the police and a crowd and effectively *enable* it to police itself.

The policing style will be dictated by the nature and scale of an event but it must be developed prior to the staging of an event and involve consultation with the organisers and community organisers. By accessing the collective habitus, there is a greater chance that the police will be aware of particular nuances and sensitivities which can be incorporated into the policing style. Had this been achieved at the Pride prior to the observed event, it is likely that community organisers could have warned of the tensions that overt filming of the crowd would create. To echo Jefferson (1990) again, there is no barrier to *experimenting* with elements of the policing strategy / tactics provided there is consultation during the planning stages. For example, the main police liaison at the observed Pride could not identify a reason for taking the 'traditional' approach of having the parade led by a police van. Instead, the decision was taken to lead with a police car driven by officers from the local Gay Police Association who openly displayed a Pride flag. Demonstrating that the policing was going to be different compared to the previous year represented the logic behind this decision. As with compiling good practice in relation to SAG / Joint Control Strategies, any evidence of effective *experimentation* should be widely available and accessible for consultation. This could be achieved through liaison between the Public Order Unit within the NCOF and forces across the country.

The empirical findings also present an opportunity to comment on the nature of the police command structures at the observed events. There was adherence to the 'metallic hierarchy' at Solstice and Pride with designated and operational Gold,

Silver and Bronze commanders. This is not surprising given that this is an established method for policing across a number of different contexts in addition to large public order operations (e.g. major incidents) (ACPO, 2001). This structure existed at Mela but only a bronze commander was operational: there were 'silver' and 'gold' commanders but they were 'on-call' and not consulted or needed during the staging of the event. There was no metallic command structure at the Multicultural Festival.

The first point to make is that this command structure is not needed for *every* public event that involves the police. If an event is small in nature and police involvement is minimal, patrolling officers can be briefed accordingly to their roles and responsibilities. However, it is important that officers are aware of contingency plans and procedures should a major incident occur if there is no explicit metallic command structure at an event. The events which did operate the metallic hierarchy did not exhibit problems associated with 'arcing' such as, for example, the gold commander making tactical decisions after consultation with bronze and effectively leaving silver out of 'the loop' (P.A.J Waddington, 1991). The system worked most effectively at Pride where the gold devised the 'policing plan' for the event and silver implemented it off-site. Supplementing this were two bronze commanders: one held responsibility for policing the parade whilst the other directed the operation at the park. The only problem to arise from this arrangement concerned the role of the bronze commander at the parade. It was decided that this bronze commander would work closely with the parade director (one of the community organisers) as part of the joint control strategy. At the last PPG meeting, a 'table-top' exercise was conducted to run through hypothetical situations that could arise and all the commanders bar this bronze attended. Therefore, on the day of the parade, the director and corresponding bronze did not know each other and this exacerbated a problem with regards to managing the parade effectively (see chapter seven for more details).

The key issue here relates to communication. Within a joint control strategy, it would be beneficial to all parties if the police commanders meet the organisers / community organisers prior to the staging of the event. The table-top exercise offers an ideal opportunity to achieve this and it can potentially increase cohesive

decision-making if the organisers / police commanders are due to work closely with each other. Even when a joint control strategy is not utilised, it would again be beneficial if the police commanders meet the organisers prior to the event as it at least increases familiarity in relation to roles and responsibilities.

Communication also represented an important factor in the policing operation at the observed Solstice. The command strategy employed a gold and silver who were based off-site (silver command) but an additional silver was present on-site (silver control). As chapter seven documented, this created problems for the bronze commanders as they did not know which silver they should be communicating with as the operation unfolded. Therefore, if two silvers are to be used at an event the distinction between the two should be explicit and communicated through the briefing process. This also relates to *any* modification away from the tradition of one gold and one silver commander for the policing of public order. In contrast, the officers at the observed Mela were clear about the command arrangements as this was clearly communicated to them via the briefing process.

The problems of communication at the observed Solstice were also compounded as a) radios did not work on the site and b) there was no joint communication strategy. Although silver control was aware of the actions of security / organisers, bronze commanders were at times left unsure as to what was happening. For example, if an ambulance came onto the site there was no immediate method to establish if it was attending an incident which required police assistance. The bronze commanders had to decide which silver they needed to contact and then try and ascertain communication through mobile phones. The same problem was also evident for private security personnel and other organisers (hence the *partial* joint control distinction in comparison to Pride). Regardless of the size or nature of the event, it is recommended that the police / organisers develop a shared system of communication. This could take the form of a joint control strategy at a large event or simply be the sharing of communication devices (e.g. radios) at smaller events. This would increase the ability to share and act on information as the event progresses and minimise confusion and the potential impact of any incidents.

The main priority for organisers and community organisers is to stage a successful event. Within this remit there will be discussion of health and safety issues and the planning process should act as an interface to relate these to the police. Translating these efforts into the staging phase of an event again relies on effective communication. The most obvious conduit for this is the briefing process. This presents an opportunity for *all* personnel involved in the staging of an event to be made aware of the relevant processes (e.g. the aim of an event, the roles of the police and organisers, the communication strategy). The key organisers / community organisers involved in the planning stages must contribute to this process. This will ensure that the work conducted during the planning stages is communicated to personnel who have not been privy to this process. The aim of such an exercise is to minimise ambiguity and promote cohesion (i.e. everybody knows their own role and responsibility *and* those of others).

Of relevance to policing the event is the function of private security / stewards. These were a component at all the observed events and had an important role in order maintenance and elements of crime prevention (see chapter six). The briefing should emphasise how these personnel will work with any police involvement at an event. It has been noted that these personnel represent evidence of the contemporary pluralisation of policing (Loader, 2000) and their presence during the staging of an event will impact on the policing operation. The decision to be made during the planning process relates to the extent that private security / stewards should be used at an event. This issue may be forced by logistical considerations. For example, it could be cheaper to employ private security / stewards compared to police officers (the next section will cover the issue of cost in more detail). This could be an attractive option in light of recent legislation that requires private security personnel to be licensed which ensures a baseline and standardised level of competence in relation to criminal and civil law, communication skills and conflict management.<sup>2</sup> However, it is important to note that this legislation does not apply to unpaid (i.e. volunteer) stewards.

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<sup>2</sup> See SIA (2005) for further information.

The task facing organisers concerns clarifying the number and roles of private security / stewards for an event. In relation to numbers, guidance exists through the 'purple guide' (HSE, 1999) although role definition will rely on the discretion of the organisers and the capabilities of any private security firm that they employ. A benefit of these personnel is that they are potentially more approachable for event attendees compared to the police. This was highlighted in chapter seven in relation to the observed Pride and this is not surprising given the problems associated with the policing during the previous year. Private security / stewards could therefore represent an important interface in interacting with a crowd which, as Reicher *et al* (2004) argue, could *enable* the crowd to police itself. In terms of role definition, stewards could be employed to provide information whilst private security might have a more proactive order maintenance / crime prevention role (e.g. managing crowd flow, confiscating drugs). Whatever form this component of an event takes, it is important these personnel are aware of their roles and where they fit within an overall staging strategy. This in turn can be transmitted through the briefing process and a joint control strategy would enhance communication between these personnel and the police / other organisers. As with approaches to planning and the police input into staging events, experimentation (e.g. such as the use of 'peace' stewards at the observed Solstice) and good practice must be both encouraged and disseminated.

There is also a proactive role for community organisers in contributing to the policing of an event. At the observed Pride, a member of the local LGBT community attended the table-top exercise and then acted as an advisor to the silver commander during the staging of the parade and celebration on the park. This situation occurred in response to the policing problems experienced during the previous event. The rationale behind this position was simple: this individual could advise and inform the silver commander on aspects of the policing operation as it progressed and relate any concerns over sensitivity. The police would at least have been aware of the potential consequences of overt filming had such a position been adopted at the previous Pride.

The position of a community advisor in this capacity would be analogous to that of a public order trained tactical advisor who accompanies commanders during the

policing of event (ACPO, 2001; NCOF, 2002). Each commander at Solstice and Pride had access to a public order trained tactical (or ‘tac’) advisor although their advice was not required due to the ultimately safe and orderly nature of the observed events. A community advisor could therefore usefully supplement the policing operation at the silver level, especially if there is a history of tension between the police and the wider community. If an event is focussed on a minority community, this role could be filled by an officer who is knowledgeable about that community (e.g. from the Gay Police Association, the Black Police Association etc) or a relevant community organiser. It is important that such an individual has some involvement in the planning process so that they are familiar with the aim and logistics associated with the event. Although acting in an advisory capacity, it would also be desirable that the inputs of a community advisor are noted in the command log for the purposes of auditing (ACPO, 2001).

The final aspect of good practice that arises in the planning and staging processes concerns the debriefing process. This exercise was conducted at all the observed events and presents an opportunity for the participants to reflect on what had gone well and identify areas for improvement. For example, it was acknowledged at Pride that there would have to be contact between the parade director and his bronze counterpart at any future event. At Solstice, it was acknowledged that the communication strategy would require revising in light of the problems that were experienced. The observed Mela presented the opportunity to consider the *consequences* of this process: it was identified that the focus of the event had to change and that a wider number of organisers from the community and other agencies were required to a) plan for a bigger event and b) take the emphasis away from certain community organisers with party political agendas. This culminated in a re-drafted constitution and the emergence of the concept of the Multicultural Festival.

The nature of the feedback from the debriefing process will take many forms depending on what has occurred. If an event is successful, the feedback might focus on relatively minor logistical concerns (e.g. car park opening times). If there are problems, the debriefing offers the most effective method of noting them and marks the start of attempts to resolve them. In terms of good practice, this process

should involve all the key personnel who are involved in the planning and staging phases of an event. It should also ideally be conducted as soon as possible after the staging of the event. Related to this process are 'handover' procedures: if a key member is not to be involved in the planning or staging of future events, it is important that their replacement is briefed prior to them engaging with future planning and / or staging. This applies to the police, organisers and community organisers. The processes of debriefing and 'handover' should form an important component of the planning and staging of any event, especially if it is to be repeated in the future.

This section has identified potential avenues of good practice that are associated with the planning and staging of community-based events. The key recommendation from this exercise relates to the instigation of the Safety Advisory Group at a statutory level. It is crucial that the police, organisers and community organisers meet to identify and plan for any health and safety concerns. The continuation of close working through a joint control strategy at the staging of an event also offers potential benefits to ensuring order and safety. This could be effectively instigated at large and / or complex events that require a large number of personnel to stage them. Experimentation should be encouraged in relation to these approaches to successfully cater for the diverse forms that events can take. Effective communication is also an important factor in minimising the impact of any issues that arise during the planning and staging process. Finally, debriefing and, where relevant, 'handover' processes are important to allow for the identification of issues that require addressing before the planning and staging of any future event. The outcomes associated with the above should also be disseminated to a wider audience so that other event planners can learn from good practice / problem resolution. If these policy recommendations are implemented in respect of community-based events then the prospects for safety and order can only be enhanced.

Before exploring 'post-event' policy implications, it is pertinent to address the opportunities for further research. A flaw in this research concerns a lack of consideration in relation to canvassing the opinions of the actual *communities* that the four observed events were aimed at. This is an important area which requires

further investigation, especially in relation to representation.<sup>3</sup> The community organisers involved in the planning and staging of Pride were also members of an elected LGBT committee so were in a position to take onboard the views of the local LGBT community. At Solstice, the community members were not elected on behalf of any specific community although they represented the perspective of pagans and druids. Importantly, any member from these communities could partake in the SCG if they wished. The community organisers were a problematic aspect of the observed Mela as it was perceived they were using the event for their own party political purposes. This was remedied to an extent by the election of new community organisers to the MFPG who were active amongst the local Asian community. However, it was acknowledged after the staging of the Multicultural Festival that greater effort would be required in recruiting more community organisers to ensure greater representation of the local community.

Future research could assess the extent to which the views and actions of community organisers actually reflect the community that the events are aimed at. Jones and Newburn (2001) argue that 'community leaders', who are often consulted by the police, do not necessarily reflect the views of their community. Future research could therefore ascertain whether this is a valid concern in relation to community organisers. The perspective of the wider (e.g. resident and business) community should also be addressed as they may hold no interest in an event but they could be affected by it (e.g. parking regulations). These perspectives could illuminate accountability issues such as those noted by Barton and James (2003). Such future research could also lead to the generation of further good practice guidelines that enhance the prospect of order and safety at community-based events.

### **3. 'Beyond the Event' Policy Implications**

The planning and staging of community-based events also present policy implications that go 'beyond the event'. The best example of this concerns the observed Pride where the policing strategy was aimed at both ensuring safety and

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<sup>3</sup> This could be achieved by canvassing the views of event attendees through qualitative and / or quantitative techniques.



order *and* rebuilding damaged trust and links with the resident LGBT community. This occurred out of necessity due to the consequences of the policing strategy from the previous year. This example raises two important issues that will be explored in this section. Firstly, it must be acknowledged that the policing at these types of events can have wide-ranging consequences beyond the event. This marks a subtle but important difference between the policing of community-based events and the policing of protest. A protest event could focus on a location (e.g. central London) with protestors attending from all over the country. The event would be policed and the crowd will disperse thus effectively marking the end of police / crowd contact. Whilst this dynamic occurs to an extent during a community-based event (i.e. event attendees come from around the country / world), the police could come into future contact with locally based attendees in different policing contexts. From the empirical research findings, this was particularly the case for Pride, Mela and the Multicultural Festival. This then raises the second issue of how the police can use the event as an opportunity to connect more widely with the community and improve the delivery of their service. In addition, the procedures and practices associated with the observed events also hold policy implications for different policing contexts.

An important factor that organisers need to consider in relation to staging an event is the potential cost of the policing. Although the policing at the observed events was free, this is an important aspect of the staging process that is set to change. ACPO (2005) provides policy guidance to chief officers in relation to the levels of charging that should be applied to policing an event and the intention is that all forces will adopt this policy by 2008. A decision matrix is supplied to assist chief officers in deciding when to apply charges. For example, all policing costs should be recovered from a commercial event such as a music festival or sporting occasion. 50% of costs should be recovered from a community or charitable events whilst no charge should be applied to 'de minimus' (i.e. minimal impact) events. A 'de minimus' must demonstrate two characteristics: it should not be commercial in nature or require more than 24 policing hours (however deployed) in total (ACPO, 2005). Crucially, ACPO (2005) acknowledge that a chief officer (or BCU commander in the context of 'de minimus' events) may use their

discretion in deciding when to apply charges although a 'decision matrix' is provided to assist in this matter.

One factor that chief officers / BCU commanders may want to consider in respect of charging is the benefits that an event may hold for the police. Any potential benefits should be viewed in the context of the National Policing Plan (Home Office, 2004) which states that the police must reduce overall crime and provide a 'citizen focussed' service. The mechanisms for achieving this can be located in 'proactive' policing strategies. Examples of such strategies include community policing, intelligence-led policing, problem oriented policing and zero tolerance policing (Johnston 2000; Tilley, 2003). With regards to intelligence-led policing, the National Intelligence Model (NIM) has been adopted by all forces (Home Office, 2004). A potential benefit of policing an event is that it can generate new and useful intelligence. This could be acquired from either the planning or staging phase and may take many forms. John and Maguire (2004) argue that the lack of input from partner agencies hinders the effective implementation of NIM. Working closely with organisers / community organisers therefore presents an opportunity to address this gap and gain a wider perspective for intelligence purposes.

Potentially of greater significance are the reassurance benefits that may arise from the policing of a community event. For example, the police at the observed Pride acknowledged that the event presented an opportunity to develop trust and closer links with the resident LGBT community. The methods for promoting reassurance policing are based on the concept of 'signal crimes' (Innes and Fielding, 2002) and are currently being evaluated.<sup>4</sup> These methods include identifying and addressing crime and disorder issues that are most pertinent to a community with the net result of reducing crime and increasing public confidence. The process of working with organisers and community organisers can alert the police to potential 'reassurance gaps' (e.g. the identification of hate crime as an issue). In addition, community events may present an opportunity to promote public confidence through high visibility policing and / or the dissemination of relevant

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<sup>4</sup> Results from this evaluation are due in December 2005. See the National Reassurance Policing Project for further information ([www.reassurancepolicing.co.uk](http://www.reassurancepolicing.co.uk)).

information (this could range from the distribution of literature concerning local police policy through to specific police recruitment stalls).

The opportunities will vary according to the nature and form of an event but it is important that the police consider what 'beyond event' intelligence / reassurance benefits may arise from the planning and staging processes. The fiscal cost of policing services should be considered in light of these potential benefits. A case could be made to lower costs if it is judged that intelligence / reassurance benefits may be considerable to the police. To assist this process, future research could attempt to track and evaluate the extent to which the police gain additional benefits from the planning and staging of community-based events. Again, this may generate additional good practice that could be disseminated to a wider audience. It is also important to acknowledge that community events may provide benefits to a community that go beyond the planning and staging process. The Mela and Multicultural Festival were identified by organisers and community organisers as potentially enhancing community cohesion. Festivals are recognised as a possible way of promoting understanding and cooperation in diverse communities (Community Cohesion Unit, 2002) and future research could contribute to evaluating any wider positive impacts in respect of this.

The planning and staging of community events also presents benefits for other policing contexts. Community-based events such as Pride and the Multicultural Festival offer the potential to promote recruitment opportunities for regular and special constabulary police positions, and Police Community Support Officer (PCSO) posts. In addition, the police liaison at the observed Solstice recognised that the rationale behind engagement with community organisers at this event could be applied to partnership working with other communities (e.g. the traveller community). The ethos of consultation and cooperation that has been identified as a key factor in successful event planning could therefore be applied to other contexts, for example engaging with 'hard to reach' groups (Jones and Newburn, 2001), with positive benefits. These processes might also help partnership working in the context of crime reduction and community safety. Although the aims are different (i.e. three year strategies, as opposed to staging an event), genuine consultation and cooperation could help build trust and foster more

effective partnership working between different agencies. This would help avoid 'structural conflict' (i.e. the different occupational ethos and cultures) that is evident in the multi-agency crime reduction and community safety context (Crawford, 1997, 1998).

This section has identified how the police might identify 'beyond the event' benefits. This is an area that requires more research to ascertain the extent to which intelligence / reassurance benefits can be identified and implemented in different contexts. Further research could also assess whether the techniques associated with planning and staging successful events are applied to other contexts (e.g. crime reduction and community safety partnership working). As with the previous section, any good practice that is identified in respect of these areas should be widely disseminated to aid and improve both the policing of community events and other policing contexts.

#### **4. Policy Implications for Other Public Order Contexts**

Yin (2003) suggests that care should be taken in making generalisations from a small set of case studies. When this is coupled with the fact that this research represents a 'perspective' (P.A.J Waddington, 2000b) on the policing of community-based events, caution should be taken in applying the empirical findings to other public order contexts. The lack of *contention* is an important factor underlying the planning and staging of the observed events. However, there are some general considerations that may be relevant to both the policing of protest / industrial disputes and community disorder which this section will present.

P.A.J Waddington (2001, p7) argues that 'the aim of public order policing should lie in the avoidance of confrontation, rather than winning any confrontation that might arise.' In this respect, the ethos of partnership working prior to the staging of protest / industrial disputes is important. This process is extensively documented by P.A.J Waddington (1994a) and the findings from this research broadly support his view that negotiation and compromise are key elements in enhancing the prospect for order. The obvious policy implication from this

research is that this process can be further enhanced if the police / protestors can work effectively and closely prior to an event. This process may culminate in a collective aim to plan and ultimately stage a safe and orderly event. It could be more difficult to engage with protestors if their particular cause is contentious. Jefferson's (1990) assertion that *experimentation* should be an element of public order policing policy is relevant in this case. For example, the police liaison and community organisers at Solstice engaged with potential protestors through the internet. From the police perspective, some form of engagement was deemed better than none at all. If it is difficult to contact / work with protestors in person, then dialogue through the internet possibly offers an option to break down barriers. Whatever the context, the police should be proactive in trying to pursue engagement with protestors prior to the event. The work done during planning will ultimately help in avoiding 'in-the-job' and 'on-the-job' forms of trouble (P.A.J Waddington, 1994a).

With regards to the actual policing of protest / industrial disputes, the findings from this research would echo the perspective of Reicher *et al* (2004). In sum, interaction and engagement with the crowd should be the aim of the police and disciplinarian and controlling tactics should be avoided whenever possible. Even in a relatively non-contentious context, the implications of adopting the wrong strategy and tactics (i.e. at the Pride prior to the observed event) can have negative and wide-ranging consequences. This could be amplified in relation to the policing of contention. The empirical findings from the four observed events would suggest that the policing of a protest / industrial disputes can be aided by the involvement of protestors during the planning and staging phases. For example, protestors, stewards and / or private security could be implemented into a joint control strategy (e.g. a member from the protesting body working alongside bronze commanders). Even though some circumstances might dictate that this is not possible, this option should at least be explored in relation to the policing of protest / industrial disputes as this thesis suggests that this process improves the prospects for safety and order.

The empirical findings from this thesis also present avenues for minimising the impact of community disorder. Firstly, the identification of potential community

tension is enhanced if the intelligence / reassurance possibilities are realised during the planning and staging of an event. If the event history / context suggest that wider tensions are possible between the police and relevant community then proactive steps can be taken to address these during an event (e.g. information provision etc). Again, experimentation is important and the number of options will be increased if the organisers and community organisers are involved in this process. A second avenue arises from the contacts made with community organisers during the planning and staging of events. The NCOF (2002) state that effective community consultation represents a key component in minimising community disorder and community organisers may present wider consultation opportunities to achieve this aim. In the worst case scenario of having to manage community disorder, these community organisers may also represent important links that can be utilised in attempts to minimise disorder (e.g. advising police strategy, communicating with crowds). To assess whether these recommendations for the policing of protest / industrial disputes and community disorder have any positive impact requires future research that focuses specifically on these contexts.

The previous three sections have outlined the policy implications arising from this thesis that can enhance safety and order at community events. The key theme for good practice centres on close and consistent working relationships between the police and organisers / community organisers during the planning and staging process. Therefore, an 'ideal' method for achieving this would consist of the following elements:

- The utilisation of a Safety Advisory Group during the planning phase to identify relevant health and safety issues. Ideally this would become a statutory requirement for event planning;
- The employment of a joint control strategy during the staging of an event. Embedded within this approach is a briefing procedure, the establishment of clear lines of communication, and a shared command and control location;
- A debriefing process to identify any issues arising from the planning and staging of an event. If key personnel are not to be involved in future

events, they should ensure that a 'handover' occurs to pass on their knowledge and experience.

To supplement this method there should also be identification of potential 'beyond the event' benefits; dissemination of good practice and an accessible resource consisting of procedures / policies that the police and organisers can consult for advice. This 'ideal' method is not intended to be prescriptive as community events can take many forms and sizes. Therefore, experimentation should be encouraged as a response to this diversity of circumstances. However, this method does represent an ethos that should be acknowledged and explored by the police and organisers prior to the planning and staging of *any* community event, whatever the format. Likewise, this method might also be explored by the police in relation to other public order contexts. To conclude in relation to policy implications, future research represents the best approach to evaluating whether this method can impact to the benefit of the police, organisers / community organisers, and the wider community.

## **5. Thesis Conclusions**

This thesis has provided an empirical and theoretical 'perspective' on the public order policing of community-based events. The observed events presented a variety of challenges to the police and organisers but ultimately safety, order and the event future were secured at all of them. To understand *why* this should be the case, the planning and staging processes have been examined in detail. This has revealed a multitude of processes that represent contributory factors in enhancing the prospects for safety, order and the event future. At a macro level, the planning and staging is informed and guided by the event history / context. This reveals that, compared to other public order contexts, *contention* (P.A.J Waddington, 2003) is relatively absent. Instead, the focus for the police represents the maintenance of 'general' (i.e. the safety of event attendees), as opposed to more challenging and contested 'specific' forms of order (Walker, 2000).

At a meso and micro level, the planning and staging phases are dictated by the nature of the inputs and working relationship between the police and the

organisers / community organisers. At its most developed, these factors can culminate in an on-going collective ethos which is both generated and informed by close partnership working. The observed Pride event represented this approach and it was manifested through a Safety Advisory Group and joint control strategy during the planning and staging respectively. The benefits of this included the development of trust, cohesion, flexibility and consistency between all the individuals and agencies involved. These factors were also associated with the other observed events but were not evident to the same extent (e.g. the employment of partial joint and fragmented control strategies). Despite this, order and safety were maintained at these events although post-event reflection / feedback revealed a greater number of problematic issues arising from the planning and staging compared to Pride (e.g. the communication failings at Solstice). With regards to the research aims listed at the end of chapter two, these findings therefore provide valuable insight into the roles and inputs of the police and organisers at these types of events. This helps to partially address a missing perspective from the general literature on public order policing.

In respect of accounting for these findings in a theoretical context, existing public order related analytic perspectives provide a useful resource. Social movement theory may inform the shaping of an event context / history whilst the work of P.A.J Waddington (1994a) allows for an appreciation of the motivation of the police and organisers to avoid different forms of 'trouble'. Even those perspectives that are based in accounting for *disorder* provide insight. The 'flashpoint' model (D Waddington *et al*, 1987; D Waddington *et al*, 1989; D Waddington 1992) highlights the importance of considering the broader social, political and legal context that public order policing is practiced in whilst Jefferson (1990) presents a series of recommendations for 'de-amplifying' the impact of 'paramilitarism' that can be scrutinised and contrasted with the outcomes of public order policing.

However, an evaluation of these accounts also reveals a number of methodological and conceptual limitations, and this is characterised by debate on the ideological motivations of the proponent of each account (Jefferson, 1993; D Waddington; 1998, P.A.J Waddington, 1987, 1991, 1993, 2000b). To overcome



this, the work of Pierre Bourdieu was drawn upon with specific reference to the concepts of habitus and the field. From this it is possible to develop an analytical framework that appreciates, a) the involvement of the police *and* organisers, b) the impact of micro, meso and macro processes and, c) the ever-evolving circumstances that encapsulate the public order policing of community-based events. This framework suggests that *collective habitus* at the level of planning groups and event management strategies represents the key factor in enhancing the prospects for safety and order. The pool of cultural knowledge that forms the collective habitus is most potent when the police and organisers are working closely together (e.g. as demonstrated at the observed Pride). The concepts contained within this analytic account could be tested and further developed by future research on both the public order policing of community-based events and in other contexts.

A consequence and benefit of this analytic account is that it offers various good practice avenues. These have been subject to detailed discussion in this chapter but in summary the principle and mechanism of the SAG should be established on a statutory basis. Whatever the form of a public event, the joint control strategy should be explored as a method of managing the staging phase. There are also potential ‘beyond the event’ benefits that should be identified and addressed during the planning and staging. Finally, the principles of dissemination and experimentation should be encouraged. This could possibly be achieved through an internet resource that police and organisers can consult for examples of good practice and general event planning / staging advice. As with the presented analytic framework, these policy implications can be developed and fine-tuned through future research. In addition, such research could determine whether they are applicable to other public order contexts.

The arguments and ideas presented thus far in this set of conclusions address the research aims outlined at the end of chapter two. The final task of this thesis is to speculate on what these reveal in relation to the prospects for contemporary and future public order policing. Chapter one started with a quote bemoaning the lack of media interest in a large scale Mela held in Bradford during the summer of 2001. This thesis signifies an academic perspective on the mechanisms associated

with such events and offers an account explaining why they are characterised by order and safety. To re-work Reiner's (2000a) cycling analogy, it is hoped that the consideration of why 'the wheels stay on' in this public order context can enlighten and supplement the work that has been conducted in relation to the (more contentious) public order policing of political protest / industrial disputes and community disorder.

Further research into public order policing should be encouraged, whatever the context. From a contemporary perspective, Reiner (1998) is correct in linking the evolving nature of protest to the fragmentation and globalisation of society. The community disorder in Oldham, Burnley and Bradford during 2001 demonstrates that this particular phenomenon is not just a remnant of the 1980s. It is therefore a requirement for academia and practitioners to respond to these issues and aid the police in developing the most appropriate public order response. In addition, academics and practitioners should be proactive in identifying the nature of future public order concerns that result from, for example, the impacts of terrorism (P.A.J Waddington, 2003) or the pluralisation of policing (Loader, 2000). Although this thesis has less dramatic concerns, it demonstrates the need for a constant review of existing analytic accounts. The ethos of experimentation that Jefferson (1990) advocates in devising public order policy should be applied to those who wish to critique it. Such experimentation and subsequent revision in relation to *all* public order contexts offers the potential to inform and shape effective 21<sup>st</sup> century public order policing practice and policy.

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## **Glossary of Acronyms**

ACPO	Association of Chief Police Officers
APA	Association of Police Authorities
BPA	Black Police Association
CASE	Collaborative Award for Science and Engineering
EGT	Evidence Gathering Team
FIT	Forward Intelligence Team
GPA	Gay Police Association
HMIC	Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary
HSE	Health and Safety Executive
LGBT	Lesbian, Gay, Bi-sexual and Transgender
MFPG	Multicultural Festival Planning Group (See page 116 – 117 for details)
MPG	Mela Planning Group (See page 112 for details)
NCOF	National Crime and Operations Faculty
NCPE	National Centre for Policing Excellence
NIM	National Intelligence Model
NPOIU	National Public Order Intelligence Unit
PPG	Pride Planning Group (see page 106 for details)
PSU	Police Support Unit
SAG	Safety Advisory Group
SCG	Solstice Consultation Group (see page 97 for details)
SIA	Security Industry Authority
SPG	Solstice Planning Group (see page 97 for details)

**Appendix A: Interview Information and Consent Form**

RESEARCH TITLE: THE PUBLIC ORDER POLICING OF COMMUNITY-BASED  
EVENTS

The purpose of this form is to convey a little background information about the interview and to make sure that you are still happy to participate. It is anticipated that the interview will last no longer than 60 minutes. I would like to tape record the interview so that I do not miss anything you say. At any stage of the interview you can ask me to turn the tape recorder off or rewind the tape to erase anything you have said. Everything that you do say will be kept in confidence and will not be disclosed to anyone else. I will be publishing and presenting findings from my research and this may include extracts taken from your interview, along with others. It is important to point out that your identity will be kept anonymous and any details that may identify you will be excluded from any published / presented findings. You are also free to decline from answering any questions or stop the interview without having to give a reason for doing so.

If you wish, after I have transcribed the interview I will send you a copy along with a pre-paid self-addressed envelope that will enable you to review and remove / add to any of the comments you have made. If you request it, I will also provide you with a copy of the interview tape.

More information on my research can be found at:  
[www.geocities.com/francispikeuk/phdresearch.html](http://www.geocities.com/francispikeuk/phdresearch.html)

If you have any questions or queries about the interview or research, please feel free to contact me at:

E-mail: [f.pike@surrey.ac.uk](mailto:f.pike@surrey.ac.uk)  
Telephone: xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

If you are happy to proceed with the interview, please sign below and print your name. Signing this form does not affect your right to stop the interview at any point.

- I consent to being interviewed for the purpose of this research study
- I consent to the interview being tape-recorded
- I consent to my views and words being included in published or presented material provided that my identity is kept anonymous
- I understand that I can stop the interview at any stage and do not have to give a reason for doing so.

SIGNATURE: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

FULL NAME (BLOCK CAPITALS): \_\_\_\_\_